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Family Secrets and Relational Privacy: 
Protecting Not-So-Personal, Sensitive 
Information from Public Disclosure 
J. LYN ENTRIKIN* 
This Article seeks to map contemporary relational pri-
vacy issues in the context of the evolving “right of privacy” 
in the United States. Generally, the Article explains why the 
so-called “personal” right of informational privacy, what-
ever its legal foundations, cannot be realistically confined to 
an individual right given the dramatic scientific and techno-
logical developments in the twenty-first century. In particu-
lar, the Article proposes that both state and federal law must 
grapple with the inherently relational nature of privacy in-
terests with respect to DNA profiles, which inherently impli-
cate the privacy interests of one’s biological relatives, 
whether known or unknown. 
Part I summarizes the historical development of the right 
of privacy in the United States, as well as its relational as-
pects that predate recognition of the “personal” right of pri-
vacy. Part II explores the early recognition of the relational 
aspects of tortious invasion of privacy. Part III addresses the 
nature and scope of “personal privacy” interests expressly 
recognized in federal statutes regulating freedom of infor-
mation and privacy with respect to public records. Part IV 
explains the constitutional foundations of the American right 
of privacy, including the conceptual relationship between 
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informational privacy and autonomous decision-making pri-
vacy. Part V discusses relational privacy interests in the con-
text of DNA databanks, whether used for criminal investiga-
tions or genealogical research. The Article concludes by 
conceptualizing the ever-expanding American right of pri-
vacy to encompass at least close family members whose pri-
vacy may be implicated when sensitive information about a 
relative is at risk of public disclosure without family mem-
bers’ knowledge or consent.  
 
A rapidly developing technology is furnishing ever 
more effective means of invading privacy, and the sit-
uation has been viewed with increasing alarm.1 
[T]he most beautiful quality of law is that it is never 
finished.2 
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 1 Harry D. Krause, The Right to Privacy in Germany – Pointers for American 
Legislation?, 1965 DUKE L.J. 481, 481; see, e.g., David H. Kaye, The Genealogy 
Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial Searching”, 50 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 109, 163 (2013) (conceding that “a database of expanded profiles of con-
victed offenders used for full-match and near-miss [criminal investigation] trawls 
will cause anguish to family members when it links close relatives to crimes, and 
if and when it exposes genetic relationships (or their absence) . . . kept as family 
secrets”); Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 
109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 315–16 (2010) (discussing sensitive issues of family pri-
vacy surrounding the use of DNA databases for criminal investigations); see also 
Monica Rodriguez, You Discovered Your Genetic History. Is it Worth the Privacy 
Risk?, FORTUNE (Sept. 10, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://fortune.com/2018/09/10/ge-
netic-history-test-privacy-risk/. 
 2 Leon Green, Basic Concepts: Persons, Property, Relations, 24 A.B.A. J. 
65, 69 (1938) [hereinafter Green, Basic Concepts]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Members of a traditional family share a unique configuration of 
sub-cellular biological material known as deoxyribonucleic acid—
more commonly known as DNA—that provides modern technology 
a window into the most personal of family relationships and secrets.3 
For decades, law enforcement organizations have developed and 
maintained DNA databanks using samples taken from crime scenes, 
convicted felons, and even arrestees.4 More recently, commercial 
genealogy companies have heavily promoted the voluntary collec-
tion of saliva samples to locate close and distant relatives with sta-
tistically similar DNA profiles through a process called DNA 
matching.5 Law enforcement investigations have recently solved a 
 
 3 See Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Fact Sheet, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. 
INST., https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Deoxyribonucleic-
Acid-Fact-Sheet (last updated Nov. 13, 2019). 
 4  “The advent of DNA technology is one of the most significant scientific 
advancements of our era. The full potential for use of genetic markers in medicine 
and science is still being explored, but the utility of DNA identification in the 
criminal justice system is already undisputed.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 436, 
442, 461 (2013) (5-4 decision) (holding that routinely taking DNA cheek swabs 
from felony arrestees at booking and uploading results to state law enforcement 
DNA databases to assist in investigating cold cases do not qualify as an unreason-
able search for Fourth Amendment purposes because “the Court must give great 
weight both to the significant government interest at stake in the identification of 
arrestees and to the unmatched potential of DNA identification to serve that inter-
est.”).  
DNA was first used for law enforcement purposes in 1986 to prosecute a 
criminal case in England. Id. at 442 (citing JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
FORENSIC DNA TYPING 5 (2009)). In 2008, a routine DNA swab taken from a 
young man during a driving incident identified the driver as a close match with a 
DNA sample collected at the 1983 crime scene of a rape and murder. James 
Sturcke, Man Jailed for Life over 1983 Murder of Colette Aram, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
25, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jan/25/paul-hutchinson-jailed-
colette-aram. The arrest led investigators to identify the young man’s father as the 
perpetrator of the crime twenty-five years earlier. Id. The murderer pleaded guilty 
in 2009 but died in prison eight months later from a self-inflicted drug overdose. 
Colette Aram Murderer Paul Hutchinson Died from Overdose, BBC NEWS (Oct. 
25, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-15452142. 
 5 See, e.g., How It Works: It’s Just Saliva. No Blood. No Needles., 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/?vip=true (last visited March 10, 2020); 
see also Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877 (2015) 
[hereinafter Ram, DNA by the Entirety] (“DNA’s shared nature complicates the 
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number of “cold cases” using this type of “familial searching” in 
genealogy databases to locate relatives with shared DNA profiles6 
and by contacting those individuals to ask whether they have any 
relatives who might match the DNA collected from crime scenes.7 
 
usual individualistic rules that have characterized the law governing DNA.”); Na-
talie Ram, The U.S. May Soon Have a De Facto National DNA Database, SLATE 
(Mar. 19, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/national-dna-
database-law-enforcement-genetic-genealogy.html [hereinafter Ram, U.S. DNA 
Database] (“Since April 2018, law enforcement investigations stemming from 
DNA searches in consumer genetics databases have led to nearly three dozen ar-
rests. In every case, those ultimately arrested . . . were identified through partial 
matches between crime scene DNA samples and the genetic profiles of often-
distant relatives shared on consumer [genealogy] platforms . . . .”). 
 6 Familial Searching: What Is Familial Searching?, NAT’L INST. JUST., 
https://projects.nfstc.org/fse/13/13-0.html (last visited March 13, 2020). 
Familial searching is a process by which a DNA profile of in-
terest in a criminal case is searched against the database. If there 
are no direct matches, it is then searched again in an attempt to 
find DNA profiles that are similar to the profile of interest and 
could belong to a close relative of the person who left the DNA 
at the crime scene. There are two parts to the process. First, the 
software ranks candidate offender relatives in order of likeli-
hood that they are closely related to the person who left the 
DNA. There will always be an appreciable number of candi-
dates on this list. Next, all of the offender candidates’ samples 
are subjected to additional DNA typing, using existing Y-chro-
mosome testing. This testing can strongly establish the exist-
ence of a close familial relationship (typically father-son or 
brother-brother) between the person who left the evidence and 
the offender in the database. 
Id. 
 7 E.g., Hayley Compton & Caroline Lowbridge, How Familial DNA 
Trapped a Murderer for the First Time, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-45561514 (describing 
an early use of “familial DNA searching” to locate close relatives of a rapist and 
murderer in England and reporting that the technique was first used in 2002 by a 
team led by Frances Bates to solve a manslaughter case); Camila Domonoske, 
Suspect in Decade-Old Serial Rapes Arrested, with Help of Genealogy Database, 
NPR (Aug. 23, 2018, 11:54 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/23/641208167/ 
suspect-in-decade-old-serial-rapes-arrested-with-help-of-to-genealogy-database 
(explaining how law enforcement solved the cold case of the “Ramsey Street Rap-
ist” in Fayetteville, North Carolina); Laurel Wamsley, In Hunt for Golden State 
Killer, Investigators Uploaded His DNA to Genealogy Site, NPR (Apr. 27, 2018, 
7:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/27/606624218/in-
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What legal rights, if any, does a person have after voluntarily 
contributing DNA to a commercial or noncommercial database? 
Can the contributor prevent law enforcement from using DNA col-
lected after an arrest if the arrestee is later exonerated?8 Does a 
 
hunt-for-golden-state-killer-investigators-uploaded-his-dna-to-genealogy-site 
(describing how investigators identified the “Golden State Killer” in California 
using familial DNA searching on GEDmatch, a website inviting voluntary contri-
butions of DNA samples). The Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for GED-
match, now owned and operated by Verogen, Inc., display the following state-
ment: 
 While the results presented on this Site are intended solely 
for genealogical research, we are unable to guarantee that users 
will not find other uses, including both current and new gene-
alogical and non-genealogical uses. For example, some of these 
possible uses of Raw Data, personal information, and/or Gene-
alogy Data by any registered user of GEDmatch include but are 
not limited to . . . [f]amilial searching by third parties such as 
law enforcement agencies to identify the perpetrator of a crime, 
or to identify remains.  
 You understand that future genealogical and non-genealog-
ical uses may be developed, including uses that GEDmatch can-
not predict or foresee. If you find any of these current or future 
uses unacceptable, do not provide Raw Data to GEDmatch, and 
remove any of your Raw Data already provided to this Site. 
GEDmatch.com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, 
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2019) (emphasis 
added). Verogen, Inc. acquired the GEDmatch website on December 9, 2019. See 
Press Release, Verogen, Inc., Gedmatch Partners with Genomics Firm (Dec. 9, 
2019), https://verogen.com/gedmatch-partners-with-genomics-firm/; see also 
Nila Bala, We’re Entering a New Phase in Law Enforcement’s Use of Consumer 
Genetic Data, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technol-
ogy/2019/12/gedmatch-verogen-genetic-genealogy-law-enforcement.html 
(“With no legal regulations providing clarity on how and when genetic genealogy 
should be used to fight crime, we have left private entities in charge of the deci-
sion-making. And with Verogen taking over GEDmatch, we have new reasons to 
be concerned.”); Jennifer Lynch, Genetic Genealogy Company GEDmatch Ac-
quired by Company with Ties to FBI & Law Enforcement—Why You Should Be 
Worried, EFF (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/genetic-
genealogy-company-gedmatch-acquired-company-ties-fbi-law-enforcement-
why. 
 8 Cf. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 18–19 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is one thing to disclose the identities of targets who were 
eventually convicted in public proceedings; but the privacy calculus becomes in-
creasingly more significant if disclosure extends to those who were acquitted, or 
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contributor, for example, have any legal right to prevent the use of 
that information by law enforcement officials for genetic genealogy 
testing to identify close or distant relatives who may be suspected of 
perpetrating crimes?9 What about insurance companies, which 
might be interested in accessing commercial DNA databases to 
identify genetic markers that represent a heightened inherited risk 
for certain diseases, such as breast cancer and alcohol or drug addic-
tion?10 
This Article seeks to map these issues in the context of the “right 
of privacy” as it has developed in the United States. In particular, I 
propose that to address the privacy issues surrounding the use of 
DNA, the law should recognize the inherently relational nature of 
privacy interests with respect to DNA profiles.11 More generally, the 
Article explains why the so-called “personal” right of informational 
privacy, whatever its legal foundations, cannot be realistically con-
fined to the individual any longer. In fact, a handful of cases decided 
over the last two decades reflect a growing judicial awareness that 
privacy rights cannot be so narrowly cabined, especially given the 
dramatic scientific and technological developments in the twenty-
first century’s global community. 
Part I of this Article summarizes the historical development of 
the right of privacy in the United States, as well as its relational as-
pects that predate recognition of the “personal” right of privacy be-
ginning in the early twentieth century. Part II explores the early 
recognition of the relational aspects of tortious invasion of privacy 
 
to those whose activities were never the focus of public attention, such as un-
charged investigative subjects, witnesses, or bystanders.”). 
 9 See Domonoske, supra note 7 (referring to “genetic genealogy testing” as 
the process of “look[ing] for partial matches in DNA [that has] been uploaded to 
public genealogy sites by people looking to find relatives”); Rodriguez, supra 
note 1 (reporting on the results of one person’s efforts to track down her 
estranged father using genealogy databases).   
 10 See Michelle Andrews, Genetic Tests Can Hurt Your Chances of Getting 
Some Types of Insurance, NPR (Aug. 7, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/08/07/636026264/genetic-tests-
can-hurt-your-chances-of-getting-some-types-of-insurance; Fergus Walsh, DNA 
Test Reveals 80 Markers for Inherited Cancer Risk, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-21945812. 
 11 See Ram, DNA by the Entirety, supra note 5, at 898–906 (explaining sci-
entific reasons why DNA is “immutably and involuntarily” shared among biolog-
ical relatives). 
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as the cause of action developed beginning in the early years of the 
twentieth century. Part III addresses the nature and scope of “per-
sonal privacy” interests expressly recognized in federal freedom of 
information and privacy statutes. Part IV explains the constitutional 
foundations of the American right of privacy, including the loose 
(and somewhat overlapping) relationship between the two primary 
aspects of privacy interests: informational privacy and decisional 
privacy. Part IV also evaluates and critiques recent cases in the 
Ninth Circuit holding that relatives have a privacy right, grounded 
in substantive due process, to limit dissemination of sensitive infor-
mation that relates to the death of a loved one.12 Part V discusses 
relational privacy interests in the context of DNA databanks, 
whether used for criminal investigations or genealogical research. 
The Article concludes by summarizing the ever-expanding view of 
the American right of privacy to encompass at least close family 
members whose privacy may be implicated when sensitive infor-
mation about a relative is at risk of public disclosure or dissemina-
tion without knowledge or consent of family members.13  
 
 12 E.g., Marsh v. Cty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1157–60 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that while surviving mother had a substantive due process right to rela-
tional privacy supporting her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against county prosecutor 
for disclosing to the press an autopsy photo of her deceased toddler son, qualified 
immunity vindicated defendants because the constitutional right was not clearly 
established at the time of disclosure). 
 13 While some nations have expressly defined “sensitive information” in pri-
vacy statutes or regulations, U.S. law does not provide a general definition for that 
term. See, e.g., Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) pt II div 1 s 6 (Austl.) (defining “sensitive 
information” broadly to include genetic and biometric information); Data Protec-
tion Act 2018, c. 12, § 3 (Eng.) (defining terms consistent with the European Un-
ion’s General Data Protection Regulation); cf. Freedom of Information and Pro-
tection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c F.31 (Can.) (defining “personal infor-
mation”); Council Regulation 2016/679, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Move-
ment of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR] (discussing “personal data”). 
United States military law relating to government contracts narrowly defines 
“sensitive information” to mean “confidential commercial, financial, or proprie-
tary information, technical data, or other privileged information.” 
10 U.S.C. § 129d(b)(2) (2018); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2367(g) (defining “sensitive 
information”); 38 U.S.C. § 5727(19) (2018) (defining “sensitive personal 
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I. AMERICAN RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND RELATED “QUASI-
PROPERTY” INTERESTS 
With few exceptions, civil liability for invasion of privacy in the 
United States has traditionally focused on the interests of the indi-
vidual.14 In 1890, Samuel Warren and future Supreme Court justice 
Louis Brandeis urged courts to openly recognize an individual’s 
“right to be let alone”15 in what would become one of the most 
 
information” for purposes of veterans’ benefits); cf. Perkey v. Dep’t of Motor Ve-
hicles, 721 P.2d 50, 61 (Cal. 1986) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (describing “personal 
and sensitive” information). 
Individuals are constantly faced with requests for personal and 
sensitive information from a wide variety of government agen-
cies and private organizations. In many cases, this information 
is essential to the provision of needed services . . . . The collec-
tion and storage of fragmentary bits of information and their use 
for narrowly specified purposes do not necessarily pose a seri-
ous threat to individual privacy, provided there are adequate 
safeguards against misuse and unwarranted disclosure. 
Id.  
      The federal Freedom of Information Act does not define “sensitive infor-
mation” but does define “record” to mean “any item, collection, or grouping of 
information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but 
not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal 
or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, 
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger 
or voice print or a photograph . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (2018) (emphasis 
added). 
 14 See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information 
Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (“[I]nformation privacy legislation in the 
United States has placed heavy reliance on individuals policing their own data 
records and protecting their own information from unintended use.”); Neil M. 
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Con-
fidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 127 (2007) (“American privacy law has centered 
around the individual’s inviolate personality . . . .”); cf. Tiffany R. Jones & Larry 
Peterman, Whither the Family and Family Privacy?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 193, 
201 (1999) (making the case that “recent thinking, especially as it is reflected in 
court decisions, diminishes [the historical focus of American thought on] family 
distinction and privacy, preferring instead individualized conceptions of pri-
vacy”). 
 15 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 197 (1890) (considering whether existing law afforded “a principle 
which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it 
does, what the nature and extent of such protection is”) (emphasis added). 
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influential American law review articles of all time.16 They inven-
toried early cases that tentatively marked the boundaries of a per-
sonal right to control dissemination of private information and im-
ages.17 
Beginning soon after the turn of the twentieth century, states one 
by one started recognizing a private tort action to vindicate inten-
tional invasions of personal privacy.18 Some states enacted stat-
utes.19 Most addressed the issue by judicial declaration.20 The per-
sonal right of privacy began as a matter of state law and developed 
 
 16 See, e.g., SAMANTHA BARBAS, NEWSWORTHY: THE SUPREME COURT 
BATTLE OVER PRIVACY AND PRESS FREEDOM 64 (2017) (referring to the Warren 
and Brandeis article as a “legal landmark”); Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of 
the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1, 3 (1979) (crediting Warren and 
Brandeis with having invented “a categorical description of the right to privacy”). 
 17 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 207–11. 
 18 See Kyle Sammin, Honor and Dignity: The Common Law of Privacy, 
North and South, 1890-1967, 23 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 93, 97–107 (2015). 
 19 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (Consol. 1909) (originally en-
acted 1903). 
 20 See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91–92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); 
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68 (Ga. 1905); Kunz v. Allen, 
172 P. 532, 532–33 (Kan. 1918). Professor Thomas Cooley has been credited with 
coining the term “the right to be let alone.” E.g., Glancy, supra note 16, at 3 n.13; 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195 n.4. However, Cooley used the term in 
a very different sense analogous to individual liberty. Among several classifica-
tions of rights, he referred to the right of “personal immunity” as “the right to be 
let alone.” THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE 
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (Callaghan & Co. 1879). 
That right, he explained, was a corollary of one’s duty to refrain from injuring (or 
attempting to injure) anyone else. Id.; cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2599–602 (2015) (grounding same-sex couples’ fundamental constitutional right 
to marry in part on the “individual autonomy” protection of the Due Process 
Clause, while explaining that “decisions concerning marriage are among the most 
intimate that an individual can make” and referring to the constitutional right “to 
enjoy intimate association,” to family relationships and autonomy as “a central 
part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,” and to “the right of same-
sex couples to marry [as] part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment”) (citations omitted); ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST 
WE HIDE? 9–11 (2011) (arguing that a nation that prizes personal liberty must 
impose mandatory privacy protections, whether or not the general citizenry de-
sires them). 
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incrementally in jumps and starts.21 And the nature and scope of pri-
vacy rights varied substantially from one state to the next, although 
invasion of privacy has always been categorized as an intentional 
tort.22 By 1957, one jurist described the still-developing right of pri-
vacy as “a haystack in a hurricane,”23 calling to mind the familiar 
English idiom “tempest in a teapot.”24 
A. Disposition of Human Remains 
With respect to privacy issues surrounding the death of a loved 
one, courts in the nineteenth-century United States began acknowl-
edging the special interests and emotional vulnerability of a dece-
dent’s next of kin.25 This trend reflected a significant departure from 
 
 21 One author writing in the early 1930s declined to speculate “what the scope 
of the right to privacy should be, or to discuss the various necessary limitations 
involved in the recognition of a right of such a vague nature as freedom from the 
publication of one’s features, doings or personal history.” S. G. P., Torts: The 
Right to Privacy and the Pursuit of Happiness, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 100, 100 (1931). 
“The right even in the jurisdictions where it has been recognized is a nebulous 
one[,] and there has been but a slight development of the law concerning it.” Id. 
 22 See, e.g., Marich v. MGM/UA Telecomms., Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60, 63 
(Ct. App. 2003) (“The elements of both the statutory invasion of privacy and com-
mon law invasion of privacy include intentional conduct.”). 
 23 Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956). 
The court observed that the still-young right of privacy already had a broad and 
multi-faceted reach, having “read of the right of privacy, of invasion of property 
rights, of breach of contract, of equitable servitude, of unfair competition; and        
. . . even suggestions of unjust enrichment.” Id. at 485; see id. at 485 n.7 (refer-
encing various examples); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (ac-
knowledging that the Court’s “‘right of privacy’ cases . . . defy[] categorical de-
scription”). 
 24 See The Scotch Poets, Hogg and Campbell—Hynde and Theodric, 17 
BLACKWOOD’S EDINBURGH MAG. 109, 112 (1825) (critiquing a Campbell poem 
describing “strife in the elements” by describing the passage as “[a] tempest in a 
teapot!”). 
 25 See, e.g., Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 285 (1868). Responding to a 
claim for wrongfully disinterring the corpse of plaintiff’s decedent and reburying 
it in a “charity lot,” the Massachusetts court stated that “the natural injury to the 
feelings of the plaintiff may be taken into consideration . . . . We know of no rule 
of law which requires the mental suffering of the plaintiff, or the misconduct of 
the defendant, to be disregarded.” Id.; see also Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point 
Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872). 
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tradition. English common law had recognized no property interest 
on behalf of surviving family members in a human corpse, reasoning 
that the disposition of human remains was primarily an ecclesiasti-
cal matter.26 English criminal law provided the exclusive remedy for 
 
That there is no right or property in a dead body, using the word 
in its ordinary sense, may well be admitted. Yet the burial of the 
dead is a subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a 
much greater degree than many matters of actual property. 
There is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of mankind to 
be discharged by some one towards the dead; a duty, and we 
may also say a right, to protect from violation; and a duty on the 
part of others to abstain from violation; it may therefore be con-
sidered as a sort of quasi property, and it would be discreditable 
to any system of law not to provide a remedy in such a case. 
Pierce, 10 R.I. at 237–38. 
 26 See Pierce, 10 R.I. at 237 n.1; Meagher, 99 Mass. at 284 (holding that an 
heir has no property interest in his ancestors’ bodies or ashes); Larson v. Chase, 
50 N.W. 238, 239 (Minn. 1891) (“The doctrine that a corpse is not property seems 
to have had its origin in the dictum of Lord Coke, . . . where, in asserting the au-
thority of the church, he says: ‘It is to be observed that in every sepulchre that 
hath a monument two things are to be considered, viz., the monument, and the 
sepulture or burial of the dead. The burial of the cadaver that is caro data vermibus 
[flesh given to worms] is nullius in bonis, and belongs to ecclesiastical cogni-
zance; but as to the monument action is given, as hath been said, at the common 
law, for the defacing thereof.’”); see also Erin Colleran, My Body, His Property?: 
Prescribing a Framework to Determine Ownership Interests in Directly Donated 
Human Organs, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1203, 1205–07 (2007); J. F. H., Note, The Na-
ture of Rights in a Dead Body, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 404, 404 (1926) (stating that 
there were no property rights in a corpse at common law); Francis L. Wellman, 
Note, Law of Burial. – Quasi Property in Corpse. – Right to Dispose of Remains 
Before Burial, and After Burial, 14 AM. L. REV. 57, 59 (1880) (“By the common 
law though the heir has a property [interest] in the monuments and escutcheons 
of his ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any 
civil action against such as indecently, at least, if not impiously, violate and dis-
turb their remains when dead and buried.”). But cf. Snyder v. Snyder, 60 How. Pr. 
368, 369–70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880) (“It is asserted in many cases, following the 
Roman law, that the exclusive right of burial and the right to select the place of 
burial rests, in the absence of any testamentary direction on the part of the de-
ceased, in the next of kin.”).  
The primary reason for the English courts’ refusal to recognize a property 
right in a human corpse was that the duty to ensure a dignified disposition of the 
body fell on the church; burials were considered matters of ecclesiastical cogni-
zance. See R. S. Guernsey, The Ownership of Corpse Before Burial, 10 CENT. L.J. 
303, 303–04 (1880). 
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the removal of human remains from a burial site.27 And early com-
mon law courts in both England and America, skeptical of the po-
tential for fraudulent claims, were not inclined to award recovery for 
mental anguish alone.28 
In early America, however, equity jurisprudence found ways to 
remedy the emotional distress of surviving family members by ac-
knowledging a property right of sorts to control the manner of dis-
position of a human corpse.29 It was not uncommon in early America 
for creditors to seize a corpse as security against the unpaid debts of 
the decedent; and body-snatchers, motivated by greed, sometimes 
stole human corpses and held them for ransom.30 Perhaps for those 
reasons, equity courts began to consider a decedent’s corpse as an 
asset of the estate—a quasi-property interest within the jurisdiction 
of equity.31 These early judicial remedies were all the more 
 
 27 See Pierce, 10 R.I. at 237 n.1 (citing relevant cases). 
 28 See infra note 32 and accompanying text; see also Culpepper v. Pearl St. 
Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 883 (Colo. 1994) (“[T]here is no property right in a 
dead body . . . .”). 
 29 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 63 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th 
ed. 1984) (expressing skepticism regarding the “property” right as “something 
evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and . . . in reality the personal feelings 
of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a 
lawyer”); e.g., Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422, 423 (1881) (“Neither the husband 
nor the next of kin have, strictly speaking, any right of property in a dead body; 
but controversies between them as to the place of its burial are in this country, 
where there are no ecclesiastical courts, within the jurisdiction of a court of eq-
uity.”). 
 30 CHRISTINE QUIGLEY, THE CORPSE: A HISTORY 277–79 (2005); see Well-
man, supra note 26, at 59 (describing ancient laws of Egypt and parts of Europe 
treating a human corpse as legal security for debts and referring to Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island statutes forbidding the practice). 
 31 Joseph R. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 
YALE L.J. 115, 115–16 (1923) (acknowledging a general rule that “the test of eq-
uity jurisdiction” is “the existence of a property right needing protection,” but 
critiquing the premise that an equity court has “no jurisdiction to protect personal 
rights where no property rights are involved”). Some courts have recognized that 
the constructive “property right” with respect to human remains was merely a 
legal fiction to redress surviving family members’ emotional distress, for which 
they had no remedy under common law. See, e.g., Colavito v. New York Organ 
Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 224 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying New York law). 
The courts that have declined to treat this sort of claim as as-
serting a valid property right have explained that it should have 
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remarkable for the time. A remedy for emotional harm alone, espe-
cially in the absence of physical injury, was highly unusual in the 
nineteenth century.32 
In the mid-nineteenth century, most courts granted the primary 
right to determine how and where to bury human remains to the 
 
been brought as a claim for emotional distress—which indeed 
is the gravamen of the injury bereaved families seek to redress 
in such circumstances . . . . But because the mishandling of a 
corpse is presumed to be emotionally distressing even though 
there is no physical impact on the plaintiff, courts have created 
the legal fiction of the “quasi-property right” . . . to permit re-
covery in such cases. 
Id. 
 32 See, e.g., Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law 
of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936) (noting that English and American 
common law “has been reluctant to recognize the interest in one’s peace of mind 
as deserving of general and independent legal protection, even as against inten-
tional invasions”). Magruder traced this principle back to English common law. 
Id. at 1033 (“Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to 
redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone.”) (quoting Lynch 
v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861)). His premise, novel for its time, was that 
United States courts had recognized a tort action claiming damages for emotional 
distress independent of any other tort claim, as long as the “mental distress [was] 
of an aggravated sort, resulting from an outrageous aggression by the defendant 
upon the plaintiff’s peace of mind.” Id. at 1064; see also William L. Prosser, In-
tentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 874–
75 (1939).  
The American Law Institute later recognized the tort of emotional distress, 
but not until 1948. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. Supp. 1948); 
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (outlining the 
elements of “Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 45–47 
(AM. LAW INST. 2012) (defining “emotional harm” to mean “impairment or injury 
to a person’s emotional tranquility”). The independent tort action to remedy emo-
tional distress, like the claim for invasion of privacy, arose from academic schol-
arship rather than the courts. See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: 
Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 797 (2007). Kircher 
acknowledged that long before the tort of outrage was recognized in the United 
States, courts granted remedies for “mental distress associated with intentional 
mistreatment of dead bodies or burial rights.” Id. at 796 (referencing Gostkowski 
v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus & Mary, 186 N.E. 798, 
800 (N.Y. 1933)). 
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decedent’s surviving spouse.33 The decedent’s close family mem-
bers could seek equitable remedies against private parties for inter-
fering with a gravesite or grave goods—often known in early Amer-
ica as “grave-robbing” or “body-snatching.”34 By the end of the 
 
 33 See, e.g., Durell v. Hayward, 75 Mass. 248, 249 (1857) (rejecting a claim 
by the mother of a female decedent against decedent’s widower for removing a 
gravestone erected by the mother and replacing it with one selected by widower). 
The indisputable and paramount right, as well as duty, of a hus-
band, to dispose of the body of his deceased wife by a decent 
sepulture in a suitable place, carries with it the right of placing 
over the spot of burial a proper monument or memorial in ac-
cordance with the well known and long established usage of the 
community. 
Id.; see also Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422, 424 (1881) (holding that surviving 
widower had implied right to remove decedent’s remains from original place of 
burial in proximity to her siblings and move it to a suitable burial plot of his own 
choosing); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 235 (1872) 
(recognizing widow’s right to remove decedent’s body from original burial place 
over objection of decedent’s only child); Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 473 
(App. Div. 1896) (recognizing, as a matter of first impression, a widow’s tort 
claim against the defendant for unlawfully conducting an unauthorized autopsy 
over her objection after husband died in tragic accident). 
By the common law, and stricti juris, the proposition [that no 
property right exists in a dead body] may be maintainable. A 
long line of judicial decisions appear to have established a gen-
eral doctrine to that effect; but courts of equity have frequently 
interfered to protect the remains of the dead, and courts of law 
have also afforded remedies . . . wherever any element of tres-
pass to property, real or personal, was associated with the mo-
lestation of the remains of the dead. In more recent times the 
obdurate common-law rule has been very much relaxed, and 
changed conditions of society, and the necessity for enforcing 
that protection which is due to the dead, have induced courts to 
re-examine the grounds upon which the common-law rule re-
posed, and have led to modifications of its stringency. The old 
cases in England were decided when matters of burial, and the 
care of the dead, were within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiasti-
cal courts, and they are no longer absolutely controlling. 
Id. 
 34 For example, during the nineteenth century, medical schools often secured 
cadavers for purposes of teaching anatomy by disinterring recently buried corpses, 
which led to a public outcry. MICHAEL SAPPOL, A TRAFFIC OF DEAD BODIES: 
ANATOMY AND EMBODIED SOCIAL IDENTITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 
3–5 (2002); Grave Robbing, OHIO HIST. CENT., 
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nineteenth century, some state courts recognized comparable com-
mon law rights for the violation of which surviving close relatives 
could claim money damages.35 
Tort remedies for interfering with the survivors’ rights to dis-
pose of a dead body survive today in many jurisdictions.36 The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts expressly recognized a cause of action 
 
https://ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Grave-robbing (last visited Feb. 15, 2020); see 
also Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 472 (noting that in 1854, New York enacted a statute 
expressly barring a hospital, over objection of “relatives or friends of the de-
ceased,” from dissecting the corpse of a patient who had died in the hospital, or 
delivering a corpse to someone else for that purpose).  
To deter the practice of grave-robbing, enterprising inventors patented de-
vices such as the “coffin torpedo.” See, e.g., Coffin-Torpedo, U.S. Patent No. 
208,627 (filed June 29, 1878) (issued Oct. 8, 1878). The invention’s purpose was 
as follows: 
to provide a means which shall successfully prevent the unau-
thorized resurrection of dead bodies; and with this end in view 
[the] invention consists of a peculiarly-constructed torpedo, 
adapted to be readily secured to the coffin and the body of the 
contained corpse in such manner that any attempt to remove the 
body after burial will cause the discharge of the cartridge con-
tained in the torpedo and injury or death of the desecrator of the 
grave. 
Id. 
 35 See, e.g., Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 240 (Minn. 1891) (“[I]t would be 
a reproach to the law if a plaintiff’s right to recover for mental anguish resulting 
from the mutilation or other disturbance of the remains of his dead should be made 
to depend upon whether in committing the act the defendant also committed a 
technical trespass upon plaintiff’s premises, while everybody’s common sense 
would tell him that the real and substantial wrong was not the trespass on the land, 
but the indignity to the dead.”). 
 36 E.g., Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 375 (N.M. 1989) (quoting 
Infield v. Cope, 270 P.2d 716, 719 (N.M. 1954)) (noting that while “no special 
rule provides relatives a right of privacy in the body of a deceased per-
son[,] . . . New Mexico has granted relatives of a decedent a [limited] cause of 
action for mistreatment of a corpse . . . derived from the common law notion of ‘a 
quasi-property right in a dead body vesting in the nearest relatives of the deceased 
and arising out of their duty to bury their dead’”); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 
188, 189 (Fla. 1950) (holding that impact rule did not bar mother’s claim against 
undertaker for tortious interference with her child’s body without her consent; 
acknowledging that “tortious interference with rights involving dead human bod-
ies” naturally results in “mental anguish to the surviving relatives[,]” which “is 
frequently the only injurious consequence to follow from it.”). 
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for tortious interference with a dead body.37 The superseding Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm, finalized 
in 2012, continues to recognize the claim, but now treats it as a sub-
category of tortious infliction of emotional distress.38 
 
 37 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
(“One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates 
or operates upon the body of a dead person or prevents its proper interment or 
cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family of the deceased who is 
entitled to the disposition of the body.”). In limiting the claim to the family mem-
ber “who is entitled to the disposition of the body,” id. § 868 cmt. a, the Restate-
ment  recognizes a family member’s tort action for intentional, reckless, or negli-
gent interference with the decedent’s body, which some courts have characterized 
as a “quasi-property” right. E.g., Cochran v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 59 
N.E.3d 234, 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (“This cause of action has its roots in the 
early recognition of a quasi-property right in a decedent’s body by his next of 
kin.”), aff’d, 93 N.E.3d 493 (Ill. 2017). The Restatement further acknowledges 
the questionable nature of the property classification, observing that “the technical 
right has served as a mere peg upon which to hang damages for the mental distress 
inflicted upon the survivor; and in reality the cause of action has been exclusively 
one for the [survivor’s] mental distress.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 868 cmt. a. 
 38 The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes that the claim is essentially 
one for negligent, reckless, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. b, 
Reporter’s Note cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (addressing liability for negligent 
conduct directly inflicting emotional harm on another). The Reporter’s Note ex-
plains that the rule in subsection (b) originated in cases dealing with negligent 
mishandling of corpses and negligent transmission of information about death or 
terminal illness, and the rule has since been expanded in many states to include 
“other activities or undertakings.” Id. (citing Kaufman v. W. Union Tel. Co., 224 
F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955) as “what appears to be the last of the negligent telegraph-
transmission cases”); see also Jackson v. McKay-Davis Funeral Home, Inc., 830 
F. Supp. 2d 635, 653, 655 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (denying summary judgment to de-
fendant funeral home on claim by decedent’s widow and daughter for negligent 
handling of human remains and negligent infliction of emotional distress, noting 
that “the negligent handling [of human remains] cases have developed in tandem 
with the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2012) 
(addressing liability for outrageous intentional or reckless conduct causing severe 
emotional distress). 
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B. Names and Reputations of Decedents and Surviving 
Relatives 
In the late nineteenth century, at about the same time Warren and 
Brandeis published their groundbreaking law review article, surviv-
ing family members began seeking equitable remedies for conduct 
they perceived as sullying the names and reputations of their de-
ceased relatives and, by implication, their own.39 
Among the earliest cases was Schuyler v. Curtis,40 decided by 
the New York Court of Appeals in 1895. The plaintiff, a nephew of 
the female decedent who had died fourteen years earlier, sought to 
enjoin the defendants’ plans to erect a statue honoring his deceased 
aunt without the consent of the “immediate members of the [dece-
dent’s] family.”41 The plan was to display the statue at the Chicago 
World’s Fair in the same room as a statue depicting Susan B. An-
thony, an early ardent feminist.42 The nephew asserted various con-
cerns about the plans, including a complaint that the circulars pro-
moting the statue had inaccurately credited the decedent for certain 
philanthropic actions during her lifetime.43 He also alleged that these 
were activities for which the decedent would not have wanted pub-
licity, and that she would have rejected any apparent affiliation with 
Susan B. Anthony.44 But the plaintiff’s primary rationale for litigat-
ing the issue was “to establish a principle[] that the right of privacy 
should be respected.”45 
The court rejected the nephew’s claim.46 It reasoned that any 
right of privacy on the part of the decedent had died with her, and 
the surviving family members had no claim against the promoters 
 
 39 For a concise summary of early state cases addressing the right of privacy, 
see Sammin, supra note 18, at 97–107. 
 40 42 N.E. 22, 22 (N.Y. 1895). 
 41 Id. at 24. 
 42 Id. at 23; see, e.g., Barbara Babcock, Women’s Rights, Public Defense, and 
the Chicago World’s Fair, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481, 482, 486–87 (2012) (de-
scribing Susan B. Anthony’s role in the fair’s promotion of women’s suffrage and 
recognition of women’s contributions to the labor force). 
 43 Schuyler, 42 N.E. at 24. 
 44 Id. at 24–25. The court was unpersuaded that the planned display would 
suggest that the decedent had in any way sympathized with Ms. Anthony’s advo-
cacy of the nascent “wom[e]n’s rights movement.” Id. at 27. 
 45 Id. at 25. 
 46 Id. at 26. 
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for failing to secure the family’s consent to erect the statue depicting 
the decedent.47 
 
 47 The court explained its reasoning for rejecting the claim, which asserted 
what would later become known in academic circles as a relational right of pri-
vacy: 
Whatever the rights of a relative may be, they are not, in such 
case as this, rights which once belonged to the deceased, 
and which a relative can enforce in her behalf and in a mere 
representative capacity; as, for instance, an executor or admin-
istrator, in regard to the assets of a deceased. It is not a question 
of what right of privacy Mrs. Schuyler had in her lifetime. The 
plaintiff does not represent that right. Whatever right of privacy 
Mrs. Schuyler had died with her. Death deprives us all of rights, 
in the legal sense of that term; and, when Mrs. Schuyler died, 
her own individual right of privacy, whatever it may have been, 
expired at the same time. The right which survived (however 
extensive or limited) was a right pertaining to the living only. It 
is the right of privacy of the living which it is sought to enforce 
here. That right may in some cases be itself violated by improp-
erly interfering with the character or memory of a deceased rel-
ative, but it is the right of the living, and not that of the dead, 
which is recognized . . . . We hold that in this class of cases 
there must, in addition, be some reasonable and plausible 
ground for the existence of [the survivors’] mental distress and 
injury. It must not be the creation of mere caprice nor of pure 
fancy, nor the result of a supersensitive and morbid mental or-
ganization, dwelling with undue emphasis upon the exclusive 
and sacred character of this right of privacy . . . . The fact that 
Mrs. Schuyler is dead alters the case, and the plaintiff and other 
relatives must show some right of their own violated . . . . 
Id. at 25–26 (emphasis added).  
The court’s reasoning has been followed by other courts in analogous cases 
decided throughout the twentieth century and beyond. See, e.g., Young v. That 
Was the Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1341 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (“[T]he right 
of privacy is personal and can only be asserted by the individual whose privacy 
has been invaded. It dies with him and cannot be claimed by his estate. Neither 
can it be asserted by the anguished or outraged relatives and friends of the subject 
individual, who may have been disturbed by the disclosure or exploitation.”), 
aff’d, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970); Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 
285, 287 (Mich. 1899) (rejecting claim that defendants used decedent’s photo-
graph to market cigars without consent; holding that “a court of equity has no 
power to restrain a libelous publication”); see also Cannady v. St. Vincent Infir-
mary Med. Ctr., 423 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Ark. 2012) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977)) (rejecting a mother’s 
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In 1940, the New York Court of Appeals revisited the issue.48 
The court dismissed a claim by a widow and her children, who al-
leged that a newspaper article had erroneously described their dece-
dent as a confessed murderer and identified the plaintiffs as his sur-
vivors.49 The court held that “a libel or slander upon the memory of 
a deceased person which makes no direct reflection upon his rela-
tives gives them no cause of action for defamation.”50  
In 1952, the California Supreme Court addressed an invasion of 
privacy claim against local law enforcement officials after the plain-
tiffs’ son was acquitted for the misdemeanor offense of unlawful 
assembly.51 The parents claimed that the prosecution’s publicity had 
negatively affected the father’s practice as an attorney and CPA.52 
The court refused to recognize the parents’ claim that their privacy 
had been violated as an incident of the prosecutor’s allegedly wrong-
ful prosecution of their son.53 For the same reason, in 1959, a federal 
district court in Illinois held that a decedent’s son had no claim for 
 
claim on behalf of her deceased daughter for invasion of privacy, referencing Re-
statement (Second) of Torts in part for proposition that “[i]n the absence of statute, 
the action for the invasion of privacy cannot be maintained after the death of the 
individual whose privacy is invaded”). 
 48 Rose v. Daily Mirror, 31 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1940). 
 49 Id. at 182–83. 
 50 Id. at 182. 
 51 Coverstone v. Davies, 239 P.2d 876, 881 (Cal. 1952). The court was unable 
to identify any cases allowing a plaintiff to recover “where defendant’s alleged 
wrongful act was directed toward a third person, and only as an incident to that 
act was it claimed that plaintiff’s privacy had been invaded.” Id. 
 52 Id. at 880. 
 53 The court reasoned that recognizing such a privacy claim would open the 
floodgates to litigation by involuntary public figures: 
Neither reason nor authority indicates that there should be an 
extension of liability to cover such a situation. Such a rule 
would open the courts to persons whose only relation to the as-
serted wrong is that they are related to the victim of the wrong-
doer and were therefore brought unwillingly into the limelight. 
Every defamation, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecu-
tion would then be an actionable invasion of the privacy of the 
relatives of the victim. 
Id. at 881 (emphasis added). 
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libel of his own name on the basis of defendant’s alleged libel of the 
plaintiff’s deceased father.54 
Similarly, modern courts have generally rejected “relational” 
claims by relatives for defaming the names or reputations of their 
decedents.55 In some cases, courts rely on state survival statutes that 
expressly exclude reputational claims. Thus, a decedent’s heirs may 
not vindicate defamatory statements concerning a decedent unless 
the claim is asserted before the direct victim’s death.56 
C. “Personal” Nature of the Right of Privacy 
As the intentional tort of invasion of privacy evolved throughout 
the twentieth century,57 the right of privacy was considered personal 
to the individual whose right was violated.58 The only exception was 
 
 54 Insull v. N.Y. World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615, 636 (N.D. Ill.) 
(applying Illinois law), aff’d, 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959). 
 55 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Times Herald Printing Co., 513 S.W.2d 124, 126 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (holding that plaintiff-widow had no claim against defend-
ant-newspaper for reporting that her husband’s body was found in an area known 
for drug trafficking, unless she personally had been subject of alleged defamatory 
statements). 
 56 E.g., Fitch v. Voit, 624 So. 2d 542, 543–44 (Ala. 1993) (citing Smith v. 
Doss, 37 So. 2d 118, 121 (Ala. 1948), and quoting Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 
2d 235, 237 (Ala. 1955)) (“As to the issue of privacy, the trial judge concluded 
correctly that the right of privacy is a personal right, and that this Court has not 
recognized a ‘relational right of privacy,’ under which the plaintiffs make their 
claim.”); see also Lamonaco v. CBS, Inc., No. CIV. A. 93-1975(DRD), 1993 WL 
556536, at *3 (D.N.J. July 29, 1993) (noting that “the tendency of most courts to 
invoke and then dismiss [a claim for] relational privacy without ever defining it”), 
aff’d, 27 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1994). But see Weller v. Home News Publ’g. Co., 271 
A.2d 738, 740 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970) (holding that, while New Jersey 
law does not generally recognize a survivor’s claim implicating a relational right 
of privacy, state survival statute preserved decedent’s own claim against defend-
ant for falsely portraying her as a fictional charity patient). 
 57 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975) (noting that “the 
[twentieth] century has experienced a strong tide running in favor of the so-called 
right of privacy”). By 1971, nearly every jurisdiction had recognized a claim for 
invasion of privacy in one form or another. Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW 
OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971)). 
 58 See Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237, 238–39, 253, 
256–57 (1932) (noting that interests identified in the privacy cases qualify as “in-
terests of personality,” rather than “property interests” or “interests in relations 
with other persons,” and listing “privacy” as one of several “interests of 
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the variation on the privacy right that would later become known as 
the “right of publicity”—the right to prevent a third party’s commer-
cial misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness without con-
sent.59 Over time, this version of the privacy tort was increasingly 
recognized as a right that could be vindicated by the individual dur-
ing her lifetime—and even after death by her surviving heirs under 
limited circumstances.60 The right of publicity, also known as the 
 
personality,” including “physical integrity,” “feelings or emotions,” “capacity for 
activity or service,” “name,” “likeness,” and “history”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 652I (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“Except for the appropriation of one’s 
name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a 
living individual whose privacy is invaded.”); id. § 652I cmt. a (“The right pro-
tected by the action for invasion of privacy is a personal right, peculiar to the 
individual whose privacy is invaded. The cause of action is not assignable, and it 
cannot be maintained by other persons such as members of the individual’s fam-
ily, unless their own privacy is invaded along with his.”); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910 (1984) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 165, 174–75 (1969)) (stating that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and 
may not be vicariously asserted); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (re-
ferring to “the individual’s interest in [informational] privacy”); Moore v. Charles 
B. Pierce Film Enters., Inc., 589 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (restrict-
ing recovery for invasion of privacy to “the person about whom facts have been 
wrongfully published, unless the Legislature sees fit to establish a right of action 
in the relatives of such a person.”); Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitu-
tional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 158 (1991) 
(“The interest in informational privacy—the right to control personal infor-
mation—belongs with the individual.”); cf. Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 
F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 1965) (applying Illinois law and observing that “[i]t is 
anomalous to speak of the privacy of a deceased person.”). 
 59 See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (ex-
plaining that right of publicity “protect[s] the property interest that an individual 
gains and enjoys in his identity through his labor and effort”); Carson v. Here’s 
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983) (concluding that 
defendant had violated Johnny Carson’s right of publicity under Michigan law by 
intentionally appropriating for commercial use the phrase “Here’s Johnny,” which 
evoked the celebrity’s persona as the host of a long-running late-night television 
program). 
 60 Compare, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 462 
(Cal. 1979) (refusing to permit a claim for violation of right of publicity for using 
the identity of Rudolph Valentino, a deceased celebrity, in a film), and Groucho 
Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding 
that “California [law in 1982] would not recognize a descendible right of publicity 
that protects against an original play using a [deceased] celebrity’s likeness and 
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tort of misappropriation of name and likeness,61 evolved to become 
what is today a heritable right in many, if not most, of the states that 
recognize it.62 But the other variations on the common law right of 
privacy presumably terminated immediately upon the death of the 
individual whose “personal” privacy right was allegedly violated.63 
 
comedic style.”), with, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports, 
Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 326 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We believe that the weight of authority 
indicates that the right of publicity is more properly analyzed as a property right 
and, therefore, is descendible.”), and Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. 
Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 1982) (hold-
ing that “the right of publicity survives the death of its owner and is inheritable 
and devisable.”).  
If a state’s own constitution independently recognizes a right of privacy, state 
courts have held that those rights do not expire as a matter of law at the time of 
death. For example, in Weaver v. Myers, the Florida Supreme Court held that 
“[d]eath does not retroactively abolish [Florida’s] constitutional protections for 
privacy that existed at the moment of death.” 229 So. 3d 1118, 1127–28 (Fla. 
2017) (4-3 decision). The majority struck down as unconstitutional statutory 
amendments to the state’s medical malpractice laws that had required the release 
of a deceased patient’s medical records to “prying [defense] lawyers, insurance 
companies, experts, and doctors” and authorized ex parte, “secret” interviews of 
decedent’s medical providers. Id. at 1140–41; see also Brian W. Boelens, Weaver 
v. Myers: The Future of Ex Parte Communication in Florida Medical Malprac-
tice, FLA. B.J., July–Aug. 2018, at 22, 26. 
 61 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1977) (noting that the right of publicity “is in the nature of a property right”). 
 62 See State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 
89, 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (“The legal literature has consistently argued that 
the right of publicity should be descendible. A majority of the courts considering 
this question agree.”). In some states, the right of publicity is descendible not by 
judicial declaration, but rather statutory enactment. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 3344.1(a)–(b) (West 2012); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316(b)(3) 
(West 2007). 
 63 The general common law rule is that, “[e]xcept for the appropriation of 
one’s name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only 
by a living individual whose privacy is invaded.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 652I (AM. LAW INST. 1977); id. § 652I cmt. b (“In the absence of a stat-
ute, the action for the invasion of privacy cannot be maintained after the death of 
the individual whose privacy is invaded.”); see, e.g., Swickard v. Wayne Cty. 
Med. Exam’r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Mich. 1991). 
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II. EARLY RECOGNITION OF “RELATIONAL” PRIVACY 
INTERESTS 
A. Scholarly Recognition 
As early as 1916, Roscoe Pound addressed relational interests of 
individuals within the nuclear family,64 as distinguished from 
 
 64 Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. 
REV. 177, 177 (1916) [hereinafter Pound, Domestic Relations] (focusing on “in-
dividual interests of the individual parties to domestic relations in the maintenance 
and integrity thereof and with the securing of these interests both against the world 
at large and between the parties”). Pound viewed the family as an economic and 
social unit. He explained, 
[T]he law has to give effect to the right of the one party to the 
relation against the other and enforce the corresponding [rela-
tional] duty toward the former, and also to give effect to the 
right of each against the whole world not to have the relation 
interfered with by outsiders. 
Id. at 179. This latter aspect of family interests—the family unit’s rights against 
external interference—is the underpinning of relational privacy rights. For exam-
ple, early American common law claims for alienation of affections and loss of 
consortium implicitly acknowledged relational interests in maintaining the integ-
rity of the domestic family unit. See id. at 188–89. Another example is the com-
mon law concept of coverture, by which a married woman had no legal identity 
apart from her husband. See Jones & Peterman, supra note 14, at 215. In the last 
half of the nineteenth century, most states abolished coverture by enacting “mar-
ried women’s statutes” following the lead of New York, the first state to do so in 
1848. See J. Lyn Entrikin, The Death of Common Law, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 351, 458–59 (2019).  
However, these traditional notions of “family” privacy focused on protecting 
family autonomy rather than protecting against invasion of privacy by the misuse 
or misappropriation of family-related information. See Jones & Peterman, supra 
note 14, at 216; see also, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) 
(referring to the “enduring American tradition” of parents’ autonomy to educate 
their own children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (striking 
down Massachusetts statutes regulating child labor based on respect for “the pri-
vate realm of family life which the state cannot enter”); Pierce v. Soc’y of the 
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (striking 
down Oregon law requiring public education for “unreasonably interfer[ing] with 
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (deferring to parental au-
thority to control education of their children).  
Similar family autonomy interests, and by extension reproductive autonomy, 
were the underpinnings of major Supreme Court cases. See Carey v. Population 
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individual interests of “personality.”65 He explained that these rela-
tional interests are “wider than the individual personality [and] in-
volve more than the individual body and life, and yet they are inti-
mately related thereto.”66 Pound sought to distinguish relational 
rights from “interests of personality” of the sort modern legal 
thought characterizes as “personal” rights.67 
American scholars have acknowledged the so-called “rela-
tional” right of privacy, albeit not uniformly.68 Beginning in the 
 
Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693, 699–70 (1977) (unmarried minors’ “right to pri-
vacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1972) (unmarried women’s right to use contraceptives); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–63 (1973) (women’s right to choose abortion, in 
consultation with their physicians, during first trimester of pregnancy); Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (married couples’ right to use con-
traceptives). But the evolution of reproductive autonomy has departed from what 
was once a family-focused theme in favor of a woman’s individual procreational 
autonomy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
58 (1976) (holding that not even a pregnant woman’s husband could interfere with 
her decision to terminate a pregnancy within the first twelve weeks).  
While the Court has departed from its traditional focus on family privacy in 
favor of personal and individual privacy in its decisional autonomy jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court’s concerns about protecting family and relational privacy con-
tinue to reverberate in its informational privacy cases. See infra Part IV.A (distin-
guishing privacy rights with respect to decisional autonomy from privacy rights 
with respect to disclosure of sensitive personal information). 
 65 Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 349 (1915) 
[hereinafter Pound, Personality]. 
 66 Pound, Domestic Relations, supra note 64, at 177. 
 67 See Pound, Personality, supra note 65, at 350. While recognizing that “[a]ll 
classifications are more or less arbitrary,” Pound’s 1915 article sorted “individual 
interests” into three subcategories: “(a) interests of personality, — the individual 
physical and spiritual existence; (b) domestic interests, — the expanded individ-
ual life; and (c) interests of substance, — the individual economic life.” Id. at 349 
(internal quotation marks omitted). From a historical perspective, Pound surmised 
that individual interests were relatively late in coming as distinguished from 
“group rights.” Id. “This culminated in the eighteenth century in a working out of 
individual interests as distinguished from public interests, to which our bill of 
rights, in which the natural rights of the individual are solemnly asserted against 
the state, still bear witness.” Id.  
 68 See, e.g., Ian Kerr, Schrödinger’s Robot: Privacy in Uncertain States, 20 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 123, 130 (2019) (“[T]he moniker of relational privacy 
has been used to mean different things . . . .”); Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, 
Relational Privacy: Surveillance, Common Knowledge, and Coordination, 11 U. 
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1930s, Leon Green, then Dean of Northwestern University Law 
School, published a series of five articles on various categories of 
“relational interests.”69 The first of these focused on relational inter-
ests within the family.70 The author devoted several pages to the re-
lational interest of surviving family members with respect to the 
“personality” of a decedent,71 acknowledging that courts consider-
ing those claims routinely focused on the “mental suffering of the 
surviving relative as the chief element of recovery.”72 Green con-
cluded that harm to these relational family interests, which he de-
fined as “hurt to one member of a family by reason of conduct 
 
ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 (2017) (defining relational privacy as “a va-
riety of informational privacy,” meaning “the ability to determine for yourself 
when others may collect and how they may use your information,” and explaining 
that “[i]nformational privacy is relational when control over the flow of infor-
mation is exercised collectively by a group, not unilaterally by individuals”); see 
also Stuart Hargreaves, ‘Relational Privacy’ & Tort, 23 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 433, 463 (2017) (“[R]elational privacy accepts . . . that privacy has . . . a role 
to play both in creating a personal zone of freedom from unwanted outside inter-
ference, [and] as a means of protecting one’s interactions within a broader com-
munity . . . .”); Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 483, 528 (2017) (discussing relational privacy as a cluster of “privacy of rela-
tions”); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 
359, 388–89 (2000) [hereinafter Rao, Property, Privacy] (citing Radhika Rao, Re-
conceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1077, 1078 (1998) [hereinafter Rao, Reconceiving Privacy] (referring to 
right of relational privacy as one component of constitutionally protected privacy 
that “casts a mantle of immunity from state interference around certain intimate 
and consensual relationships”)); Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and 
DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309, 364 (2010) (referring to 
relational privacy as “protect[ing] the sanctity of the family by working to support 
the relationships that are constitutive of the family”). 
 69 Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460 (1934) [hereinafter 
Green, Relational Interests (1934)]; Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. 
REV. 1041 (1935); Leon Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935); 
Leon Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 314 (1935); Leon Green, Rela-
tional Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936); see also Green, Basic Concepts, supra 
note 2, at 65 (distinguishing interests in person and property, the focus of early 
common law actions, from interests in “relations with other persons,” which he 
characterized as “an entirely new group of interests”). 
 70 Green, Relational Interests (1934), supra note 69, at 464. 
 71 Id. at 485–90. 
 72 Id. at 486. 
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[directed] towards some other member,”73 warranted legal protec-
tion to the same extent as other interests.74  
Even earlier, the venerable William Blackstone had acknowl-
edged “relative rights; or such as are incident to persons considered 
as members of society, and connected to each other by various ties 
and relations.”75 Of these “relative rights,” distinguished from the 
“absolute” rights of the individual, Blackstone identified four spe-
cific categories of rights in private relations: “husband and wife, par-
ent and child, guardian and ward, master and servant.”76 
But none of these early scholars expressly identified what would 
come to be known as “relational privacy” or “familial privacy” in-
terests with respect to disclosures of sensitive information. That ter-
minology would develop much later in the twentieth century.77 In 
 
 73 Id. at 490. 
 74 Id. at 460; see also Green, Basic Concepts, supra note 2, at 66 (distinguish-
ing relational interests from interests of personality and property on the basis that 
“[t]heir value lies in the fact that one person has an interest in the welfare and 
conduct of some other person”); Pound, Domestic Relations, supra note 64, at 
196. 
 75 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138–39. 
 76 Id.; see Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 
BUFF. L. REV. 205, 273–75 (1979) (explaining Blackstone’s distinctions between 
absolute and relative rights of persons). 
In the law of relative rights, Blackstone was primarily interested 
in presenting English society as a set of hierarchies of persons. 
Each hierarchy had a function, and each was composed of com-
plex social roles heavily regulated by common law and statute. 
Two of the hierarchies . . . had the function of exercising the 
powers of the state, and Blackstone identified them as public. 
At the other extreme, there were the “domestic” or “economi-
cal” hierarchies of employment and family. As with the state 
hierarchies, Blackstone described these in terms of clusters of 
legal rules all related to the functions and ranks of the people 
involved, but here those were private, and he so identified them. 
In the middle were people in public relations, with some private 
and some public functions. 
Id. at 288–89 (emphasis in original); see also Jones & Peterman, supra note 14, 
at 200 n.36 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *422) (“The origi-
nal sense of family privacy descended from the common law.”). 
 77 See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 38–39, 42 (1967). 
Westin, a renowned privacy scholar, recognized the need for “emotional release 
through privacy” at times of “loss, shock, or sorrow.” Id. at 36. “In such moments 
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fact, the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) articulation of common 
law “personal” privacy rights in the first two versions of the Restate-
ment of Torts stymied the conceptual development of relational pri-
vacy rights recognized by early common law.78 
B. The Restatement of Torts and the Influence of William 
Prosser 
The first Restatement of Torts was published in 1939.79 It sepa-
rately acknowledged claims for “interference with a dead body”80 
and “interference with privacy.”81 Both, however, were articulated 
 
society provides comfort both through communal support by gatherings of friends 
and through respect for the privacy of the individual and his intimates.” Id.; see 
also Rao, Reconceiving Privacy, supra note 68, at 1104 (distinguishing the “indi-
vidual right of privacy—the right to be left alone, and the relational right of pri-
vacy—the right to connect with others”); Note, The Relational Right of Privacy 
Theory—Recovery on the Basis of Conduct Directed at a Deceased or Living Rel-
ative, Friend or Associate, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 74, 74 (1966) (comprehensively 
analyzing early cases dealing with “what is called a ‘relational right of privacy’” 
and noting that use of the term “relational . . . perhaps heaps ambiguity upon am-
biguity”). 
 78 See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed 
Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1903, 1905 (2010) (explaining that Prosser’s 
rendition of privacy claims took hold in the first and second Restatement of Torts 
and was “clear and orderly[,]” a contrast to the “characteristic creativity and ad 
hoc nature of the common law”). 
 79 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
 80 Id. § 868 (“A person who wantonly mistreats the body of a dead person or 
who without privilege intentionally removes, withholds or operates upon the dead 
body is liable to the member of the family of such person who is entitled to the 
disposition of the body.”). The Restatement commentary explained that “[t]he 
cause of action is primarily for mental suffering caused by the improper dealing 
with the body [and] includes also the right to recover damages for physical harm 
resulting from such mental suffering.” Id. § 868 cmt. b; see supra text accompa-
nying notes 35–37. 
 81 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (“A person who un-
reasonably and seriously interferes with another’s interest in not having his affairs 
known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other.”). 
Comment b to this section explained that the claim “has not been recognized until 
recently, not only because it normally involves nothing more than mental distress, 
but also because there is not a clear line of demarcation between what should and 
what should not be permitted.” Id. § 867 cmt. b. Comment d elaborated on the 
nature and scope of the nascent privacy claim, focusing on its concern with offen-
sive informational disclosures: 
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as personal rights: the first limited to the “member of the family of 
such [deceased] person who is entitled to the disposition of the 
body,”82 and the second limited to an individual whose “interest in 
not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to 
the public” is “unreasonably and seriously interfere[d] with.”83 At 
the same time, another section of the Restatement of Torts expressly 
foreclosed any claim for conduct, regardless of intention, that 
caused “only mental or emotional disturbance to another.”84 
 
[L]iability exists only if the defendant’s conduct was such that 
he should have realized that it would be offensive to persons of 
ordinary sensibilities. It is only where the intrusion has gone 
beyond the limits of decency that liability accrues. These limits 
are exceeded where intimate details of the life of one who has 
never manifested a desire to have publicity are exposed to the 
public, or where photographs of a person in an embarrassing 
pose are surreptitiously taken and published. On the other hand, 
there is no invasion of a right of privacy in the description of 
the ordinary goings and comings of a person or of weddings, 
even though intended to be entirely private, or of other publica-
tions to which people do not ordinarily seriously object. In de-
termining liability, the knowledge and motives of the defend-
ant, the sex, station in life, previous habits of the plaintiff with 
reference to publicity, and other similar matters are considered. 
A distinction can be made in favor of news items and against 
advertising use. It is only when the defendant should know that 
the plaintiff would be justified in feeling seriously hurt by the 
conduct that a cause of action exists. If these conditions exist, 
however, the fact that the plaintiff suffered neither pecuniary 
loss nor physical harm is unimportant. 
Id. § 867 cmt. d. 
 82 Id. § 868 (emphasis added). 
 83 Id. § 867. 
 84 Id. § 46. 
The interest in mental and emotional tranquillity and, therefore, 
in freedom from mental and emotional disturbances is not, as a 
thing in itself, regarded as of sufficient importance to require 
others to refrain from conduct intended or recognizably likely 
to cause such a disturbance. Conduct, either of act or omission, 
which is intended or likely to cause only mental or emotional 
distress is not tortious. Therefore, it cannot subject the actor to 
liability no matter what its consequences. 
Id. § 46 cmt. c (emphasis added). 
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William Prosser, selected in 1955 as the reporter for the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts,85 was highly influential in formulating 
American common law privacy rights. In 1977, the four familiar 
variations on the right of privacy found their origins in the second 
Restatement,86 which largely tracked the definitions Prosser had ar-
ticulated in a 1960 law review article.87 Prosser acknowledged that 
one of the four privacy tort variations, intrusion on seclusion, was 
essentially vindicating the same injury as a claim for intentional in-
fliction of mental distress, which many courts had already recog-
nized as a separate, limited basis for tort liability.88 
But the Restatement (Second) of Torts expressly disclaimed any 
relational privacy interest. Section 652I, captioned “Personal Char-
acter of Right of Privacy,” clarified that as a general rule, only the 
person then living whose privacy has been violated could maintain 
 
 85 Laurence H. Eldredge, In Memoriam: William Lloyd Prosser, 23 
HASTINGS L.J. xxxii, xxxv (1972). 
 86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–E (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
They include (a) unreasonable intrusion on seclusion, (b) appropriation of an-
other’s name or likeness, (c) unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life, 
or (d) publicity that unreasonably casts another in a false light. Id. § 652A. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts continued to recognize a tort claim for interference 
with a dead body, but expanded it to include unintentional conduct, setting it apart 
from the four privacy torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977) (“One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, 
withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or prevents its 
proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family of 
the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body.”). 
 87 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 422–23 (1960) (out-
lining the “four distinct and only loosely related torts”). 
 88 See id. at 422 (citing William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. 
REV. 40, 52 (1956)); William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffer-
ing: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 884 (1939). 
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally 
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is sub-
ject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm 
to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. 
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor 
is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes se-
vere emotional distress (a) to a member of such person’s imme-
diate family who is present at the time, whether or not such dis-
tress results in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person who is 
present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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a cause of action for invasion of privacy.89 The only exception was 
misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness, which could be 
vindicated by a decedent’s surviving family members.90 
C. Judicial Recognition 
The right to personal privacy is not confined . . . 
to the right to control information about one-
self. . . . Congress’ use of the term “personal pri-
vacy” [in FOIA] permit[s] family members to assert 
their own privacy rights against public intrusions 
long deemed impermissible under the common law 
and in our cultural traditions.91 
 
By the last third of the twentieth century, surviving family mem-
bers increasingly sought civil remedies for perceived invasions of 
privacy that contemporary common law had treated as personal to 
the decedent.92 In 1965, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, interpreting Illinois law, considered whether the 
widow and son of Al Capone had a relational privacy interest suffi-
cient to support a claim against television broadcasters and 
 
 89 See, e.g., Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A.2d 694, 702 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1986) (citing with approval RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977)) (declining to recognize a cause of action by an immediate fam-
ily member of a decedent for invasion of relational privacy for publicizing private 
information about decedent). 
 90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (AM. LAW INST. 1977)) 
(“Except for the appropriation of one’s name or likeness, an action for invasion 
of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is in-
vaded.”). Comment a elaborates: 
The right protected by the action for invasion of privacy is a 
personal right, peculiar to the individual whose privacy is in-
vaded. The cause of action is not assignable, and it cannot be 
maintained by other persons such as members of the individ-
ual’s family, unless their own privacy is invaded along with his. 
The only exception to this rule involves the appropriation to the 
defendant’s own use of another’s name or likeness. 
Id. § 652I cmt. a (citing id. § 652C cmt. a). 
 91 Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 165–67 (2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92 See generally Robert P. Kennedy, Note, The Right to Privacy in the Name, 
Reputation and Personality of a Deceased Relative, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 324, 
324 (1965) (reviewing relevant case law). 
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producers for portraying their deceased relative.93 The court rejected 
the claim, relying on an analogous Illinois precedent holding that the 
right of privacy did not support a surviving mother’s claim to redress 
her mental anguish caused by the defendant’s publicizing her son’s 
murder when the publication did not relate specifically to the 
mother.94 
In 1969, a federal court applying Ohio law rejected a class action 
asserted by surviving family members against a popular television 
production for defaming their recently deceased relative.95 The liti-
gation was filed after the program published the following account 
memorializing an elderly woman who had died just two weeks ear-
lier: “Mrs. Katherine Young of Syracuse, New York, who died at 99 
leaving 5 sons, 5 daughters, 67 grandchildren, 72 great-grandchil-
dren, and 73 great-grandchildren, gets our First Annual Booby Prize 
in the Birth Control Sweepstakes.”96 In rejecting the claim, the court 
acknowledged that a few early cases had recognized “a so-called 
‘relational’ right of privacy.”97 However, the court discounted those 
cases, summarily reasoning that most were “not recent, and their 
 
 93 Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 1965). 
 94 Id. (citing Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 168 N.E.2d 64, 65, 66 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1960)). 
 95 Young v. That Was the Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1337–38, 1343 
(N.D. Ohio 1969) (granting summary judgment on the basis that surviving family 
members had no cause of action under Ohio law), aff’d, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 
1970). 
 96 Id. at 1338. 
 97 Id. at 1341 n.2. As examples of these “few cases,” the court cited Smith v. 
Doss, 37 So. 2d 118, 121 (Ala. 1948); Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass’n, 
17 P.2d 535, 535 (Colo. 1932); Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 155 S.E. 194, 
195 (Ga. 1930); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849, 850 (Ky. 1912); and Schuyler 
v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 24 (N.Y. 1895). Young, 312 F. Supp. at 1341 n.2. All of 
these cases sought remedies for surviving family members whose decedents al-
legedly had been subjected to unwanted publicity. In some of these cases the 
plaintiffs prevailed. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons, 17 P.2d at 537 (holding that plaintiff 
widow stated a claim that mortician violated its contractual agreement that noth-
ing would be done to outrage feelings of ordinary person or unnecessarily inflict 
humiliation and mental suffering); Bazemore, 155 S.E. at 194 (holding that par-
ents stated a claim against hospital, photographer, and newspaper for unauthor-
ized publication and distribution of photograph of their deceased child); Douglas, 
149 S.W. at 850 (upholding jury verdict in lawsuit by parents of deceased Siamese 
twins against photographer). 
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authority, even in the states which decided them, is questionable.”98 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, expressly rejecting the appel-
lants’ alternative argument that even if the decedent’s personal pri-
vacy right had expired at death, the survivors should be able to sue 
for “invasion of their own privacy and the privacy of the descend-
ants whom they undertake to represent by class action.”99 The court 
concluded that “no such right of action exists under the averments 
of the complaint in the present case.”100 
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in 
the more typical context of a criminal investigation.101 The plain-
tiff’s seventeen-year-old daughter, a rape victim, had died as a result 
of the injuries she had sustained.102 Her father sued a broadcaster, as 
authorized by a Georgia statute, for revealing the name of his daugh-
ter as the rape victim, claiming the disclosure had invaded his own 
right of privacy.103 The Georgia Supreme Court upheld his claim.104 
But the United States Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the 
broadcasting company’s reporter was exercising his First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights by publishing information that he had law-
fully gathered from court records and proceedings open to the gen-
eral public.105 
 
 98 Young, 312 F. Supp. 1341 n.2 (citing Waters v. Fleetwood, 91 S.E.2d 344, 
346–48 (Ga. 1956)). 
 99 Young, 423 F.2d at 266. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 474 (noting that the original action was brought under GA. CODE 
ANN. § 26-9901 (1972)). 
 104 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 131 (Ga. 1973) (acknowledg-
ing the “head-on collision between the tort of public disclosure and First Amend-
ment rights of freedom of speech and press”), rev’d, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). As a 
state law claim, Cox Broadcasting did not involve a request under the federal 
FOIA statute for access to public records held by a federal agency. Instead, a fa-
ther asserted a claim based on a Georgia statute that barred disclosure of a rape 
victim’s identity, which the defendant broadcaster challenged as unconstitutional. 
Id. at 133–34. 
 105 Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 496–97. “Appellee has not contended that 
the name was obtained [improperly] or that it was not on an official court docu-
ment open to public inspection. Under these circumstances, the protection of free-
dom of the press . . . bars the State of Georgia from making appellants’ broadcast 
the basis of civil liability.” Id. The Court did not disclaim the father’s privacy 
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A Florida appellate court in 1981 addressed a claim by surviving 
family members after an author had published a book including in-
formation about their deceased relative.106 The family claimed a 
 
interests protected by the Georgia statute, but implicitly reasoned that First 
Amendment considerations with respect to public records outweighed any privacy 
concerns of family survivors. See id. at 494–95. 
[E]ven the prevailing law of invasion of privacy generally rec-
ognizes that the interests in privacy fade when the information 
involved already appears on the public record. The conclusion 
is compelling when viewed in terms of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments and in light of the public interest in a vigorous 
press. The Georgia [statutory] cause of action for invasion of 
privacy through public disclosure of the name of a rape victim 
imposes sanctions on pure expression—the content of a publi-
cation—and not conduct or a combination of speech and non-
speech elements that might otherwise be open to regulation or 
prohibition. The publication of truthful information available 
on the public record contains none of the indicia of those limited 
categories of expression, such as ‘fighting’ words, which [are 
not entitled to First Amendment protection]. 
By placing the information in the public domain on official 
court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded 
that the public interest was thereby being served. Public records 
by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the 
administration of government, and a public benefit is performed 
by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the media. 
The freedom of the press to publish that information appears to 
us to be of critical importance to our type of government in 
which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of 
public business. In preserving that form of government the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing less than that 
the States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truth-
ful information contained in official court records open to pub-
lic inspection. 
Id. (citations omitted). In effect, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a state 
statute restricting disclosure of rape victims’ identities, with the result that any 
state law limiting free access to public information risks a challenge based on the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment freedom of the press. But cf. Weaver v. Myers, 
229 So. 3d 1118, 1141–42 (Fla. 2017) (4-3 opinion) (upholding analogous state 
privacy claim on behalf of decedent’s estate grounded in Florida Constitution, 
which protects confidentiality of decedent’s medical records). 
 106 Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Loft cited 
the Georgia Supreme Court decision in Cohn as one of several cases illustrating 
the rationale that “relatives of the deceased have their own privacy interest in 
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violation of the right of privacy under both Florida statutory and 
common law.107 Although the court rejected the relatives’ claim be-
cause they had not asserted “any independent violation of their own 
privacy rights,” the court refused to reject all relational privacy 
claims out of hand.108 As the court explained in dicta, 
We are wary of a blanket rule barring all relatives of 
a deceased from bringing a common law invasion of 
privacy action simply because the relatives were not 
directly involved in the publicity [pertaining to the 
decedent]. However, . . . such relatives must shoul-
der a heavy burden in establishing a cause of action. 
When there are unusual circumstances, . . . it may be 
that a defendant’s conduct towards a decedent will 
be found to be sufficiently egregious to give rise to 
an independent cause of action in favor of members 
of decedent’s immediate family.109 
But in 1998, in Reid v. Pierce County, the Washington Supreme 
Court recognized a common law relational privacy interest in sev-
eral decedents’ immediate relatives, holding that they could assert 
claims against county officials for misappropriating photographs of 
the decedents’ corpses and displaying them to third parties.110 The 
photographs had been taken during forensic investigations or during 
 
protecting their rights in the character and memory of the deceased[,] as well as 
the right to recover for their own humiliation and wounded feelings caused by the 
publication.” Id. While noting that the Supreme Court had reversed Cohn “on 
other grounds,” the Florida court did not address the potential conflict between its 
dicta and the First Amendment. Id. 
 107 Id. at 621 (citing FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (1977)). The claim did not assert a 
privacy right grounded in the Florida Constitution, which did not expressly grant 
a personal right of privacy until four years after the 1976 publication of the book 
that was the source of the family’s privacy claims. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 
(“Right of Privacy.—Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free 
from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except [that] [t]his sec-
tion shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records 
and meetings as provided by law.”). 
 108 Loft, 408 So. 2d at 624. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Reid v. Pierce Cty., 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998). 
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autopsies.111 The court reasoned that if the defendants had physically 
interfered with the corpses, liability certainly would have attached 
under the state’s precedents.112 The court also cited a Washington 
statute declaring that autopsy reports were confidential and gener-
ally prohibiting their disclosure to third parties, with limited excep-
tions such as the decedent’s personal representative, family mem-
bers, and attending physician.113 Rejecting as “counterintuitive” the 
county’s argument that the relatives’ claims were meritless “no mat-
ter how egregious the act,”114 the court concluded that “immediate 
relatives of a decedent have a protectable privacy interest in the au-
topsy records of decedent [that] is grounded in maintaining the dig-
nity of the deceased.”115 The Washington Supreme Court’s holding 
in Reid has been followed by appellate courts in Delaware and Ten-
nessee as a matter of state common law.116 
 
 111 Id. at 335. A concurring judge in a later California case addressing a similar 
issue narrowly characterized the right recognized in Reid and analogous cases as 
“a familial right of privacy in autopsy photographs.” Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. 
Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 391 (Ct. App. 2010) (Aronson, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added). 
 112 Reid, 961 P.2d at 339–40 (citing Gadbury v. Bleitz, 233 P. 299 (Wash. 
1925); Wright v. Beardsley, 89 P. 172 (Wash. 1907)). 
 113 Id. at 341 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.105 (1987)). 
 114 Id. at 342. 
 115 Id. at 342–43. The court reasoned that the county’s actions had been “suf-
ficiently egregious to enable the families of the deceased to maintain their own 
action.” Id. at 342. While the plaintiffs in Reid also asserted a claim for violation 
of the state constitutional right of privacy, the court declined to address that issue, 
reasoning “that Plaintiffs may obtain adequate relief under the common law and 
that such actions are better addressed under the common law invasion of privacy 
action.” Id. at 343. Notably, however, the Reid court expressly approved the dicta 
in Loft v. Fuller, in which a Florida appellate court had declined to foreclose a 
relational right of privacy claim if “a defendant’s conduct towards a decedent [is] 
sufficiently egregious to give rise to an independent cause of action in favor of 
members of decedent’s immediate family.” Id. at 342 (quoting with approval Loft 
v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 116 See Lawson v. Meconi, 897 A.2d 740, 743, 747 (Del. 2006) (holding that 
state statutes barring public disclosure of autopsy report and other death-related 
information created privacy right on the part of decedent’s widow) (citing DEL. 
CODE. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 4707(e), 4710(b), 4710(c)) (2003); Harris v. Horton, 341 
S.W.3d 264, 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“Plaintiffs may have a protectable pri-
vacy interest in photographs of their deceased relative . . . consonant with prior 
Tennessee cases holding that the family of a decedent has a protectable interest in 
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The various state court decisions addressing “relational privacy” 
are difficult to harmonize, and, at least so far, not even the American 
Law Institute has attempted to do so. The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, parts of which were published in final form in 2012, now ex-
pressly acknowledges a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
 
making certain that the decedent’s remains are not disturbed or mutilated.”) (cit-
ing with approval Reid, 961 P.2d at 335–36, 341, 342), overruled on other 
grounds by Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 n.6 (Tenn. 2012).  
In Lawson, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision 
rejecting the widow’s claim, reasoning as follows: 
In providing the statutory protections that have been invoked by 
Mrs. Lawson, the General Assembly has recognized concepts 
that have been respected in almost all civilizations from time 
immemorial: “[f]amily members have a personal stake in hon-
oring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted 
public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends 
to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the de-
ceased person who was once their own.” 
Lawson, 897 A.2d at 747–48 (quoting Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Fav-
ish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004)).  
But other state courts have declined to follow Reid. E.g., Cannady v. St. Vin-
cent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 423 S.W.3d 548, 553–54 (Ark. 2012) (rejecting 
mother’s claim that decedent’s right of privacy survived according to Arkansas’s 
survival statute, but holding that decedent’s tort of outrage claim did survive and 
that mother could assert a claim for outrage on her own behalf as a “relational 
wrong”). In Cannady, the defendant hospital’s employees had pled guilty to fel-
ony violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6) (2006) (the federal Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)), which prohibits obtaining or dis-
closing “individually identifiable health information.” 423 S.W.3d at 549. The 
plaintiff’s counsel apparently did not argue that the mother had a derivative pri-
vacy right against the hospital based on its employees’ federal criminal convic-
tions. See id. at 550–54. However, nearly all courts that have considered the issue 
have held that HIPAA does not authorize a private cause of action to enforce its 
privacy protections, even by a direct victim of the violation. E.g., Dodd v. Jones, 
623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010) (“HIPAA does not create a private right of 
action.”); cf. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278, 290–91 (2002) (holding 
that Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 creates no privacy rights 
that an aggrieved individual can enforce in a private cause of action).  
On remand, the Cannady trial court denied the hospital’s summary judgment 
motion on the mother’s tort of outrage claim. Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary 
Med. Ctr., 537 S.W.3d 259, 262–63 (Ark. 2018). The hospital argued in part that 
“[the decedent’s mother] was not present when the allegedly outrageous conduct 
occurred.” Id. at 262. Although the trial court certified the issue for immediate 
appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court demurred, holding that the interlocutory or-
der was non-appealable. Id. at 266.  
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distress without regard to physical harm under two broad sets of cir-
cumstances.117 First, a defendant may be liable for emotional harm 
as a result of actions that place the plaintiff “in danger of immediate 
bodily harm.”118 Second, a defendant may be liable for a plaintiff’s 
emotional harm resulting from conduct “in the course of specified 
categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which neg-
ligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional 
harm.”119 The relevant comments demonstrate that the second set of 
circumstances is broad enough in scope to cover the series of cases 
addressing negligent handling of corpses or negligent transmission 
of death-related information.120 
But what of the relational right of privacy claim of the nature 
recognized by the Washington Supreme Court in Reid v. Pierce 
County?121 Many other courts have rejected an asserted relational or 
familial right of privacy that survives the decedent, citing the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, published in final form in 1977.122 The 
 
 117 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 
(AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
 118 Id. § 47(a). 
 119 Id. § 47(b) (emphasis added). 
 120 Id. cmt. f. 
Historically, the rule stated in Subsection (b) originated in cases 
involving telegrams announcing death or illness or caring for or 
handling a corpse . . . . Even in the case of mishandling corpses, 
one of the classic categories for permitting recovery of negli-
gently inflicted emotional harm, courts have had to supervise 
and limit those relatives who can sue for emotional 
harm . . . . Now the rule has been extended by many jurisdic-
tions to cover other activities or undertakings.” 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); cf. Cannady, 423 S.W.3d at 553 (holding 
that decedent’s mother had no survival claim for invasion of a “relational right of 
privacy” against hospital for its employees’ unlawful access to photographs in 
decedent’s medical records, but mother could pursue a tort of outrage claim on 
her own behalf as a “relational wrong”). 
 121 See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text. 
 122 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(“Except for the appropriation of one’s name or likeness, an action for invasion 
of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is in-
vaded.”); e.g., Boyd v. Thomson Newspaper Publ'g Co., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
1020, 1023 (W.D. Ark. 1980) (predicting that Arkansas courts would reject a 
claim grounded in a relational privacy interest); Cannady, 423 S.W.3d at 552–53 
(rejecting claim that mother had a relational right of privacy that survived 
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Restatement (Third) of Torts, now underway, has yet to address the 
issue.123 Moreover, the four aspects of the right of privacy recog-
nized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts all purport to limit the 
tortious cause of action to intentional invasions of privacy.124 The 
question remains whether a court would recognize a common law 
claim for negligent or reckless invasion of privacy, akin to the one 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes for infliction of emo-
tional distress with various degrees of culpability.125 
In January 2019, the ALI approved development of the next part 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which will address both defa-
mation and privacy claims.126 The next iteration is likely to address 
significant issues, perhaps including the scope of relational privacy 
 
decedent) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I). But cf. In re Estate 
of Reynolds, 327 P.3d 213, 218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-3110 (2014)) (holding that a surviving daughter’s Mother’s Day tribute 
to her deceased parent did not violate decedent’s right of publicity, which had 
survived her death notwithstanding Arizona survival statute that expressly ex-
cluded privacy claims). 
 123 As of this writing, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) has either issued or 
embarked upon four subcomponents of the Restatement (Third) of Torts that su-
persede relevant parts of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Products Liability, 
Apportionment of Liability, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, and Lia-
bility for Economic Harm. See Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Defamation 
and Privacy, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/torts-defama-
tion-and-privacy/#_status (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Restatement of 
the Law Third, Torts]. Other Restatements address aspects of the right of privacy 
in particular settings, such as employment. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
LAW ch. 7 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 5, 2012) (addressing “Employee 
Privacy and Autonomy”).  
As this Article went to press, the ALI website describes the forthcoming in-
stallment of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, on “Defamation and Privacy,” as 
“address[ing] torts dealing with personal and business reputation and dignity, in-
cluding defamation, business disparagement, and rights of privacy. Among other 
issues, the updates will cover the substantial body of new issues relating to the 
internet.” Restatement of the Law Third, Torts, supra (emphasis added).  
 124 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 125 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 126 Restatement of the Law Third, Torts, supra note 123. Currently underway 
is the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons, but that compo-
nent reportedly does not address privacy rights. See Kenneth W. Simons & W. 
Jonathan Cardi, Restating the Intentional Torts to Persons: Seeing the Forest and 
the Trees, 10 J. TORT L. 1, 15 (2018) (acknowledging that the intentional torts of 
defamation and invasion of privacy are not addressed in Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons). 
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interests. But most likely the next installment will not be soon in 
coming.127 Time will tell, but in the meantime, courts will continue 
to struggle with relational aspects of privacy interests in a rapidly 
advancing technological age.128 
III. FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND FEDERAL 
PRIVACY ACT PROTECTION OF “PERSONAL” PRIVACY 
The federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),129 and many 
comparable state open records acts,130 indirectly recognize “per-
sonal privacy” interests with respect to otherwise “public” records131 
but do not articulate the source, nature, or scope of those privacy 
 
 127 See Project Life Cycle, AM LAW INSTI., https://www.ali.org/projects/pro-
ject-life-cycle/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) (outlining the many steps of the process 
from project announcement to project completion). 
 128 See, e.g., Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 WL 3126229, 
at *1–2 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009) (acknowledging a mother’s claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against her daughter’s former paramour, who had 
emailed sexually explicit photos of the daughter to her mother and other family 
members). The court found little precedent or persuasive secondary authority for 
this “revenge porn” issue. See id. at *4 (“Today, unlike 1977, the year that the 
American Law Institute officially adopted the Restatement (Second), due to the 
advent of the Internet, ‘the barriers of creating publicity are slight.’ Conse-
quently . . . the Restatement offers little to no assistance to the Court in its effort 
to resolve the present matter.”) See generally Eric Goldman & Angie Jin, Judicial 
Resolution of Nonconsensual Pornography Dissemination Cases, 14 I/S: J.L. & 
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 283, 292–93 (2018); Elizabeth Williams, Cause of Action for 
Internet Posting of “Revenge Porn”, 72 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 537 (2016) (dis-
cussing the causes of action through which a victim of “revenge pornography” 
may obtain civil redress). 
 129 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018). 
 130 E.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -111 (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 45-215 to -223 (2019). While state open-records acts and the federal FOIA 
serve similar public policy goals, state and federal acts reflect “stark differences 
in scope and utility.” Christopher P. Beall, Note, The Exaltation of Privacy Doc-
trines over Public Information Law, 45 DUKE L.J. 1249, 1251 (1996). 
 131 Just what constitutes “public” information is a conundrum in its own right. 
See Woodrow Hartzog, The Public Information Fallacy, 99 B.U. L. REV. 459, 465 
(2019) (“[N]obody knows what ‘public’ means, because it has no set definition in 
law or policy.”). 
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interests.132 In general, FOIA statutes provide that all “agency rec-
ords” maintained by executive branch agencies must be disclosed 
upon request—subject to certain restrictions and express exemp-
tions.133 The exemptions are many, but two of them are particularly 
relevant to personal privacy.134 
 
 132 See, e.g., Michael Hoefges et al., Privacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure 
Policy: The “Uses and Effects” Double Standard in Access to Personally-Identi-
fiable Information in Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3 
(2003) (observing that FOIA’s privacy exemptions appear “to place the public 
interest in full public disclosure of government-held information in an adversarial 
relationship with the individual privacy interest in nondisclosure”). 
 133 The courts have acknowledged that FOIA’s “remedial purpose was to 
pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of 
public scrutiny.” Rose v. Dep’t of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974), 
aff’d, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); see also Alirez v. N.L.R.B., 676 F.2d 423, 425 (10th 
Cir. 1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (noting that FOIA’s “basic pol-
icy” favors disclosure and, accordingly, the Act “is to be broadly construed in 
favor of disclosure . . . and, unless requested material in the possession of a fed-
eral agency falls within one of the statutory exemptions structured to protect spec-
ified confidentiality and privacy interests, it must be made available on demand 
to any member of the general public . . . . These statutory exemptions are to be 
narrowly construed with all doubts resolved in favor of disclosure . . . .”); Lauren 
Bemis, Balancing a Citizen’s Right to Know with the Privacy of an Innocent Fam-
ily: The Expansion of the Scope of Exemption 7(C) of The Freedom of Information 
Act Under National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, 25 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 507, 508 (2005) (noting that FOIA was designed as “a 
full-disclosure statute”). FOIA places the burden on the agency “to show that cer-
tain pieces of information should not be released,” expressly limiting the circum-
stances under which an agency is authorized to withhold information. Id. Those 
circumstances include when “the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure 
would harm an interest protected by an exemption described in subsection (b).” 5 
U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). 
 134 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (“personnel and medical files and similar files the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy”) (emphasis added); id. § 552(b)(7) (“records or information compiled for 
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law 
enforcement records or information . . . (C) could reasonably be expected to con-
stitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”) (emphasis added). While 
both exemptions purport to protect “personal privacy,” the Supreme Court has 
carefully distinguished the language of the two exemptions, interpreting Exemp-
tion 7(C) to provide considerably more agency discretion to withhold sensitive 
information that could infringe on personal privacy interests. See, e.g., Favish, 
541 U.S. at 165–66; News-Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 
1198 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that while amendments to Exemption 7(C) eased 
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The first exception pertains to “personnel and medical files and 
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy.”135 The second pertains to 
“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,” 
which an agency may withhold from disclosure “only to the extent 
 
the burden on a federal law enforcement agency to justify withholding a record 
from disclosure on that basis, “Congress . . . steadfastly refused to yield as to Ex-
emption 6” for personnel, medical, and similar records that would lead to a 
“clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”). 
 135 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Bibles v. Oregon Nat. 
Desert Ass’n, 519 U.S. 355, 355–56 (1997) (per curiam) (reversing Ninth Cir-
cuit’s holding that 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) did not justify the Bureau of Land Man-
agement (“BLM”) decision to withhold its mailing list from respondent environ-
mental association, which had asserted “a perceived public interest in ‘providing 
[persons on the BLM’s mailing list] with additional information’”) (alteration in 
original). The Court observed that while the asserted reasons for requesting dis-
closure of public information are irrelevant, “the only relevant public interest in 
the FOIA balancing analysis is the extent to which disclosure of the information 
sought would shed light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties or oth-
erwise let citizens know what their government is up to.” Id. at 355–56 (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted) (emphasis in original). Releasing the 
mailing list to an environmental advocacy group, the Court reasoned, would not 
advance the public policy goals underlying FOIA. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit directed the trial court on remand to dismiss the associa-
tion’s FOIA claim seeking the agency’s mailing list, presumably on the basis that 
its disclosure would impose a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy 
under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Oregon Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Bibles, 125 F.3d 1282, 
1282 (9th Cir. 1997). Such a finding strains credulity, given the limited “personal” 
information contained in the mailing list. See Oregon Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Bibles, 
83 F.3d 1168, 1169 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the claim sought “the names and 
addresses of persons who receive the BLM’s newsletter [that] provide[d] infor-
mation about the BLM’s activities and plans affecting the Oregon de-
sert”), rev’d, 519 U.S. 355 (1997).  
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bibles rested on a narrow interpretation 
of FOIA’s disclosure mandate by confining it to its purported policy rationale 
favoring government transparency, while at the same time broadly interpreting 
the exemption under § 552(b)(6) authorizing BLM to withhold the mailing list. 
See Bibles, 519 U.S. at 355–56. The Court’s interpretation thus directly conflicted 
with the longstanding practice of narrowly construing FOIA’s “limited exemp-
tions” in favor of disclosure, consistent with the statute’s “dominant objective.” 
E.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (citations 
omitted). 
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that the production . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute 
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”136 
Does this federal statutory disclosure mandate that yields to per-
ceived “personal privacy” interests refer to the federal constitutional 
right of privacy? Or do the FOIA exemptions instead recognize a 
federal statutory right of privacy by negative implication? Or does 
the statutory term “invasion of personal privacy” refer to privacy 
rights protected by state law, whether constitutional, statutory, or 
common law?137 If the latter, how is a federal agency—or a federal 
 
 136 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (emphasis added); see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989) (reaffirming 
that “whether an invasion of privacy is warranted cannot turn on the purposes for 
which the request for information is made”). Similar to the language in 
§ 552(b)(7)(C), the otherwise mandatory disclosure subsections of FOIA gener-
ally provide the following: 
To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying de-
tails when it makes available or publishes an opinion, statement 
of policy, interpretation, staff manual, instruction, or copies of 
records referred to in subparagraph (D) [with certain records to 
be made available for public inspection in electronic format]. 
However, in each case the justification for the deletion shall be 
explained fully in writing, and the extent of such deletion shall 
be indicated on the portion of the record which is made availa-
ble or published, unless including that indication would harm 
an interest protected by the exemption in subsection (b) under 
which the deletion is made. If technically feasible, the extent of 
the deletion shall be indicated at the place in the record where 
the deletion was made. 
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(E) (emphasis added). 
 137 Several states have incorporated privacy rights into their respective state 
constitutions. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending 
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every nat-
ural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into 
the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall 
not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records and meet-
ings as provided by law.”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person shall be secure 
in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against un-
reasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.”) (emphasis added); 
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or 
his home invaded, without authority of law.”); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics 
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reviewing court—to determine which state’s substantive privacy 
law applies? These questions have no clear answers, and courts ap-
pear to take a multitude of different approaches in interpreting the 
scope of the FOIA “personal privacy” exemptions.138 
Moreover, some significant federal precedents suggest that one 
or perhaps both of FOIA’s “personal privacy” exemptions from dis-
closure incorporate an expansive “relational” perspective on pri-
vacy—in contrast to state common law privacy rights, which are 
generally thought to protect only individual privacy.139 This Part 
considers those perplexing and confounding issues. 
A. Personnel, Medical, and Similar Records: Exemption 6 
In 1996, in a closely divided en banc opinion, the Federal Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether a 
federal agency had acted properly when it withheld an audiotape re-
cording of the astronauts’ voices during the tragic launch of the 
Challenger space shuttle from the press.140 The applicable federal 
FOIA exemption pertained to “personnel and medical files and sim-
ilar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy.”141 The lower court had held 
 
v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997) (“[I]n many contexts, the scope and 
application of the state constitutional right of privacy is broader and more protec-
tive of privacy than the federal constitutional right of privacy as interpreted by 
the federal courts.”). See generally Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in 
State Constitutional Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 971, 988 (2006) (“State constitutional 
conceptions of privacy independent of the federal model began to emerge at a rel-
atively early date.”); Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/telecommunications-and-information-technology/ privacy-protections-in-
state-constitutions.aspx. 
 138 Compare, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1004–10 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990), with, e.g., McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 766 S.W.2d 909, 913–
16 (Ark. 1989). 
 139 But cf. McCambridge, 766 S.W.2d at 915 (recognizing that City’s intended 
disclosure of criminal investigation photos and documents, including personal let-
ters relating to son’s murder-suicide, implicated his mother’s asserted federal con-
stitutional privacy right against disclosure; but mother’s informational privacy in-
terests, while “very high,” were outweighed by government’s “highly valued gov-
ernmental interest” in disclosure under Arkansas FOIA). 
 140 N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1003–04 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (6-5 
opinion on rehearing en banc). 
 141 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); see supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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that disclosure was mandatory because the audio recording did not 
qualify as a personnel, medical, or similar file to which the exemp-
tion expressly applied.142 
The disputed recording had captured the last remarks by the 
seven ill-fated astronauts just before the Challenger space shuttle 
exploded with all of them aboard.143 The National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (“NASA”) claimed that giving the press a 
copy of the audiotape would subject the astronauts’ surviving family 
members “to hearing the voices of their loved ones, an intrusion on 
their grief which would certainly exacerbate feelings of hurt and 
loss.”144 NASA responded to the FOIA request by supplying a tran-
scribed readout of the tape, but the New York Times wanted a copy 
of the audio recording itself.145  
A slim majority of the en banc court of appeals held that the 
audio recording met the threshold test of the FOIA exemption.  The 
court reasoned that the recording pertained to particular persons, 
and therefore NASA had the statutory authority to withhold it from 
disclosure, even if the astronauts personally were not the subjects of 
the recording.146 The majority directed the trial court to give NASA 
an opportunity on remand to establish that releasing the recording 
would indeed invade the privacy of either the decedents themselves 
or their surviving families.147 The majority rejected the dissenters’ 
argument that, to avoid the FOIA disclosure mandate, NASA 
needed to establish that the recording included personal information 
about the surviving family members, who argued that disclosure 
would implicate their own personal privacy interests.148 The dissent-
ers, reasoning that the subject of the recording was the safety of the 
Challenger space shuttle, not the personal lives of the ill-fated astro-
nauts, concluded that NASA’s rationale for withholding it from the 
 
 142 N.Y. Times Co., 920 F.2d at 1003. The district court therefore did not ini-
tially address whether the recording’s disclosure would have amounted to a 
“clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Id. at 1004. 
 143 Id. at 1004. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1009–10. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 1007–09. 
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press did not satisfy the precondition for invoking the FOIA exemp-
tion.149  
On remand, NASA persuaded the district court that the surviv-
ing family members’ “personal privacy” interests outweighed the 
public interest in disclosing the audio recording, which would 
amount to a clearly unwarranted invasion of the family members’ 
privacy.150 In reaching that conclusion, the district court expressly 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court had narrowly interpreted the 
public interest in disclosure of government records protected by 
FOIA’s mandate.151 
B. Criminal Investigation Records: Exemption 7(C) 
The most significant case that expansively interpreted the fed-
eral FOIA disclosure exemption for criminal investigation rec-
ords152 was the 2004 Supreme Court decision in National Archives 
& Records Administration v. Favish.153 Allan J. Favish, a California 
lawyer, filed a federal FOIA request with the National Archives 
seeking photographs of the corpse of Vince Foster, who had died in 
1993 as an apparent victim of a self-inflicted gunshot wound during 
his tenure as President Clinton’s Deputy White House Counsel.154 
 
 149 See id. The majority and dissenting opinions of the D.C. Circuit on rehear-
ing en banc reflect the controversy inherent in the language Congress used in 
drafting the FOIA privacy exemptions: Do they purport to protect individual “per-
sonal privacy,” consistent with the traditional understanding of personal privacy 
rights? Or do they reasonably extend to “personal privacy” interests of the indi-
vidual subject’s family members? See id. at 1006 (reasoning that the threshold for 
invoking Exemption 6 “was set at a low level”); see also id. at 1010–11 (Edwards, 
J., dissenting) (“The majority now holds that if an identifiable individual is some-
how connected with a Government file, that file automatically becomes a ‘similar 
file’ under Exemption 6. That is not what the statute says.”). 
 150 N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 628, 633 (D.D.C. 1991). 
 151 Id. at 632 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). 
 152 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2018). 
 153 541 U.S. 157 (2004). The Court’s decision cited with approval the district 
court’s opinion on remand in New York Times Co. v. NASA, in particular its focus 
on the privacy interests of the astronauts’ surviving family members. Id. at 170–
71. 
 154 See id. at 161. See generally KENNETH W. STARR, REPORT ON THE DEATH 
OF VINCENT W. FOSTER, JR., BY THE OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN RE: 
MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION 1–28 (1997), 
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The relevant federal agencies had denied the FOIA request, assert-
ing that releasing the death scene photographs would amount to an 
“unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”155 Although the dece-
dent’s own “personal privacy” was certainly not at stake, Vince Fos-
ter’s surviving family members intervened, objecting to the photo-
graphs’ release.156 
The Court held that the statutory exemption relating to unwar-
ranted invasions of “personal” privacy for disclosure of criminal in-
vestigation records was broad enough to extend to Foster’s surviv-
ing family members because they had objected to releasing photo-
graphs showing the condition of Foster’s body at the scene of his 
death.157 The Court reasoned,  
[W]e think it proper to conclude from Congress’ use 
of the term “personal privacy” that it intended to per-
mit family members to assert their own privacy rights 
against public intrusions long deemed impermissible 
under the common law and in our cultural traditions. 
This does not mean that the family is in the same po-
sition as the individual who is the subject of the dis-
closure. We have little difficulty, however, in finding 
in our case law and traditions the right of family 
members to direct and control disposition of the body 
of the deceased and to limit attempts to exploit pic-
tures of the deceased family member’s remains for 
public purposes . . . . Family members have a per-
sonal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and 
objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by 
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&con-
text=federal_documents. 
 155 See id. at 160 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000) and explaining that 
it “excuses from disclosure ‘records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes’ if their production ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy’”). 
 156 See id. at 167. 
 157 Id. at 165. 
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rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased 
person who was once their own.158 
The Court reiterated that the privacy right attributed to Foster’s 
family members was a statutory right by implication, foreclosing 
any inference that it rested on a constitutionally protected privacy 
right.159 
We have observed that the statutory privacy right 
protected by [FOIA] Exemption 7(C) goes beyond 
the common law and the Constitution . . . . It would 
be anomalous to hold in the instant case that the stat-
ute provides even less protection [for personal pri-
vacy] than does the common law.160 
 
 158 Id. at 167–68 (emphasis added). 
 159 See id. at 170 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 n.13 (1989)). In Reporters Committee, however, the 
Court had distinguished the scope of FOIA’s “personal privacy” protections from 
those protected by state common law and the Constitution, suggesting that the 
FOIA statutory privacy protections are significantly narrower. See Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 763 (referring to “the individual's con-
trol of information concerning his or her person”). In the footnote cited in Favish, 
the Reporters Committee majority observed that “[t]he question of the statutory 
meaning of privacy under the FOIA is, of course, not the same as the question 
whether a [common law] tort action might lie for invasion of privacy or the ques-
tion whether an individual’s interest in privacy is protected by the Constitution.”  
Id. at 762 n.13 (emphasis added).  
 160 Id. at 170 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Marzen v. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 825 F.2d 1148, 1152 (7th Cir. 1987) (observing 
that “the privacy interest protected under FOIA extends beyond the common 
law”).  
What is unclear, however, is just what the federal courts mean by the “com-
mon law” privacy interest beyond which the FOIA exemptions purportedly reach. 
Of course, the federal courts have no power to create federal common law. Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general com-
mon law.”). And until a century ago, most states did not recognize a “common 
law” right of privacy. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
AND PRIVACY 836–37 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining that the “rights of privacy and 
publicity were unknown to the early common law of England or the 
United States” and that Georgia in 1905 was the first state to judicially recognize 
the right of privacy). Even fewer recognized a state constitutional right of privacy 
until the latter part of the twentieth century. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred 
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Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1423 (1992) (“Few of the states rec-
ognized anything approaching an identifiable right of privacy under their own 
constitutions during the first two centuries of this nation’s history.”). But cf. Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing a constitutional right 
to marital privacy, “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than 
our political parties, older than our school system”). 
The Court has declared that FOIA’s several express exemptions from com-
pelled agency disclosure were “plainly intended to set up concrete, workable 
standards for determining whether particular material may be withheld or must be 
disclosed.” Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973). However, in the 
years since FOIA’s first enactment in 1966, the Supreme Court has been charac-
teristically nebulous in mapping the boundaries of FOIA’s informational “right of 
privacy,” articulating its legal foundations, and explaining how it applies. See, 
e.g., FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 408–10 (2011) (holding that federal courts 
have interpreted FOIA’s “personal privacy” exemptions to apply to an “individ-
ual’s right of privacy”; thus, FOIA’s personal privacy protection “against disclo-
sure of law enforcement information . . . does not extend to corporations”) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 777–79, 779 n.22 
(holding that balancing private and public interests to determine whether to dis-
close criminal investigation records does not require an “ad hoc,” individualized 
approach; rather, a categorical approach employing “discrete categor[ies] of ex-
empt information” represents a “workable” rule that advances FOIA policy favor-
ing expedited disclosure) (citations omitted); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Washington 
Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599, 602 (1982) (“House and Senate Reports . . . suggest 
that Congress’ primary purpose . . . was to protect individuals from the injury and 
embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal infor-
mation . . . . When disclosure of information which applies to a particular indi-
vidual is sought from Government records, courts must determine whether release 
of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of that per-
son’s privacy.”) (emphasis added); id. at 602 n.5 (explaining that (1) information 
exempted from mandatory disclosure in “similar files” is not “limited to [that] 
containing intimate details about individuals such as might also be contained in 
personnel or medical files,” and (2) scope of exemption may extend to information 
contained in public records if disclosure could result in a “clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy”); Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 
(1976) (“Congress sought to construct an exemption [for personnel and medical 
records] that would require a balancing of the individual’s right of privacy against 
the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act ‘to open 
agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’ The device adopted to achieve that 
balance was the limited exemption, where privacy was threatened, for ‘clearly un-
warranted’ invasions of personal privacy.”) (emphasis added). But see Nat’l Ar-
chives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (interpreting “per-
sonal privacy” in exemption for criminal investigation records to include privacy 
rights of family members “against public intrusions long deemed impermissible 
under the common law and in our cultural traditions,” but sidestepping whether 
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Thus, the so-called “right” of Vince Foster’s immediate family 
members that the Court presumably recognized and enforced in 
Favish was expressly grounded solely in FOIA’s disclosure exemp-
tion for information in criminal investigation records that, if re-
leased, could amount to an “unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy.”161 While the Court disclaimed reliance on the federal Consti-
tution as the source of the relational right of privacy, the statutory 
right of privacy the Court attributed to Foster’s surviving family 
members was interpreted as broader than, but at least coterminous 
with, the common law right of privacy.162 The question Favish left 
open was the nature, scope, and relational reach of the surviving 
family’s statutory privacy “right” that the Court extrapolated from 
the FOIA exemption for certain information in criminal investiga-
tion records.163 
Finally, the Favish Court held that under the circumstances, the 
surviving family’s statutory privacy interests outweighed the re-
quester’s asserted public interest in favor of securing access to the 
photographs.164 Therefore, the Court upheld the federal agencies’ 
 
“the family is in the same position as the individual who is the subject of the 
disclosure”). 
 161 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000). 
 162 Favish, 541 U.S. at 170. 
 163 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C); see also Jeffrey R. Boles, Documenting 
Death: Public Access to Government Death Records and Attendant Privacy Con-
cerns, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 271 (2012). For example, had the Na-
tional Archives elected to disclose the photographs of Foster’s corpse over the 
objection of his widow and sister, the statutory privacy protection the Court ex-
trapolated by negative implication from § 552(b)(7)(C) would not support a pri-
vate cause of action by the survivors against the federal government for infringing 
their relational right of privacy. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166. While the Privacy 
Act authorizes a private claim to redress a violation of that Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(g)(1) (2018), FOIA does not. See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
And under the Privacy Act, surely the surviving family members could not have 
reasonably argued that the photos of the decedent they sought to withhold in-
cluded information pertaining to them, either individually or collectively. See 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (allowing an individual to bring a claim, not an individual’s 
family). 
 164 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 174–75. 
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decision invoking the judicially expanded Exemption (7)(C) to 
avoid the judicially narrowed FOIA disclosure mandate.165 
C. Distinguishing the Judicially Implied FOIA Privacy 
“Right” from Agency Discretion to Prevent Unwarranted 
Invasions of “Personal Privacy” 
Various state and federal courts considering the scope of state 
common law and statutory privacy rights have distinguished Favish 
on the rationale that the FOIA privacy exemptions recognize a fed-
eral statutory right of privacy.166 However, courts have not been in-
clined to rely on Favish to expand the purported statutory “right” the 
Court articulated. For example, the Supreme Court in 2011 declined 
 
   165   See id. at 170; see also Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Free-
dom of Information Act 1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Pro-
tection over the Public Interest in Knowing What the Government's Up to, 11 
COMM. L. & POL'Y 511, 514 (2006) (“In effect, the Court has tipped the scales 
significantly in favor of a broadly construed and vaguely framed right to privacy 
over the public's right of access to government-held information.”). 
 166 E.g., Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 F. App’x 755, 761–62 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 825 (2007) (distinguishing Favish as “rel[ying] 
on a statutory privacy right under the FOIA, not a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy” in rejecting survivors’ Oklahoma privacy claim alleging wrongful pho-
tographing of decedent’s open casket and later publishing and selling photo-
graphs); Graham v. Ala. State Emps. Ass’n, 991 So. 2d 710, 720 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2007) (“Favish . . . was interpreting and applying only the statute before it—the 
FOIA—not some general privacy right recognized or created by the United States 
Constitution or by the common law . . . . In this case, we are dealing with [state] 
statutes that do not include the same language found in the FOIA.”); Mercer v. 
S.D. Attorney Gen. Office, 864 N.W. 2d 299, 304 (S.D. 2015) (holding Favish in-
applicable absent any state statutory language similar to FOIA exemption that 
might result in “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); Lawson v. Meconi, 
No. 1183-N, 2005 WL 5755653, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2005) (addressing 
widow’s claim to enjoin release of autopsy information concerning spouse’s ac-
cidental death; explaining that cases interpreting federal FOIA exemptions were 
“not dispositive as to whether [decedent’s] common law right of privacy survives 
death, especially since . . . the overwhelming weight of authority . . . holds that it 
does not”); cf. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 871 A.2d 523, 533 (Me. 
2005) (distinguishing Favish on its facts because “records requested in this case 
involve allegations of abuse alleged to have occurred twenty to seventy years ago 
[by now-deceased priests],” so the case posed no risk of “unwarranted public ex-
ploitation of grieving family members that was central to the outcome in Fav-
ish ”). 
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to hold that FOIA’s “personal privacy” exemptions extend to corpo-
rations.167 
 
 167 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 409–10 (2011) (holding that the “pro-
tection in FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground 
that it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not ex-
tend to corporations”). Chief Justice Roberts included a helpful summary of the 
legislative history of the two FOIA exemptions, which were both designed to pro-
tect “personal privacy.” Id. at 407–09; see also Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network 
v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Agency, 811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 737–38 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (as amended on reconsideration). 
And yet the Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous Court, emphasized the 
individual nature of “personal privacy” recognized by FOIA Exemption 6. See 
AT&T, 562 U.S. at 408 (“Although the question whether Exemption 6 is limited 
to individuals has not come to us directly, we have regularly referred to that ex-
emption as involving an ‘individual’s right of privacy.’”) (citations omitted). But 
that reasoning expressly undercuts the Court’s 2004 (pre-Roberts) holding in Fav-
ish, which expansively interpreted “personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) to en-
compass a decedent’s close relatives. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 170.  
On the other hand, the AT&T majority opinion explained that “‘[p]ersonal’ in 
the phrase ‘personal privacy’ conveys more than just ‘of a person.’ It suggests a 
type of privacy evocative of human concerns—not the sort usually associated with 
an entity like . . . AT&T.” AT&T, 562 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added). Chief Justice 
Roberts cited Favish with apparent approval, specifically its reliance on a 1974 
Department of Justice [DOJ] Memorandum issued soon after Congress enacted § 
552(b)(7)(C). AT&T, 562 U.S at 409. The Court referred to the 1974 DOJ Mem-
orandum as a “reliable guide” to interpreting FOIA. Id. (noting that Congress later 
reprinted the memorandum in a 1975 joint committee print).  
Because the DOJ Memorandum sheds light on the Court’s interpretation of 
Exemption 7(C), the relevant section is reprinted below. Although the Court is 
increasingly reluctant to rely on legislative history (especially subsequent legisla-
tive history) to interpret federal statutes, in this case it probably best explains why 
the Court has generously interpreted agency discretion to withhold public records 
from disclosure out of respect for a decedent’s surviving “relatives or descend-
ants.” 
  
(C) INVASION OF PRIVACY 
 
     Clause (C) [of § 552(b)(7)] exempts law enforcement inves-
tigatory records to the extent that their production would “con-
stitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The com-
parable provision in [a Senate] amendment referred to “clearly 
unwarranted” invasions, but “clearly” was deleted by the Con-
ference Committee. 
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     Except for the omission of “clearly,” the language of clause 
(C) is the same as that contained in the original Act for [Exemp-
tion 6], the exemption for personnel, medical and similar files. 
Thus, in determining the meaning of clause (C), it is appropriate 
to consider the body of court decisions regarding [Exemption 
6]—bearing in mind, of course, that the deletion of “clearly” 
renders the Government’s burden somewhat lighter under the 
new provisions. In applying clause (C), it will also be necessary 
to take account of the Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law 93-579, 
which takes effect in September 1975. 
     The phrase “personal privacy” pertains to the privacy in-
terests of individuals. Unlike clause (B), clause (C) does not 
seem applicable to corporations or other entities. The individu-
als whose interests are protected by clause (C) clearly include 
the subject of the [criminal] investigation and “any [other] per-
son mentioned in the requested file.” In appropriate situations, 
clause (C) also protects relatives or descendants of such per-
sons. 
     While neither the legislative history nor the terms of the Act 
and the 1974 Amendments comprehensively specify what in-
formation about an individual may be deemed to involve a pri-
vacy interest, cases under [Exemption 6] have recognized, for 
example, that a person’s home address can qualify. It is thus 
clear that the privacy interest does not extend only to types of 
information that people generally do not make public. Rather, 
in the present context it must be deemed generally to include 
information about an individual which he could reasonably as-
sert an option to withhold from the public at large because of its 
intimacy or its possible adverse effects upon himself or his fam-
ily. 
     When the facts indicate an invasion of privacy under clause 
(C), but there is substantial uncertainty whether such invasion 
is “unwarranted,” a balancing process may be in order, in which 
the agency would consider whether the individual’s [privacy] 
rights are outweighed by the public’s interest in having the ma-
terial available. 
     The Conference Report states (p. 13) that “disclosure of in-
formation about a person to that person does not constitute an 
invasion of his privacy.” It must be noted, however, that records 
concerning one individual may contain information affecting 
the privacy interests of others. Of course, when information 
otherwise exempt [from disclosure] under clause (C) is sought 
by a requester claiming to be the subject of the information, the 
agency may require appropriate verification of identity. 
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Regardless of what Congress may have intended in 1974, the 
plain language of FOIA’s statutory exemptions from mandatory dis-
closure of public records does not come close to creating a statutory 
“right” of privacy for anyone, let alone an individual’s relatives. If 
such a privacy “right” exists at all, it is nothing more than a creature 
of judicial “gloss” on the plain language of the statute.  
Indeed, FOIA’s personal privacy exemptions from mandatory 
disclosure expressly grant only discretionary authority to a federal 
agency holding public records to override what is otherwise a statu-
tory duty to disclose those records upon request.168 The exemptions 
qualify a federal agency’s statutory duty to disclose, but they do not 
confer an independent right of privacy on anyone, including the per-
son to whom the information directly and specifically pertains.169 
As virtually every court has held, the language that Congress em-
ployed in FOIA imposes a broad duty to disclose information in 
public records,170 unless the agency exercises its statutory authority 
to withhold certain records (or parts of records) under the specific 
conditions outlined in each enumerated exemption.171 Nor does ei-
ther privacy exemption prohibit agency disclosure to protect 
 
Attorney General’s Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/oip/attorney-generals-memorandum-1974-
amendments-foia (last updated July 23, 2014) (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted). 
 168 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(E) (2018) (stating that an agency may delete 
information that can identify an individual). 
 169 See id. 
 170 E.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 910 F.3d 1232, 
1235 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Freedom of Information Act . . . vests the public 
with a broad right to access government records.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(3)(A)) (2012); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2018) (“Each agency shall make 
available to the public information as follows: . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also 
id. § 552(d) (“This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit 
the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this sec-
tion.”) (emphasis added). 
 171 See FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Discretionary Disclosure and Waiver, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-discretionary-
disclosure-and-waiver#N_9 (last updated July 23, 2014) [hereinafter FOIA 
Guide] (explaining that because “FOIA’s exemptions are discretionary, not man-
datory, agencies may make ‘discretionary disclosures’ of exempt information, as 
a matter of their administrative discretion, where they are not otherwise prohibited 
from doing so”); cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (“Con-
gress did not design the FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure.”). 
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anyone’s personal privacy, regardless of whether the person or the 
person’s family might object. As the Court explained in 1979,  
[t]he organization of the Act is straightforward. Sub-
section (a), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), places a general obli-
gation on the agency to make information available 
to the public and sets out specific modes of disclo-
sure for certain classes of information. Subsection 
(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), which lists the exemptions, 
simply states that the specified material is not subject 
to the disclosure obligations set out in subsection (a). 
By its terms, subsection (b) demarcates the agency’s 
obligation to disclose; it does not foreclose disclo-
sure.172 
Contrary to the Court’s reasoning in Favish,173 and the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court’s interpretation in New York Times Co. 
v. NASA,174 the longstanding interpretation of the federal FOIA ex-
emptions is that they grant discretionary authority to federal agen-
cies to withhold records from disclosure under specified circum-
stances, but they impose no duty to do so.175 Absent a statutory duty 
 
 172 Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 291–92 (emphasis added); see also Doe v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 920 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2019). But see Boles, supra note 
163, at 246–47 (opining that “the [FOIA] exemptions direct an agency to withhold 
particular types of records if certain conditions are met” and that FOIA Exemp-
tions 6 and 7(C) “block the release of government records to prevent unwarranted 
invasions of privacy”) (emphasis added). In support of the statement that FOIA’s 
exemptions direct an agency to withhold particular types of records, Boles cited 
Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293–94. See Boles, supra note 163, at 246 n.45. How-
ever, the Court in Chrysler Corp. expressly stated that FOIA privacy exemptions 
do not bar agency disclosure: “[T]he exemptions were only meant to permit the 
agency to withhold certain information, and were not meant to mandate nondis-
closure.” 441 U.S. at 293–94 (emphasis added). 
 173 See discussion supra Section III.B. 
 174 N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1003–04 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 175 See, e.g., Doe, 920 F.3d at 872. “FOIA is a disclosure statute. If an agency 
wrongly withholds information in the face of a proper FOIA request, it violates 
that statute. But if an agency discloses information pursuant to other statutory 
provisions or regulations, the agency cannot possibly violate FOIA.” Id.; see also 
Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293–94 (citing statements in congressional record 
reflecting that Congress intended exemptions to permit agencies to withhold cer-
tain kinds of information without mandating withholding). 
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to withhold information, FOIA creates no correlative privacy 
“right.”176 For that reason, under any reasonable interpretation of the 
statute’s plain language, it is difficult to justify the Supreme Court’s 
generous reading of the FOIA exemptions to support any so-called 
statutory “right” of privacy.177 That is particularly true because 
FOIA expressly grants a federal agency the discretion to withhold 
information it reasonably foresees could (or would) pose an unwar-
ranted invasion of “personal privacy.”178 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the FOIA 
exemption from the disclosure mandate for information in medical, 
personnel, and similar records (“Exemption 6”) offers even less 
agency discretion to withhold sensitive information than does the 
exemption for information in criminal investigation records (“Ex-
emption 7(C)”).179 But notwithstanding the Favish Court’s interpre-
tation to the contrary, neither FOIA exemption confers a statutory 
right of personal privacy on anyone, let alone the relatives of a de-
cedent whose common law personal privacy rights terminated at 
death.180 
On the other hand, the federal Privacy Act of 1974, discussed in 
Section III.E, created a limited statutory privacy right to prevent 
government disclosure of individual information without the written 
consent of the person to whom that information pertains.181 In fact, 
the Privacy Act’s statement of legislative purpose expressly 
 
 176 As the next Subpart will explain, the Privacy Act of 1974 does arguably 
create a limited statutory “right” of personal privacy, but any such right is ex-
pressly subject to the disclosure mandate of FOIA. See infra notes 189, 207–11 
and accompanying text. 
 177 Cf. Favish, 541 U.S. at 170 (holding that “FOIA recognizes surviving fam-
ily members’ right to personal privacy with respect to their close relative’s death-
scene images . . . consistent with the unanimous view of the Courts of Appeals 
and other lower courts that have addressed the question”) (emphasis added). 
 178 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (d) (2018) (explaining in subsection 
(d) that “[t]his section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the 
availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section”) 
(emphasis added). 
 179 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166. “Exemption 7(C)’s comparative breadth is no 
mere accident in drafting. We know Congress gave special consideration to the 
language in Exemption 7(C) because it was the result of specific amendments to 
an existing statute.” Id. 
 180 See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293–94; see also Doe, 920 F.3d at 872. 
 181 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018). 
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declared that “the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental 
right protected by the Constitution of the United States.”182 But Fav-
ish had nothing to do with the Privacy Act; it involved a FOIA re-
quest by a third party for Foster’s death-scene photographs held by 
a federal agency.183 Moreover, Foster’s family members who sup-
ported the agency’s decision to withhold the photographs were in-
tervenors, not parties to the litigation.184 That is because FOIA, un-
like the Privacy Act, does not authorize a private cause of action 
against the government to protect anyone’s privacy interests that 
might be implicated by mandatory disclosure of public records.185 
Instead, FOIA authorizes a claim only by the requester of a public 
record to enforce the FOIA disclosure mandate.186 And, even if the 
agency exercises its statutory authority to withhold a public record 
under one of the privacy-related exemptions, the burden is on the 
agency itself—not a third party whose privacy might be impli-
cated—to justify that discretionary decision.187 
The Favish Court’s declaration that a statutory right of privacy 
exists based solely on the language of FOIA’s two privacy-related 
exemptions simply lacks a sound legal footing. The majority opin-
ion adopted a non-textual interpretation based on a 1974 Department 
 
 182 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 
(1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2(b) (pro-
tecting individual privacy by authorizing an individual to preclude an agency from 
disclosing “records pertaining to him . . . without his consent; [and authorizing] 
civil suit for . . . willful or intentional [agency] action” that violates an individual’s 
rights under the Act). 
 183 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 161. FOIA was enacted in 1966, predating the Pri-
vacy Act by several years.  Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 165, at 512. 
 184 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166–67. 
 185 See FOIA Guide, supra note 171. 
 186 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2018). 
On complaint, the district court of the United States . . . has ju-
risdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency rec-
ords and to order the production of any agency records improp-
erly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court 
shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the con-
tents of such agency records in camera to determine whether 
such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of 
the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and 
the burden is on the agency to sustain its action. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 187 See id. 
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of Justice Memorandum issued soon after Congress added Exemp-
tion 7(C) pertaining to medical, personnel, and similar records.188 
While Congress arguably created a limited statutory “right of 
personal privacy” by enacting the 1974 Privacy Act, the federal 
courts have repeatedly acknowledged that an individual’s qualified 
privacy right conferred by that Act is expressly subject to FOIA’s 
pre-existing disclosure mandate.189 Thus, only by a federal agency’s 
discretionary act—and, if challenged by a requester, a federal 
court’s endorsement of that discretion—does anyone enjoy privacy 
by an agency’s nondisclosure of a public record based on either 
FOIA Exemption 6 or Exemption 7(C).190 
D. Judicial Interpretation of “Personal” Privacy to 
Encompass Surviving Relatives 
While some courts have tread lightly in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of FOIA’s reference to “personal privacy” in 
favor of statutory relational privacy interests, the Ninth Circuit has 
not. In Marsh v. County of San Diego, Judge Kozinski, writing for 
the panel, expansively interpreted Favish to recognize a constitu-
tional right to relational privacy grounded in substantive due pro-
cess.191 In doing so, the Marsh panel’s dicta reached well beyond 
the reasoning expressed in Favish and the legislative history sup-
porting the Supreme Court’s holding. 
In Marsh, a surviving mother filed a statutory tort claim against 
the county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, objecting to the county’s publi-
cation of photographs of her son’s death scene and autopsy.192 
 
 188 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 169; Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 165, at 
539-40 (noting that Congress added FOIA Exemption 7(C) in 1974). 
 189 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293 n.14 (comparing FOIA and the 
Privacy Act). 
 190 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 191 Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012) (“For 
precisely the same reasons [cited by the Court in Favish], we conclude that this 
right is also protected by substantive due process.”). 
 192 Id. at 1152 (noting that the basis for Marsh’s claim was the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); see also Williams v. Baker, 464 F. Supp. 2d 
46, 49 (D. Me. 2006) (“A violation of an individual’s [constitutional] right of pri-
vacy can form the basis for a cause of action under § 1983.”) (citing Borucki v. 
Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
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Declaring the issue a matter of first impression, the panel held that 
the common law right to non-interference with a family’s remem-
brance of a decedent is so ingrained in tradition that it is constitu-
tionally protected as a matter of substantive due process.193 The 
court recognized family members’ well-established common law 
privacy right to protect a loved one’s death images from publication: 
The long-standing tradition of respecting family 
members’ privacy in death images partakes of both 
types of privacy interests protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. First, the publication of death images 
interferes with “the individual interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters . . . .” Few things are 
more personal than the graphic details of a close fam-
ily member’s tragic death. Images of the [decedent’s] 
body usually reveal a great deal about the manner of 
death and the decedent’s suffering during his final 
moments—all matters of private grief not generally 
shared with the world at large.  
 
Brenda Marsh’s toddler son died in 1983 as a result of physical injuries while 
in the care of Marsh's then-partner, Kenneth Marsh. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152. 
Kenneth Marsh served two decades in state prison for homicide before he was 
ultimately released. Id. After his release, Brenda married Kenneth Marsh, who 
was later awarded $756,000 in compensation by the California Victim Compen-
sation and Government Claims Board for the time he spent in prison. Mark Mar-
tin, $756,900 for 21 Years Wrongly Held in Prison / Dead Child's Mom Always 
Said Convict Didn't Kill Her Son, SFGATE (Jan. 20, 2006, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/756-900-for-21-years-wrongly-held-in-
prison-2506317.php (“The compensation would mark the ending of a story wor-
thy of a Hollywood script.”). 
 193 Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154. A sister circuit described substantive due process 
claims as follows: 
A substantive due process claim can be stated two different 
ways. One, substantive due process is violated when the state 
infringes “fundamental” liberty interests without narrowly tai-
loring that infringement to serve a compelling state interest. 
Two, substantive due process is offended when the state’s ac-
tions either “shock[ ] the conscience” or “offend[ ] judicial no-
tions of fairness . . . or . . . human dignity.” 
Riley v. St. Louis Cty. 153 F.3d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 
1998) (en banc)). 
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     Second, a parent's right to control a deceased 
child's remains and death images flows from the 
well-established substantive due process right to 
family integrity.194 
While the Marsh panel’s dicta squarely declared that the surviv-
ing mother’s asserted privacy rights were grounded in substantive 
due process, the court held that her § 1983 claim was nevertheless 
barred by qualified immunity because the new-found substantive 
due process right had not been “clearly established” at the time of 
the county’s alleged violation.195 The case was remanded to address 
a host of other state law claims, including intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.196 
Marsh was wrongly decided, and it appears to be generating a 
circuit split on the issue of relational privacy interests that will re-
quire either Supreme Court intervention or congressional action to 
resolve.197 Favish and the relational privacy rights the Marsh panel 
 
 194 Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 
(1977)); see also Roberts v. Bell, 281 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1086 (D. Mont. 2018) 
(rejecting § 1983 claim by decedent’s daughter and her children against the county 
for posting photographs on Facebook depicting decedent’s death; acknowledging 
Marsh but concluding that the county’s “alleged conduct [did] not rise to the level 
of a substantive due process violation”); Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 588, 
591–92 (6th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging Marsh but holding that county defend-
ants’ conduct did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to plaintiffs’ con-
stitutionally protected rights that would “shock the conscience”). But cf. Olejnik 
v. England, 147 F. Supp. 3d 763, 778 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (declining to follow 
Marsh, noting that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has not recognized any constitutionally 
protected interest in the ‘right to remembrance’ or to the non-interference with a 
loved one’s remains”; pointing out that the Supreme Court has expressly limited 
the scope of substantive due process rights) (citing Gen. Auto Serv. Station v. City 
of Chicago, 526 F.3d 991, 1000 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
 195 Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1159–60. 
 196 See Marsh v. County of San Diego, No. 37201200099693CUCRCT, 2013 
WL 12144732, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 21, 2013). 
 197 See, e.g., Granato v. Davis, 2014-Ohio-5572, 2014 WL 7224556, at *1–5, 
*15 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting a widow’s substantive due process claim 
based on Marsh for interfering with her “right of sepulcher” stemming from cor-
oner’s failure to correctly identify decedent’s body); see also, e.g., Riley, 153 F.3d 
at 630 & n.5 (describing the Missouri common law right of sepulcher as the next-
of-kin’s right “to perform a ceremonious and decent burial of the nearest rela-
tive—and an action for the breach of that right,’” which “typically involves a 
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recognized as the “long-standing tradition of respecting family 
members’ privacy in death images” involved informational privacy 
interests—meaning the right to control the dissemination of personal 
information.198 The Supreme Court has long distinguished informa-
tional privacy interests from decisional and autonomy privacy inter-
ests, such as reproductive decision making and parenting decisions 
about children’s religious and academic education.199 While both as-
pects of privacy have relational components, Favish and other FOIA 
cases addressed only informational privacy, the focus of this Article. 
E. Federal Privacy Act of 1974: Nondisclosure of Personal 
Information; Exceptions 
American privacy law took a decided turn in favor of protecting 
personal informational privacy on the eve of 1975, when the federal 
Privacy Act of 1974200 became law. The Act’s expressed purpose 
was “to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information 
 
physical intrusion, mishandling, or manipulation of the deceased’s body”) (cita-
tions omitted). The Riley panel rejected the plaintiff’s substantive due process 
claim. Id. at 631 (“We are generally hesitant to extend substantive due process 
into new arenas.”). 
 198 Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154. 
 199 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977). “The cases some-
times characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two dif-
ferent kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making cer-
tain kinds of important decisions.” Id.; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
399 (1923) (freedom in raising and educating children); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 
492, 517–19 (7th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh’g (May 15, 2003); In-
dus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Acc. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 679 (Tex. 1976). 
     Several commentators have suggested that the right of pri-
vacy protected by the U.S. Constitution actually has two mean-
ings: first, the ability of individuals to determine for themselves 
whether to undergo certain experiences or to perform certain 
acts—Autonomy; and second, the ability of individuals ’to de-
termine for themselves when, how, and to what extent infor-
mation about them is communicated to others’—the  right  to 
control information, or Disclosural privacy . . . . Most privacy 
cases decided by the Supreme Court to date have concerned au-
tonomy. Little has been said of the constitutional dimensions of 
disclosural privacy. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 200 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (1974) (cod-
ified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018)).  
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systems maintained by Federal agencies, . . . [by] regulat[ing] the 
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by 
such agencies.”201 In outlining the Act’s purposes, Congress de-
clared that “the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right 
protected by the Constitution of the United States.”202 Read in his-
torical context, Congress surely meant to declare a personal right to 
informational privacy, not decisional autonomy, which was still 
very much in judicial flux in the mid-1970s.203 
The federal Privacy Act sought to ensure that a person to whom 
personal information pertains has the right to consent—or refuse 
consent—to a third party’s request for personal information in any 
“record”204 maintained by a federal agency.205 As the Supreme 
 
 201 Id. § 2(a)(5) (emphasis added). 
 202 Id. § 2(a)(4). 
 203 See infra notes 214–15 (discussing the constitutional right to privacy with 
respect to decision-making autonomy). The 1974 Privacy Act predated Whalen v. 
Roe by three years. Whalen was the first Supreme Court case that acknowledged 
(in dicta) that informational privacy might have constitutional underpinnings. 
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the ac-
cumulation of vast amounts of personal information in comput-
erized data banks or other massive government files . . . . The 
right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically 
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to 
avoid unwarranted disclosures . . . . [I]n some circumstances 
that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution . . . . 
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. 
 204 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (2018) (defining “record” for purposes of the 
Privacy Act to mean “information about an individual that is maintained by an 
agency”) (emphasis added)). “Agency” is separately defined to mean an agency 
in the executive branch. See id. § 552a(a)(1); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (defin-
ing “agency”). Section 551(f)(1) expressly excludes Congress and the courts from 
the definition.  See id. 
 205 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). “CONDITIONS OF DISCLOSURE.—No agency shall dis-
close any record . . . to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a 
written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom 
the record pertains . . . .” Id. However, the Privacy Act lists 12 exceptions, includ-
ing one that expressly makes the Act’s prohibition on disclosure (absent the sub-
ject’s written consent) subject to the mandatory disclosure provisions of 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (“No agency shall disclose any record . . . unless 
disclosure of the record would be . . . required under section 552 of this ti-
tle . . . .”). Thus, if a third party requests public information that is part of a federal 
agency “record,” disclosure is mandatory under FOIA, unless one or more of the 
FOIA exemptions authorize withholding. See Cochran v. United States, 770 F.2d 
949, 955 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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Court once described the Privacy Act of 1974, “Congress explicitly 
require[d] agencies to withhold records about an individual from 
most third parties unless the subject gives his permission.”206 
The interplay between the federal Privacy Act and the federal 
Freedom of Information Act is confusing at best.207 While the Pri-
vacy Act generally prohibits disclosure of personal information in 
public records without the person’s written consent, FOIA generally 
mandates disclosure of information in public records, whether per-
sonal or not.208 Each statute enumerates several exceptions, often 
denominated “exemptions.”209 Privacy Act exemptions from the 
general rule of nondisclosure authorize a federal agency to disclose 
a record even without the subject’s written consent.210 In contrast, 
FOIA exemptions to the general rule of disclosure authorize a fed-
eral agency to withhold information from a requester under specified 
circumstances, notwithstanding the broad statutory mandate 
 
 206 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 n.14 (1979). 
 207 The convoluted drafting and codification of the two statutes, FOIA enacted 
in 1966 and the Privacy Act in 1974, are no doubt among the reasons the FOIA 
exemptions have generated so much litigation. See Cochran, 770 F.2d at 957 (re-
ferring to “the Privacy Act and the FOIA [as] two statutes between which there is 
great tension”); see also Julia P. Eckart, The History of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act’s Apparent Failure to Define “Record,” and the Disconcerting Trend 
of Applying Electronic Discovery Protocols to the FOIA, 11 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 
313, 313 (2018) (referring to FOIA jurisprudence as “a convoluted and complex 
area of law” and noting that “this complexity began at the FOIA’s inception”). 
But see Porter v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he 
[Privacy Act’s] language in section 552a(b)(2) could hardly be clearer. This non-
disclosure provision expressly excepts disclosures required under the Freedom of 
Information Act.”) (emphasis added); see also Cochran, 770 F.2d at 954–55. 
[T]he relationship between the two acts is clearly established. 
Subsection (b)(2) of the Privacy Act expressly defers to the 
mandatory disclosure requirements of the FOIA by prohibiting 
the nonconsensual release of personal information unless the 
information is required to be disclosed under the FOIA. 
Id. (emphasis added). To this reader (and probably most other critical legal read-
ers), the relationship between the two statutes and their many exceptions is hardly 
“clear.” 
 208 See Cochran, 770 F.2d at 954–55, 955 n.7 (summarizing relevant legisla-
tive history). 
 209 See id. at 954. 
 210 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
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favoring disclosure of information in a federal agency’s records.211 
Reconciling the terms of the companion statutes is nothing short of 
a legal mindbender.212 
 
 211 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); Cochran, 770 F.2d at 954. The Privacy Act purports 
to address the potential for conflict in the two statutes’ respective exemptions, 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(t), but that subdivision, like the others, is hardly a model of legis-
lative clarity. 
(1) EFFECT OF OTHER LAWS.— No agency shall rely on any ex-
emption contained in section 552 of this title [FOIA] to with-
hold from an individual any record which is otherwise accessi-
ble to such individual under the provisions of this section [the 
Privacy Act]. 
(2) No agency shall rely on any exemption in this section [the 
Privacy Act] to withhold from an individual any record which 
is otherwise accessible to such individual under the provisions 
of section 552 of this title [FOIA]. 
Id. When read together, these subsections support the congressional purpose fa-
voring disclosure of public records. If an individual requester may otherwise ob-
tain access to a record containing personal information under the Privacy Act, the 
agency cannot invoke one of the FOIA disclosure exemptions as a reason to with-
hold it. Id. § 552a(t)(1). Similarly, if an individual may obtain access to a public 
record under FOIA’s disclosure mandate, the agency cannot invoke one of the 
Privacy Act’s nondisclosure exemptions as a reason to withhold the record. Id. 
§ 552a(t)(2); see Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 819 
F.2d 1181, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The two acts explicitly state that access to 
records under each is available without regard to exemptions under the other.”). 
This interpretation, as codified in § 552a(t), is also consistent with 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(b)(2), which expressly makes the Privacy Act’s general rule of nondisclo-
sure subject to FOIA’s mandatory disclosure provisions. See Doe v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, 790 F. Supp. 17, 19 n.1 (D.D.C. 1992). “It is well established that the 
Privacy Act and FOIA provide separate routes for obtaining information. 
Where . . . a person files requests under both Acts, an exemption must apply from 
each Act in order for the material to be withheld.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(t) 
(1988)). 
To illustrate, assume that Requester A seeks an FBI record that contains per-
sonal information about Person B. Assume further that Person B declines to give 
written consent to the FBI to disclose the record to Requester A, which the Privacy 
Act requires as a precondition of disclosure. The FBI is nevertheless obligated by 
FOIA’s general disclosure mandate to hand over the record to Requester A, unless 
one of the privacy-related FOIA exemptions applies and the FBI elects to invoke 
its discretion to withhold the record from Requester A. Even then, if Requester A 
challenges that decision, the FBI must shoulder the burden of defending its dis-
cretionary decision to withhold Person B’s FBI record. Nothing in FOIA bars the 
FBI from disclosing the record to Requester A, even though it contains personal 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Distinguishing Informational Privacy from Decisional 
Privacy Rights 
When judges and scholars debate the constitutional right of pri-
vacy, they typically speak of either the implied Fourth Amendment 
right of individual privacy against unreasonable search and sei-
zure,213 or the right of autonomy to make personal decisions regard-
ing intimate consensual conduct, procreation, childrearing, and the 
like.214 Outside the law enforcement context, the Supreme Court has 
 
information pertaining to Person B.  On the other hand, if Person B consents to 
the release of the record to Requester A, the FBI cannot invoke one of the privacy 
exemptions in FOIA to withhold the record. In other words, § 552a(t) imposes 
additional constraints on an agency’s discretion to withhold personal information 
that is otherwise available to third parties. 
 212 Cf. United States v. Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (coining the 
descriptive term “semantic mindbender” in referring to defendant’s argument 
challenging his sentence as a career offender). 
 213 E.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (holding that 
allowing unrestricted government access to information of a “deeply revealing 
nature” in a wireless carrier’s database of physical location information gleaned 
from cell phones was subject to Fourth Amendment protection, even if a third 
party had gathered the information); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 
(2013) (5-4 opinion) (“When officers make an arrest [for a serious offense] sup-
ported by probable cause . . . , taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s 
DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking pro-
cedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (expanding the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment to protect not just places, but personal privacy as well, holding that 
what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the pub-
lic, may be constitutionally protected”). 
 214 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (addressing 
the constitutional right to make “certain personal choices central to individ-
ual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal iden-
tity and beliefs”); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional 
Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 971, 972 (2006) (“One of the more significant branches of 
the right of privacy concerns the right of an individual to make personal decisions 
about his or her life free from government control; that is, the right of individual 
autonomy.”); cf. Rao, Reconceiving Privacy, supra note 68, at 1123 (1998) (pos-
iting that the constitutional right of privacy with respect to decisional autonomy 
should be reconceived “as a relational right that attaches to entire associations ra-
ther than to isolated individuals,” a right that is “bounded by the countervailing 
interests of others [and] ends at the point when individuals within a protected 
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grappled with the “constitutional right of privacy”—generally 
meaning the right to autonomy in decision making—in a long line 
of decisions over the last several decades.215 
In what was perhaps the first of these decisions, the Supreme 
Court considered whether a District of Columbia public utility com-
mission violated public transit passengers’ constitutional privacy 
right by broadcasting amplified radio programs in passenger cars.216 
The Court rejected the claim after balancing the complaining pas-
sengers’ asserted privacy interests against the desires of other pas-
sengers who apparently enjoyed the radio broadcasts.217 
 
relationship assert contradictory interests”). On occasion, a court erroneously re-
fers to a constitutional right of informational privacy, even in factual and legal 
contexts that implicate the constitutional right to decision-making autonomy. See, 
e.g., Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1116 (10th Cir. 2006) (enjoining 
enforcement of a Kansas statute requiring professionals to report minors’ volun-
tary sexual activity with other minors after holding, as a matter of first impression, 
that “the right of informational privacy extends to minors”) (emphasis added). 
The trial court’s decision on remand was vacated as moot by the Tenth Circuit 
after the 2006 Kansas Legislature repealed the challenged statute. See Aid for 
Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1102 (D. Kan. 2006), vacated, No. 
06-3187, 2007 WL 6787808 (10th Cir. Sept. 20, 2007) (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 
38-1522 (repealed 2006)). See generally Aliya Haider, Adolescents Under Inter-
national Law: Autonomy as the Key to Reproductive Health, 14 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 605 (2008). 
 215 See supra note 214 and accompanying text; infra notes 216–39 and accom-
panying text. 
 216 Pub. Utilities Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 453, 463 (1952). 
 217 Id. at 463–64. The Court’s reasoning harkened back to the Lochner era, 
when it held that “[t]he supervision of such practices by the Public Utilities Com-
mission in the manner prescribed in the District of Columbia meets the require-
ments both of substantive and procedural due process when it is not arbitrarily 
and capriciously exercised.” Id. at 465. Justice Frankfurter wrote separately to 
express his admittedly biased reasons for recusing from the case: “My feelings 
are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy that I had better 
not participate in judicial judgment upon it.” Id. at 467 (Frankfurter, J., writing 
separately). 
Justice Douglas dissented, noting first that the passengers’ assertion of a Fifth 
Amendment liberty interest presented an issue of first impression. Id. (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). Perhaps in light of the post-World War II times, he wrote elo-
quently of the possibility that the government could require radio broadcasts on 
public transit systems to achieve ill motives: 
If liberty is to flourish, government should never be allowed to 
force people to listen to any radio program. The right of privacy 
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However complete [a passenger’s] right of privacy 
may be at home, it is substantially limited by the 
rights of others when its possessor travels on a public 
thoroughfare or rides in a public conveyance. Street-
cars and busses are subject to the immediate control 
of their owner and operator and, by virtue of their 
dedication to public service, they are for the common 
use of all of their passengers. The Federal Govern-
ment in its regulation of them is not only entitled, but 
is required, to take into consideration the interests of 
all concerned.218 
B. Constitutional Basis for a Right to Informational Privacy 
In a few cases, the Supreme Court has considered an asserted 
constitutional right to informational privacy219—specifically, a right 
to prevent government disclosure or misuse of sensitive personal in-
formation.220 However, to date, the Court has never expressly 
 
should include the right to pick and choose from competing en-
tertainments, competing propaganda, competing political phi-
losophies. If people are let alone in those choices, the right of 
privacy will pay dividends in character and integrity. The 
strength of our system is in the dignity, the resourcefulness, and 
the independence of our people. Our confidence is in their abil-
ity as individuals to make the wisest choice. That system cannot 
flourish if regimentation takes hold. The right of privacy, today 
violated, is a powerful deterrent to any one who would control 
men’s minds. 
Id. at 469 (Douglas, J., dissenting). However compelling Justice Douglas’s con-
cerns, the constitutional “right of privacy” he asserted is more closely aligned with 
the modern judicial conception of the First Amendment right of free expression, 
including a right not to listen or a right not to know, rather than general due pro-
cess liberty interests. Id.; see Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right 
Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 980 (2009) (“[T]he [proposed] 
right against compelled listening is most strongly grounded in the First Amend-
ment values of autonomy, self-realization, and self-determination.”). 
 218 Pollak, 343 U.S. at 464. 
 219 Larry J. Pittman, The Elusive Constitutional Right to Informational Pri-
vacy, 19 NEV. L.J. 135, 150–67 (2018) (discussing the right to informational pri-
vacy and the recognition of such a right in Supreme Court case law). 
 220 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (concluding that a state 
statute creating a centralized computer file of individuals taking certain 
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declared the existence of a right of informational privacy grounded 
in the federal Constitution.221 In fact, as explained in more detail 
below, the Supreme Court’s most recent opinion addressing the is-
sue sidestepped it once again.222 
Whalen v. Roe,223 decided in 1977, is the Supreme Court case 
most often cited for the premise that the right to informational 
 
prescription drugs impaired neither their interest in nondisclosure of personal in-
formation nor their interest in making personal decisions independently); see also 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (reasoning that while the 
Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the Bill of 
Rights provisions create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy, 
including the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on access to con-
traception); Leiser v. Moore, 903 F.3d 1137, 1140 (10th Cir. 2018) (noting that 
the asserted “right not to have one’s private affairs made public by the government 
[is] sometimes referred to as a right to informational privacy”); Ellen Wright 
Clayton et al., The Law of Genetic Privacy: Applications, Implications, and Lim-
itations, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 5 (2019) (“Informational privacy is a particu-
larly important dimension of genetic privacy.”). 
 221 Lisa Anne Albinger, Personal Information in Government Agency Rec-
ords: Toward an Informational Right to Privacy, 1986 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 625, 
626, 626 n.12 (1986); Guy J. Sternal, Comment, Informational Privacy and Public 
Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25, 28 (1977). 
 222 See, e.g., NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (assuming, without 
deciding, that “the Constitution protects [an informational] privacy right of the 
sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon”). Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion was 
more forthright:  
Like many other desirable things not included in the Constitu-
tion, “informational privacy” seems like a good idea—where-
fore the People have enacted laws . . . restricting government 
collection and use of information. But it is up to the People to 
enact those laws, to shape them, and, when they think it appro-
priate, to repeal them. A federal constitutional right to “infor-
mational privacy” does not exist. 
Id. at 159–60 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 223 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Whalen was a facial constitutional challenge to the 
New York Controlled Substances Act, which provided for a centralized database 
recording the names, addresses, and ages of anyone for whom a physician had 
prescribed certain pharmaceutical drugs. Id. at 591. Various prescribing physi-
cians, patients, and associations sought to enjoin the Act’s enforcement, claiming 
that it violated their constitutional “rights of privacy.” Id. After taking pains to 
give a detailed description of the Act’s legislative history and its provisions de-
signed to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the collected information, the Court 
concluded, “The New York statute . . . represents a considered attempt to deal 
with . . . a problem” of vital local concern, and the statute “was a reasonable 
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privacy is grounded in the federal Constitution.224 There, the Court 
acknowledged—in dicta—the possibility that informational privacy 
interests enjoy a constitutional foundation, but the Court declined to 
articulate the parameters of the asserted right.225 Nor has the Court 
ever held that an asserted constitutional right to informational pri-
vacy was violated, although scholars have observed that the asserted 
right has “flourished by assumption over the decades [in the lower 
 
exercise of New York’s broad police powers.” Id. at 597–98. Turning to the con-
stitutional issues, the Court acknowledged that the New York statute was chal-
lenged on dual grounds: first, the asserted right of individuals to avoid disclosure 
of personal matters, and second, the interest in decisional autonomy. Id. at 599–
600. The Court rejected both arguments, concluding that “neither the immediate 
nor the threatened impact of the patient-identification requirements in the New 
York [Act] on either the reputation or the independence of patients for whom 
Schedule II drugs are medically indicated is sufficient to constitute an invasion of 
any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 603–05; see 
id. at 600. 
 224 See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Constitutionalizing Informational Privacy by As-
sumption, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 953, 955–56 (2012) (describing Whalen as “the 
genesis of the assumed right”). 
 225 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605–06. 
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the ac-
cumulation of vast amounts of personal information in comput-
erized data banks or other massive government files. . . . The 
right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically 
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to 
avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some cir-
cumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, 
nevertheless New York’s statutory scheme, and its implement-
ing administrative procedures, evidence a proper concern with, 
and protection of, the individual’s interest in privacy. We there-
fore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be 
presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private 
data whether intentional or unintentional or by a system that did 
not contain comparable security provisions [to those provided 
by the New York Controlled Substances Act]. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457–
58, 465 (1977) (rejecting President Nixon’s asserted claim to informational pri-
vacy with respect to presidential papers and recordings, which it held was “weaker 
than that found wanting in the recent decision of Whalen v. Roe”); cf. Pittman, 
supra note 219, at 156 (interpreting Nixon as providing “strong support that the 
Court affirmed the existence of a constitutionally protected right to informa-
tional privacy”). 
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courts].”226 One scholar who canvassed federal and state court deci-
sions addressing the issue concluded that “the majority of the federal 
courts of appeals and a number of state courts have gone further 
[than the Supreme Court] and accorded the idea of informational 
privacy constitutional stature.”227 
In 2011, the Court revisited the issue.228 Several contract em-
ployees who had worked for years at a NASA worksite challenged 
the government’s recently adopted requirement that NASA com-
plete and submit detailed employment questionnaires as part of the 
agency’s background check process.229 When first hired, the con-
tract employees had not been required to complete the background 
check otherwise required for civil service employees.230 But after 
the 9/11 Commission recommended improvements in security 
measures, President George W. Bush issued a directive imposing a 
new identification process for all federal employees, including con-
tract employees.231 The Department of Commerce, which houses 
NASA and its research facilities, complied with the presidential or-
der by “mandating that contract employees with long-term access to 
federal facilities complete a standard background check.”232 The 
plaintiffs protested, arguing that the directive requiring them to dis-
close detailed personal information violated their constitutional 
right to informational privacy grounded in the Fifth Amendment.233 
 
 226 Fan, supra note 224, at 956; see also id. at 972 (“In producing decisions 
that could not quite decide if the constitutional right [to informational privacy] 
exists and offering a Rorschach blot of standards that might govern if it did, the 
Court punted to the lower courts to sort things out.”). 
 227 Id. at 974–75, 974 n.121 (citing illustrative cases by various federal and 
state appellate courts); e.g., Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983). 
 228 See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011) (6-2 opinion; Kagan, J., not 
participating). 
 229 Id. at 138. 
 230 Id. at 139. 
 231 Id. at 139–40. 
 232 Id. at 140. 
 233 Id. at 142. The Court noted that all of the information gathered in the gov-
ernment’s background check was subject to the nondisclosure provisions of the 
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 142; see supra note 204–06 and 
accompanying text. 
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The Court rejected the claim, once again sidestepping whether 
the Constitution supports a right to informational privacy.234 After 
carefully reiterating its dicta in both Whalen and Nixon, the Court 
concluded that none of its other decisions had “squarely addressed 
a constitutional right to informational privacy.”235 Following its rea-
soning in Whalen, the Court assumed, without deciding, the exist-
ence of the constitutional right but held that regardless of its hypo-
thetical scope, the right “does not prevent the Government from ask-
ing reasonable questions of the sort included . . . in an employment 
background investigation that is subject to the Privacy Act’s safe-
guards against public disclosure.”236 
Justice Scalia concurred, joined by Justice Thomas, but they 
threw cold water (figuratively speaking) on the very notion that the 
Constitution protects informational privacy.237 They declared 
bluntly that a “federal constitutional right to ‘informational privacy’ 
does not exist.”238 Thus, the Court declined to address the contro-
versial issue any further than it already had in Whalen and Nixon, 
decided more than three decades earlier, and two justices disclaimed 
any constitutional basis whatsoever for the claimed right to infor-
mational privacy.239 
In summary, Supreme Court precedents suggest that any federal 
right to informational privacy is grounded in the Privacy Act, not 
 
 234 Nelson, 562 U.S. at 159. 
 235 Id. at 146. 
 236 Id. at 148. The Court stressed that the plaintiffs had challenged only the 
collection of the information, not any risk of its improper dissemination to third 
parties. Id. at 156. Even if they had, the Court reasoned that all information gath-
ered was subject to the Privacy Act’s “protections against disclosure,” which it 
considered sufficient to “evidence a proper concern” for the contract employees’ 
individual privacy. Id. (citations omitted). The Court, however, failed to 
acknowledge that the Privacy Act's "safeguards" for personal information are ex-
pressly subject to FOIA's general disclosure mandate for information in public 
records. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a), 552a(t). 
 237 Id. at 159–69 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 238 Id. at 160; see also id. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice 
Scalia that the Constitution does not protect a right to informational privacy. . . . 
[T]he notion the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a wellspring of 
unenumerated rights against the Federal Government strains credulity for even 
the most casual user of words.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 239 See supra notes 223–38 and accompanying text. 
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the Constitution, and certainly not FOIA.240 The Favish Court incor-
rectly set the foundations of a federal right to informational privacy 
in FOIA’s discretionary exemptions from the disclosure mandate.  
Instead, the narrow scope of the federal right to informational pri-
vacy—at least for now—rests exclusively on the limited protections 
granted by the Privacy Act of 1974, which are expressly subject to 
FOIA’s disclosure requirements. 
C. First Amendment Constraints on Informational Privacy 
Rights 
Even if a constitutional basis exists for the right to informational 
privacy, the Supreme Court has carefully circumscribed it, recog-
nizing its inherent tension with the First Amendment freedom of 
speech,241 freedom of the press,242 and even the freedom of associa-
tion.243 For example, in 1975, the Court explained that invasion of 
privacy claims for disclosure and dissemination of information 
“most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and 
press.”244 
Indeed, the Court has recognized that “the creation and dissem-
ination of information are speech within the meaning of the First 
Amendment.”245 Thus, if any constitutional right to informational 
privacy exists, the Court would necessarily need to address its in-
herent conflicts with the many well-established individual rights 
 
 240 See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). 
 241 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011). 
 242 See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975). 
 243 See, e.g., NAACP v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 
(1958) (setting aside lower court’s contempt order and fine against NAACP for 
failure to produce its membership list, which infringed NAACP members’ First 
Amendment freedom of association “for the advancement of beliefs and ideas[,] 
an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”); cf. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460 (holding that Maryland pri-
vacy and other common law rights of a deceased soldier’s grieving father must 
yield to First Amendment rights lawfully exercised by anti-homosexual funeral 
picketers, regardless of the hateful content of defendants’ message). 
 244 Cohn, 420 U.S. at 488–89 (“[T]he century has experienced a strong tide 
running in favor of the so-called [common law] right of privacy.”). 
 245 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011) (striking down on 
First Amendment grounds a Vermont statute restricting sale and dissemination of 
information held by private pharmacies that revealed individual physicians’ drug-
prescribing practices). 
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protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.246 No doubt that 
is among the primary reasons, if not the primary reason, the Court 
has been reluctant to squarely address the issue.247 
Given the wide gap that remains in the Court’s informational 
privacy jurisprudence, lower federal courts are understandably mys-
tified about how to resolve these increasingly complex issues.248 
State courts too are left to resort to their own state constitutions, 
statutes, or common law protections for informational privacy, with-
out any clear guidance about First and Fourteenth Amendment con-
straints on those state rights.249 
D. Substantive Due Process and Privacy 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
resorted to the doctrine of “substantive due process” to strike down 
state regulatory statutes that a majority of the Court thought intruded 
too far into the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests of 
 
 246 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1461, 1501, 1523–24 (2000) (explaining how First Amendment jurisprudence 
constrains effective legal responses to “privacy-destroying technologies,” as il-
lustrated by “the relatively limited protection against data acquisition provided by 
existing privacy rules”); Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Pri-
vacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1061 (2009) 
(“By the 1960s, . . . privacy and press rights had each gained sufficient strength 
that the tension [between them] could no longer be ignored.”); see also Fla. Star 
v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (acknowledging the “tension between 
the right which the First Amendment accords to a free press, on the one hand, and 
the protections which various statutes and common-law doctrines accord to per-
sonal privacy against the publication of truthful information, on the other”); 
Cohn, 420 U.S. at 490 (explaining that if a privacy tort claim seeks to redress 
publication of false or misleading personal information, the plaintiff must estab-
lish that information pertaining to a “‘matter[] of public interest’” qualifies as a 
“knowing or reckless falsehood”) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–
88 (1967)). 
 247 See Froomkin, supra note 246, at 1523–24. 
 248 See Pittman, supra note 219, at 167–82 (discussing the federal courts’ var-
ious interpretations of informational privacy). 
 249 See Fan, supra note 224, at 974–75 & n.121 (citing illustrative cases by 
various federal and state appellate courts); see also, e.g., Barry v. City of New 
York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983). 
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commercial businesses and even families.250 But since the mid-
twentieth century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly discredited 
Lochner and its articulation of substantive due process as a rationale 
for striking down state statutes on federal constitutional grounds.251 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court came perhaps as 
close as it has in several decades to deciding a case on substantive 
due process grounds.252 A sharply divided Court held that same-sex 
couples have a constitutional right to marry.253 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for a slim majority, cobbled together a host of constitutional 
interests, including the constitutional right to autonomy in relational 
 
 250 E.g., Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding Or-
egon statute restricting working hours of women to a 10-hour workday, reasoning 
“that [a] woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal functions 
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence”). 
[T]here is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by 
the state . . . . Otherwise the 14th Amendment would have no 
efficacy and the legislatures of the states would have un-
bounded power, and it would be enough to say that any piece of 
legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the health, or 
the safety of the people; such legislation would be valid, no mat-
ter how absolutely without foundation the claim might be. 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revision-
ism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 
92 GEO. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2003) (explaining that the Lochner era spanned from ap-
proximately 1897 to the mid-1930s, when “the Court was dominated by Justices 
who expanded Lochner by voting to limit the power of government in both eco-
nomic and noneconomic contexts”). 
 251 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).  
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner . . . and like cases—that 
due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional 
when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long 
since been discarded. We have returned to the original consti-
tutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and 
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are 
elected to pass laws.  
Id.; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“The need for restraint in administering the strong medicine of sub-
stantive due process is a lesson this Court has learned the hard way.”). 
 252 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616, 2618–19. 
 253 Id. at 2607 (“The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples may ex-
ercise the fundamental right to marry in all States.”). 
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decision-making,254 that support the “fundamental right to marry” 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.255 However, the majority 
carefully avoided holding that the right was grounded in substantive 
due process, notwithstanding the dissenters’ rather hyperbolic pro-
testations to the contrary.256  
More recently, however, the Court held that even the fundamen-
tal right of same-sex couples to marry must yield to First Amend-
ment protections for the exercise of religious freedom, at least when 
a private businessperson asserts religious beliefs as the reason for 
declining to transact business with a same-sex couple who plans to 
marry.257 Thus, in any constitutional analysis, the courts must strike 
 
 254 Id. at 2597–98 (Kennedy, J., writing for a 5-4 majority) (“[T]hese liberties 
[protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] extend to 
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including in-
timate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”) (citing Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 
(1965)). 
 255 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05. 
[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the lib-
erty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the 
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The 
Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fun-
damental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied 
to them. 
Id. 
 256 See id. at 2618–19 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s 
“aggressive application of substantive due process [that] breaks sharply with dec-
ades of precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled approach of Loch-
ner”); id. at 2632 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority clearly uses equal 
protection only to shore up its substantive due process analysis, an analysis both 
based on an imaginary constitutional protection and revisionist view of our history 
and tradition.”). Justice Thomas opined that “[i]n its haste to reach a desired result, 
the majority misapplies a clause focused on ‘due process’ to afford substan-
tive rights, disregards the most plausible understanding of the ‘liberty’ protected 
by that clause, and distorts the principles on which this Nation was founded.” Id. 
at 2640 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 257 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1732 (2018) (Kennedy, J.) “[T]hese disputes must be resolved with toler-
ance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting 
gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”  
Id.  
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a balance among rights that are inherently in tension with one an-
other.258 
Returning to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Marsh articulating a 
relational right of informational privacy grounded in substantive due 
process, discussed supra in Section III.D, the rationale in that case 
is questionable. The Supreme Court’s decisions have closely cab-
ined, if not dismissed altogether, substantive due process as a con-
stitutional foundation for striking down state laws.259 Judge 
Kozinski’s substantive due process reasoning in Marsh directly con-
tradicted the Supreme Court’s informational privacy jurisprudence.  
V. RELATIONAL PRIVACY INTERESTS AND DNA BIOBANKS260   
[A] family history belongs to a collective of individ-
uals, each one of whom has an informational privacy 
 
 258 See supra notes 241–49 and accompanying text (discussing First Amend-
ment constraints on the recognition of a constitutional right of informational pri-
vacy). 
 259 See, e.g., Olejnik v. England, 147 F. Supp. 3d 763, 778 (W.D. Wis. 2015) 
(declining to follow Marsh in part because it “represents an expansion in substan-
tive due process law not augured in Seventh Circuit precedent”; noting that “[t]he 
Supreme Court . . . has been reluctant to enlarge the list of rights protected by 
substantive due process . . . .”) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720 (1997)). 
 260 DNA biobanks collect and link DNA samples with health information for 
research purposes. Kelly E. Ormond et al., The Views of Participants in DNA Bi-
obanks, 1 STAN. J.L., SCI. & POL’Y 80, 81–82 (2010). More than just a database, 
a “biobank” is a unique type of repository that collects, stores, processes, and dis-
tributes biospecimens, such as DNA and other tissue samples, along with the as-
sociated data. Karen J. Maschke, Biobanks: DNA and Research, in FROM BIRTH 
TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING 
BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 11, 11–12 (Mary 
Crowley ed., 2008). DNA biobanks are largely unregulated in the United States. 
See id. at 12 (“Because the United States has no comprehensive regulatory frame-
work that addresses these issues, there is confusion about when the rules govern-
ing research with humans apply to research with biospecimens and their data.”); 
cf. Sarah Zhang, What Happens When You Put 500,000 People’s DNA Online, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/ar-
chive/2017/11/what-happens-when-you-put-500000-peoples-dna-
online/543747/. 
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interest in the security of the information and a spa-
tial privacy interest in not knowing information.261 
Recent developments with respect to the public availability of 
genetic information pose serious risks for informational privacy 
rights—whatever their source—not only for individuals, but also 
their family members.262 In 2003, the scientific community an-
nounced that the Human Genome Project had successfully 
“mapped” the entire human genome.263 Currently underway is the 
Personal Genome Project, initiated in 2005, which seeks to collect 
individual genomic data from volunteers for the purpose of sharing 
it with the public “for the greater good.”264  
 
 261 GRAEME LAURIE, GENETIC PRIVACY:  A CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LEGAL 
NORMS 146 (2002). 
 262 As scholars have noted, mapping the human genome, along with the in-
creasing availability and affordability of direct-to-consumer genetic testing, has 
unprecedented implications for family privacy. See, e.g., id. at 93. 
The potential impact of the uses of genetic information on fam-
ilies, in addition to individuals, is often perceived as being 
unique to this area of inquiry. Indeed, this is frequently held out 
to be the case irrespective of the kind of genetic knowledge in-
volved. The implications of this are far-reaching. The historical 
focus of both ethics and law in the United Kingdom and the 
United States – as paradigm examples of communities nurtured 
in the Western liberal tradition – has been the rights of the indi-
vidual to determine for herself the course of her life, with min-
imal interference by others. This notion is challenged by in-
creased availability of genetic information. At least, this is so if 
we take as our premise that genetic information relates not only 
to the person from whom it is derived, but also to blood relatives 
of that person. . . . [W]e cannot ignore the fact that genetic in-
formation derived from [a genetic] sample might also reveal in-
formation about the relatives of the sample source. 
Id.; see also id. at 3 (“[I]ndividual genetic information can unlock many secrets 
within the wider genetic family.”). 
 263 International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, NAT’L 
HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 14, 2003), https://www.ge-
nome.gov/11006929/2003-release-international-consortium-completes-hgp. The 
Institute reported that “[t]he finished sequence produced by the Human Genome 
Project covers about 99 percent of the human genome's gene-containing regions, 
and it has been sequenced to an accuracy of 99.99 percent.” Id.  
 264 The Personal Genome Project, PERS. GENOME PROJECT, https://www.per-
sonalgenomes.org/us#about (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). For the national locus of 
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The public interest in the results and implications of genome 
mapping is arguably widespread.265 For example, the Public Broad-
casting Service recently announced a forthcoming Ken Burns docu-
mentary titled The Gene: An Intimate History,266 based on a best-
selling book by the same name.267 Direct-to-consumer genetic test-
ing268 will soon become a billion-dollar commercial enterprise that 
is projected to grow rapidly in coming years both in the United 
States and abroad.269 For example, the DNA database maintained by 
Ancestry, the largest commercial service offering genetic testing in 
 
the global project, see The Harvard Personal Genome Project, HARV. MED. SCH., 
https://pgp.med.harvard.edu/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). The project “invite[s] 
willing participants to publicly share their personal data for the greater good” for 
the purpose of “creating public genome, health, and trait data.” The Personal Ge-
nome Project, supra.  
 265 See, e.g., Jamie Ducharme, A Major Drug Company Now Has Access to 
23andMe’s Genetic Data. Should You Be Concerned?, TIME (July 26, 2018), 
https://time.com/5349896/23andme-glaxo-smith-kline/.  
 266 Ken Burns Presents The Gene: An Intimate History, PBS, 
https://www.pbs.org/show/gene/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). 
 267 See SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE GENE: AN INTIMATE HISTORY (2016). 
 268 See, e.g., RB Altman, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Failure Is Not 
an Option, 86 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 15, 15 (2009). 
“[D]irect-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing . . . has arisen precisely because gen-
otyping is sufficiently inexpensive and straightforward that it is easy for a com-
pany to set up shop. The cat is out of the bag: genotyping is already a commodity, 
and full-genome sequencing is well on the way.” Id.  
 269 See Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Market to Hit $2.5 Bn by 
2024: Global Market Insights, Inc., CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 11, 2018, 6:00 
AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/direct-to-consumer-genetic-
testing-market-to-hit-2-5-bn-by-2024-global-market-insights-inc--
830436085.html. 
In 2010, with whole-genome sequencing becoming increas-
ingly affordable, the promise of large-scale human genomic re-
search studies involving hundreds, thousands, and even hun-
dreds of thousands of individuals is rapidly becoming a reality. 
The next generation of human genomic research will occur on 
a scale that would have been nearly unfathomable [in 2000], 
when the publication of the Human Genome Project’s first draft 
results was still pending. 
Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., Personal Genomes in Progress: From the Human Ge-
nome Project to the Personal Genome Project, 12 DIALOGUES CLINICAL 
NEUROSCIENCE 47, 47 (2010); see also International Consortium Completes Hu-
man Genome Project, supra note 263 (“The international consortium announced 
the first draft of the human sequence in June 2000.”). 
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the United States, includes DNA samples submitted by more than 
fifteen million “DNA customers.”270  So great is the public interest 
in using DNA data to trace family history that some commentators 
have referred to the “genealogy craze” that has fueled public de-
mand for these services.271 
The rapid proliferation of DNA biobanks by nonprofit organiza-
tions and commercial enterprises is a direct result of increasingly 
affordable DNA sequencing.272 While some commentators long ago 
anticipated the privacy issues associated with massive collections of 
DNA samples,273 only a few legal scholars paid heed to the multi-
 
 270 Ancestry Surpasses 15 Million DNA Customers, ANCESTRY (May 31, 
2019), https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2019/05/31/ancestry-surpasses-15-
million-dna-customers/; see Antonio Regalado, More than 26 Million People 
Have Taken an At-Home Ancestry Test, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612880/more-than-26-million-people-
have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test/. 
 271 E.g., Ashley Barnwell, The Genealogy Craze: Authoring an Authentic 
Identity Through Family History Research, 10 LIFE WRITING 261, 261–62 (2013); 
Neil Genzlinger, TV’s Genealogy Craze Yields Game Shows and Paper Chases 
but Also Interesting Lessons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/04/02/arts/television/tvs-genealogy-craze-yields-game-shows-
and-paper-chases-but-also-interesting-lessons.html. 
 272 See, e.g., C.W. Knetsch et al., DNA Sequencing, in MOLECULAR 
DIAGNOSTICS PART 1: TECHNICAL BACKGROUNDS AND QUALITY ASPECTS 339, 
339 (E. van Pelt-Verkuil et al. eds., 2019) (noting the “substantial reductions in 
the cost of DNA sequencing” over the last 15 years); James W. Hazel & Christo-
pher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of the Privacy Policies 
Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 
28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 57 (2018). See generally The Cost of Se-
quencing a Human Genome, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., https://www.ge-
nome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost (last 
updated Oct. 30, 2019) (explaining the rapidly declining costs of both whole-ge-
nome sequencing and targeted, or partial, genome sequencing). 
 273 A few commentators foresaw the privacy risks to close family members of 
disclosing highly sensitive personal information. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, 
Genetic Privacy, 23 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 320, 327–28 (1995). 
Genomic information can wield considerable influence, affect-
ing the decisions of health care professionals, patients and their 
families, employers, insurers, and the justice system. How does 
society control this information without stifling the real poten-
tial for human good that it offers? The answer to this question 
must be in recognizing that trade-offs are inevitable. Permitting 
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dimensional risks to relational privacy associated with the rapid ex-
pansion of commercial DNA biobanks.274    
This Part explores some of the developing privacy issues impli-
cating relational privacy, all of which warrant further research and 
analysis. We have a pressing need for scholars and policymakers to 
develop innovative legal approaches to balance legitimate privacy 
interests against both the “public good” and the proprietary com-
mercial interests associated with collecting, storing, accessing, and 
disseminating DNA data. Because of its unique implications for 
identifying known and unknown genetic relatives, revealing family 
secrets, and affecting family relationships, genomic information in 
the developing era of biotechnology turns out to be not so “personal” 
to the individual after all. How policymakers balance the respective 
interests in genetic data may prove to be one of the most confound-
ing issues of our time.  
A. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Contract Rights 
and Informed Consent 
[T]he popular definition of privacy as an individual 
control over personal information, does not result in 
the protection of the interests commonly expressed 
 
the Human Genome Initiative to proceed unabated will have 
costs in personal privacy. 
Id.; see also, e.g., Graeme T. Laurie, Challenging Medical-Legal Norms: The Role 
of Autonomy, Confidentiality, and Privacy in Protecting Individual and Familial 
Group Rights in Genetic Information, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 10–11 (2001); Le-
ornard L. Riskin & Phillip P. Reilly, Remedies for Improper Disclosure of Genetic 
Data, 8 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 480, 488 (1977); Note, The Relational Right of 
Privacy Theory—Recovering on the Basis of Conduct Directed at a Deceased or 
Living Relative, Friend or Associate, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 74, 75 (1966) (suggest-
ing that the “distinct legal interest” in relational privacy arguably warrants com-
mon law protection, whether or not the relative to whom the defendant directs the 
“encroaching acts” is living or dead).  
 274 See, e.g., Suter, supra note 68, at 362–63 (discussing implications for rela-
tional aspects of family privacy); Michael Avery, Landry v. Attorney General: 
DNA Databanks Hold A Mortgage on Privacy Rights, 44 BOS. B.J. 18, 18 (2000) 
(“The personal information disclosed [by DNA analysis] may violate the pri-
vacy not only of the subject whose DNA is analyzed, but also that of close rela-
tives.”).  
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regarding genetic databases and therefore needs to 
be redrawn.275 
In the United States, the most common approach to protecting 
consumers’ privacy rights in genomic data is rooted in traditional 
contract law.276 An individual willing to pay for commercial genetic 
testing services can simply purchase a testing kit for a modest fee 
and mail in a DNA sample, generally a small tube of the individual’s 
saliva.277 Several weeks later, the direct-to-consumer genetic testing 
provider sends back the individual’s digitized DNA profile, which 
may take various forms depending on the consumer’s purposes for 
seeking the information.278   
Commercial genetic testing providers generally market their 
DNA analysis services with a strong assurance of privacy.279 But as 
a practical and legal matter, the provider’s fine-print “terms and con-
ditions” govern the scope of the consumer’s “informed consent.”280  
 
 275 Salvör Nordal, Privacy, in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN 
GENETIC DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 181, 182 (Matti Häyry et. al eds., 
2007). 
 276 See Dana A. Elfin, DNA Testing? You Might Want to Wait for More Legal 
Protection, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 7, 2019, 5:40 AM), https://news.bloomber-
glaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/dna-testing-you-might-want-to-wait-for-
more-legal-protection.  
 277 ADAM RUTHERFORD, A BRIEF HISTORY OF EVERYONE WHO EVER LIVED:  
THE HUMAN STORY RETOLD THROUGH OUR GENES 167 (2017) (describing simi-
lar features shared by direct-to-consumer genetic testing kits).  
 278 See id. at 167–68 (describing results); Jackson Ryan, What AncestryDNA 
Taught Me About DNA, Privacy and the Complex World of Genetic Testing, 
CNET (Mar. 22, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/ancestrydna-
taught-me-about-my-dna-privacy-and-the-complex-world-of-genetic-testing/ 
(describing the process of submitting a DNA sample and receiving results). 
 279 See, e.g., Privacy Is in Our DNA, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/privacy/?%20vip=true (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) 
(“Everyone deserves a secure, private place to explore and understand their ge-
netics. At 23andMe, we put you in control of deciding what information you want 
to learn and what information you want to share. See our privacy statement for 
more info.”); Origins, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/origins (last vis-
ited Mar. 18, 2020) (“Your privacy and security are at the core of everything we 
do. From the second you open your kit to the minute you get your results, you’re 
in control of your DNA data.”). 
 280 E.g., Ancestry Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRY, https://www.ances-
try.com/cs/legal/termsandconditions (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) [hereinafter 
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The concept of informed consent has a long history in United 
States tort law.281 From a privacy perspective, the notion of “in-
formed consent” represents the intersection between the right of per-
sonal autonomy (to make intimate decisions about one’s body or in-
terpersonal relationships) and the right of informational privacy (to 
regulate both the subject’s access to relevant information and its dis-
closure to third parties).282  
The terms and conditions that apply to direct-to-customer gene-
alogical services, which appear only online, also set out any re-
strictions on the service provider’s authority to retain the con-
sumer’s DNA sample. More importantly, the terms and conditions 
also govern whether the service provider may either disclose or sell 
the DNA data to third parties, which may occur with or without the 
individual’s informed consent.283 Ancestry’s “Privacy Statement” 
 
Ancestry Terms and Conditions]; Terms of Service, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/ (last updated Sept. 30, 2019) [hereinafter 
23andMe Terms of Service] (“In order to use the Services, you must first agree to 
the TOS [Terms of Service]. You may not use the Services if you do not accept 
the TOS.”).  
 281 See Martin R. Struder, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: Protecting the 
Patient’s Right to Make Informed Health Care Decisions, 48 MONT. L. REV. 85, 
86–88 (1987). The traditional notion of “informed” consent developed in response 
to paternalistic medicine—physicians making decisions they believed were in the 
patient’s best interest and often without fully informing the patient. See Jørgen 
Husted, Autonomy and a Right Not to Know, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE 
RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: GENETIC PRIVACY AND RESPONSIBILITY 24, 32–33 (Ruth 
Chadwick et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014). Some contemporary scholars have proposed 
the more modern concept of “open consent” to describe the willingness of indi-
vidual participants to include their DNA profiles in a public domain database with 
open access, without any guarantee of privacy or confidentiality. See, e.g., Jean-
tine E. Lunshof et al., From Genetic Privacy to Open Consent, 9 NATURE 
REVIEWS GENETICS 406, 406 (2008).  
 282 See supra notes 198–99 (distinguishing privacy right to autonomous deci-
sion making from privacy right to control access to and disclosure of personal 
information).  
 283 See Jacob Brogan, Who Owns Your Genetic Data After a Home DNA Test?, 
SLATE (May 23, 2017, 2:18 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2017/05/ances-
trydnas-terms-and-conditions-sparked-a-debate-about-ownership-of-genetic-ma-
terial.html (discussing the ownership implications of terms and conditions).  
     More than 12 million Americans have sent in their DNA to 
be analyzed to companies like 23andMe and AncestryDNA. 
The spit-in-tube DNA you send in is anonymized and used for 
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assures customers that “[a]t Ancestry®, your privacy is a top prior-
ity.”284 But its terms and conditions include an indemnity provision, 
by which the customer expressly waives any claim against Ancestry 
for invasion of privacy, among other specified tort claims.285 If an 
Ancestry consumer does assert a claim, mandatory arbitration pro-
visions apply.286 And the customer must pay a fee of $250 to initiate 
the arbitration process, which far exceeds the cost of the basic ge-
netic testing service.287 Terms and conditions for direct-to-consumer 
 
genetic drug research and both sites have been selling the data 
to third-party companies . . . for some time. . . . Both companies 
say this is not without consent. 
     When you sign up to share your DNA with Ancestry, you 
opt-in for “informed consent research.” However, you have the 
ability to opt out of this when you first agree to the service. Both 
23andMe and Ancestry said that they will not share genetic in-
formation freely, without a court order, but people are welcome 
to share the information online themselves sometimes in order 
to find lost relatives or biological parents. 
Nicole Martin, How DNA Companies Like Ancestry and 23andMe Are Using Your 
Genetic Data, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2018, 2:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ni-
colemartin1/2018/12/05/how-dna-companies-like-ancestry-and-23andme-are-us-
ing-your-genetic-data/#1b6bbfa36189. 
 284 Your Privacy, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/ 
privacystatement (last visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
 285 Ancestry Terms and Conditions, supra note 280 (“In addition, you release 
Ancestry from all claims, demands, actions, or suits in connection with your User 
Provided Content, including any liability related to our use or non-use of your 
User Provided Content, claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, right of pub-
licity, emotional distress or economic loss.”); see Clayton et al., supra note 220, 
at 18 (“[C]onsumers typically agree to terms and conditions that contain exclusion 
clauses that limit a company’s liability or provisions that limit the remedies and 
damages available to the consumer.”) (citing Andelka M. Phillips, Reading the 
Fine Print When Buying Your Genetic Self Online: Direct-to-Consumer Genetic 
Testing Terms and Conditions, 36 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 273, 282 (2017)). 
 286 Ancestry Terms and Conditions, supra note 280 (“If any dispute between 
us is not resolved within 30 days after contacting us, then you and Ancestry agree 
that we will resolve it through final and binding arbitration . . . .”). 
 287 Id. (“Fees: You will be required to pay $250 to initiate an arbitration 
against us. If the arbitrator finds the arbitration to be non-frivolous, Ancestry will 
pay all other fees invoiced by JAMS, including filing fees and arbitrator and hear-
ing expenses. You are responsible for your own attorneys' fees unless the arbitra-
tion rules and/or applicable law provide otherwise.”). As of March 2020, the un-
discounted retail cost of an AncestryDNA genetic test is $99. Your DNA Reveals 
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genetic testing services also often allow access to customers’ ge-
nomic data by third parties, including law enforcement.288  
While the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry is boom-
ing, it remains largely unregulated.289 For certain kinds of health-
related diagnostic tests, specifically those offered by 23andMe, the 
Food and Drug Administration has asserted regulatory authority 
over genetic testing services.290 But on the whole, the direct-to-con-
sumer genetic testing is essentially self-regulating with respect to 
genetic data collection and dissemination.291 
 
More than Ever Before—From Your Origins to Your Family’s Health, ANCESTRY, 
https://www.ancestry.com/dna/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
 288 See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 272, at 54–57; Natalie Ram, Genetic 
Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1424 (2019) [hereinafter Ram, 
Genetic Privacy].  
[T]he rapidly growing use of consumer and other genetic testing 
services will soon make third-party access to an individual’s 
genetic data commonplace and nearly unavoidable. Courts 
should act now . . . to protect the important Fourth Amendment 
interests implicated when the government seeks to access ge-
netic data in third-party hands. 
Id.  
 289 Clayton et al., supra note 220, at 19. 
 290 Id. at 16–18; see Catherine M. Sharkey, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Test-
ing: The FDA’s Dual Role as Safety and Health Information Regulator, 68 
DEPAUL L. REV. 343, 358–59 (2019) (describing the FDA’s evolving “hybrid” 
regulatory model); Direct-to-Consumer Tests, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-diagnostics/direct-consumer-tests 
(last updated Dec. 20, 2019); see also Lindsey Jones, FDA Regulation Defines 
Business Strategy in Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, BIOTECH CONNECTION 
BAY AREA (Oct. 30, 2017), https://biotechconnectionbay.org/view-points/fda-
regulation-defines-business-strategy-in-direct-to-consumer-genetic-testing (ex-
plaining the various ways the FDA has regulated the industry, including current 
and future developments). “As the field of genomics advances, genetic and ge-
nomic tests are becoming more common . . . . Yet most genetic tests today are not 
regulated, meaning that they go to market without any independent analysis to 
verify the claims of the seller.” Regulation of Genetic Tests, NAT’L HUM. GENOME 
RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/Regulation-
of-Genetic-Tests (last updated Nov. 20, 2019) (explaining the limited scope of 
federal regulation).  
 291 See Jean-Raphaël Champagne & Eliane Ellbogen, Genetic Testing and 
Privacy: What is the Code to Regulating Ours?, FASKEN (Sept. 13, 
2018), https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/2018/09/privacy-cybersecurity-
bulletin-genetic-testing-and-privacy/ (noting that the growth in the industry is in 
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A 2018 study of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry 
concluded that customers are generally provided insufficient infor-
mation to make an informed decision about whether to purchase ge-
netic testing services from a particular testing provider.292 The study 
concluded,  
[T]he privacy policies of genetic testing companies 
are evidence of a larger problem with e-commerce, 
big data, and the internet of things. Arguably all of 
these industries might benefit from enhanced con-
sumer privacy protections. . . . The goal should be 
achieving the right balance between consumer pro-
tection and informed consent so that privacy can be 
protected without unduly inhibiting the personal and 
research benefits that come from the free flow of ge-
netic information.293 
The industry is beginning to respond, in part to deflect policy-
makers’ concerns about whether and how to regulate these serv-
ices.294 In 2018, an American privacy protection think tank known 
as the “Future of Privacy Forum” issued “best practices” guidelines 
for the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry.295 Those 
 
part due to the “lack of government regulation in countries where the majority of 
these companies are located, notably the United States and China”); Clayton et 
al., supra note 220, at 18. Some states have enacted statutes that regulate various 
aspects of these services, but limited federal regulation means that state regula-
tions may have little practical effect on nationwide genetic testing services, espe-
cially if their terms and conditions include choice-of-law provisions and onerous 
waiver and arbitration clauses. See generally Helen C. Dick, Note, Risk and Re-
sponsibility: State Regulation and Enforcement of the Direct-to-Consumer Ge-
netic Testing Industry, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 167, 184, 189 (2012). 
 292 See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 272, at 66. 
 293 Id.  
 294 See, e.g., Champagne & Ellbogen, supra note 291.  
 295 See FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES FOR 
CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING SERVICES 1–2 (2018), https://fpf.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2018/07/Privacy-Best-Practices-for-Consumer-Genetic-Testing-
Services-FINAL.pdf. The guidelines include detailed provisions for seeking a 
customer’s express consent for collecting, analyzing, sharing, or reporting genetic 
data. Id. at 4–6.  
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guidelines encourage consumer education on the implications and 
consequences of genetic testing.296 Several major companies have 
signaled their willingness to follow the guidelines, which are de-
signed to ensure that industry practices are responsive to the increas-
ingly complex privacy issues relating to genetic testing.297 And in 
2019, three of those genetic testing companies—Ancestry, 
23andMe, and Helix—joined forces as the Coalition for Genetic 
Data Protection to support best practices and to “promote the indus-
try in Washington as lawmakers put more scrutiny on their privacy 
practices.”298 
 
As the industry continues to expand and the technology be-
comes more accessible, it is vital that the industry acknowl-
edges and addresses the risks posed to individual privacy when 
Genetic Data is generated in the consumer context. Given the 
potential benefits that consumer genetic and personal genomic 
testing can provide to Consumers and society, it is important 
that this data is subject to privacy controls and used responsibly. 
Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Note that nothing in this purpose statement acknowl-
edges the inherent privacy implications for nonconsenting genetic relatives of 
those individuals who, knowingly or not, give the genetic test provider “informed” 
consent to digitize their own DNA profiles. Id. 
 296 See id. at 10 (“Companies should inform Consumers about the basics of 
genetics and genetic testing; the risks, benefits, and limitations of genetic testing; 
and the appropriate interpretation and use of results.”). 
 297 Carson Martinez, Privacy Best Practices for Consumer Genetic Testing 
Services, FUTURE PRIVACY F. (July 31, 2018), https://fpf.org/2018/07/31/privacy-
best-practices-for-consumer-genetic-testing-services/ (listing 23andMe, Ances-
try, Helix, MyHeritage, Habit, African Ancestry, and Living DNA as having 
pledged to comply). 
 298 Alex Gangitano, DNA Testing Companies Launch New Privacy Coali-
tion, HILL (June 25, 2019, 6:00 AM),  
https://thehill.com/regulation/lobbying/450124-dna-testing-companies-launch-
new-privacy-coalition. But see David Lazarus, Column: DNA-Testing Firms Are 
Lobbying to Limit Your Right to Genetic Privacy, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 2019, 5:00 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-dna-genetic-
privacy-20190702-story.html (reporting that the coalition is actually run by a 
prominent lobbying firm that seeks to shape privacy laws and largely abides by 
an “honor system”). See generally About CGDP, COALITION FOR GENETIC DATA 
PROTECTION (last visited Mar. 12, 2019),  
https://geneticdataprotection.com/about/ (“While we recognize the significant op-
portunities genetic testing and research present, we also support and advocate for 
reasonable and uniform privacy regulation that will ensure the responsible and 
ethical handling of every person's genetic data.”).  
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While voluntary guidelines are a step in the right direction, they 
may not be enough to ensure that consumers are well informed about 
their rights to control access to their genetic data, including the 
rights they expressly waive—probably unknowingly—when pur-
chasing genetic testing services and their digitized results.299 If in-
deed the industry is not willing to self-regulate to better protect the 
privacy interests of consumers, Congress should step in with federal 
legislation to fill the void.300 
But any yet-to-be-devised federal regulatory framework should 
also address the relational implications of the individual customer’s 
“informed consent.” The customer’s decision implicates the privacy 
of genetic relatives, including those then unknown to the customer. 
Biological relatives’ genetic identity and privacy are inherently 
compromised because of the proliferation of partial DNA matching 
techniques, not only in private DNA databases, but also in federal 
 
 299 See Terms and Conditions May Apply, YOUTUBE (July 13, 2013),  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fzDgBITDaRY  
(cautioning consumers about carefully reading lengthy terms and conditions 
posted online and stating that “[a]nything digitized is not private, and that’s fright-
ening”); see also Lily Rothman, New Documentary Tackles Online Pri-
vacy, TIME (July 11, 2013), http://entertainment.time.com/2013/07/11/new-docu-
mentary-tackles-online-privacy/ (reviewing the documentary film Terms And 
Conditions May Apply). 
 300 See Sarah F. Sunderman, The Need for Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Testing in the United States: Assessing and Applying the German Policy 
Model, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 357, 373, 378 (2013) (calling for the 
United States to “follow Germany’s example by requiring satisfactory genetic 
counseling and enacting standardized laboratory procedure requirements” but not 
Germany’s requirement that only physicians trained in genetic counseling may 
order genetic testing); Caroline F. Wright et al., Regulating Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Tests: What Is All the Fuss About?, 13 GENETICS MED. 295, 295, 300 
(2011) (reporting “a lack of consensus as to the extent to which regulators should 
be involved, what minimum standards should and could be required across an 
international and predominantly internet-based market, and the role of legislation 
versus self-governance or voluntary guidance within an appropriate regulatory 
framework”; and recommending five “overarching principles” of  regulation); cf. 
L. Kalokairinou et al., Legislation of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing in Eu-
rope: A Fragmented Regulatory Landscape, 9 J. COMMUNITY GENETICS 117, 119 
(2018) (reviewing regulations adopted by numerous European nations to regulate, 
restrict, or prohibit direct-to-consumer genetic testing). 
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and state forensic DNA databases.301 As commentators have ob-
served, “it is not possible to rely on individual informed consent to 
do all the ethical work in the context of developments such as ge-
netic databases.”302      
B.  Forensic and Genetic Genealogy: Cold Cases and Partial 
DNA Matches 
Familial searching builds on one of the most basic 
facts of genetics: DNA is shared among family mem-
bers. As a result, a forensic DNA profile ‘not only 
reveal[s] extensive genetic information about the in-
dividual whose “genetic fingerprint” is on file, but 
also about his or her close relatives.’ Familial 
searching uses this principle to infer that someone 
whose DNA is a close, but not perfect, match to a 
 
 301 See, e.g., Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender 
Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 249, 255–59 
(2006) (considering the legal and policy implications of using partial matches in 
forensic DNA databases to identify and investigate relatives, while acknowledg-
ing that “[t]he legal and policy implications of this kind of [familial forensic DNA 
searching] have been discussed only rarely and briefly”); Natalie Ram, The Mis-
match Between Probable Cause and Partial Matching, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 182, 183 (2009) (“[B]ecause close genetic relatives have similar ‘genetic 
motifs,’ a partial match between a crime scene sample and a stored genetic profile 
may also implicate family members.”); Mary McCarthy, Note, Am I My Brother’s 
Keeper?: Familial DNA Searches in the Twenty-First Century, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 381, 398 (2011); Heather Murphy, Sooner or Later Your Cousin’s DNA 
Is Going to Solve a Murder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/04/25/us/golden-state-killer-dna.html; Heather Murphy, How 
Your DNA Could Solve a Murder, WEEK (May 19, 2019), https://theweek.com/ar-
ticles/841864/how-dna-could-solve-murder (“If you are an American, it is likely 
that your name can be extrapolated even if you have never taken a DNA test. In 
the hands of an advanced genealogical sleuth, often all that is needed to identify 
someone from a drop of saliva, blood, or semen are the DNA profiles of two third 
cousins.”).  
 302 Ruth Chadwick, The Philosophy of the Right to Know and the Right Not to 
Know, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: GENETIC PRIVACY 
AND RESPONSIBILITY supra note 281, at 13, 21–22 (emphasis in original). 
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crime scene sample might be related to the of-
fender.303   
In 2018, DNA evidence was used to identify the elusive Golden 
State Killer as Joseph James DeAngelo.304 He was arrested and pros-
ecuted for committing a series of heinous rapes and murders during 
the 1970s and 1980s in six counties surrounding Sacramento, Cali-
fornia.305 Investigators uploaded the killer’s DNA profile, generated 
by analyzing decades-old crime scene tissue samples, to a public 
domain genealogy website known as GEDmatch,306 and then traced 
the DNA profile to two distant cousins using “partial match” 
 
 303 Suter, supra note 68, at 311 (citing Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: 
Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 
782 (1999); Alice A. Noble, DNA Fingerprinting & Civil Liberties, 34 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 149, 150 (2006)). 
 304 See Wamsley, supra note 7.  
 305 See Darrell Smith, Golden State Killer/East Area Rapist Suspect in Court 
as His Lawyers Call for Long Delay, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 22, 2019, 3:39 
PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article234280297.html. As this 
Article went to press, DeAngelo offered to plead guilty in exchange for a life 
sentence. He faces the death penalty if convicted. Michael Levenson & Heather 
Murphy, Golden State Killer Suspect Offers to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/us/golden-state-killer-trial.html.  
 306  See Zoë Corbyn, How Taking a Home Genetics Test Could Help Catch a 
Murderer, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2018, 12:00 PM),  https://www.theguard-
ian.com/science/2018/dec/01/how-home-dna-tests-are-solving-cold-cases-
golden-state-killer (describing the controversy surrounding the use of the public 
domain GEDmatch database to identify the Golden State Killer). Once the story 
broke in the media in April 2018, the owner of GEDmatch, Curtis Rogers, faced 
a small exodus of users for allowing law enforcement access to the database with-
out subscribers’ consent. See id. In May 2019, GEDmatch changed its policy to 
disallow law enforcement use of the database unless a subscriber expressly opts 
in to permit that use. See Natalie Ram, The Genealogy Site That Helped Catch the 
Golden State Killer is Grappling with Privacy, SLATE (May 29, 2019, 7:30 AM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2019/05/gedmatch-dna-privacy-update-law-en-
forcement-genetic-geneology-searches.html; Judy G. Russell, GEDmatch Re-
verses Course, LEGAL GENEALOGIST (May 19, 2019), https://www.legalgenealo-
gist.com/2019/05/19/gedmatch-reverses-course/ (“The change came after a fire-
storm over the decision of the site owners . . . to allow an exception to their pub-
lished terms of use in a Utah case without informing site users or obtaining in-
formed consent to such an exception.”). 
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methodology.307 Having narrowed down the possible suspects to 
one male with the expertise of a genetic genealogist,308 investigators 
secured a paper cup DeAngelo had discarded, analyzed the DNA 
from the saliva sample, and found a direct match with the stored 
DNA that police had taken from the Golden State Killer’s crime 
scenes.309 
Law enforcement investigators have used DNA as a forensic 
tool for decades.310 Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Federal Bureau 
 
 307 See Adhiti Bandlamudi, Tactics Used to Find Golden State Killer Raise 
Privacy and Legal Questions, NPR (Apr. 27, 2018, 4:22 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/27/606580162/tactics-used-to-find-golden-state-
killer-raise-privacy-and-legal-questions (explaining how law enforcement com-
pared DNA crime scene samples to online digitized DNA profiles uploaded by 
DeAngelo’s genetic relatives to GEDmatch, a public domain genealogy website, 
to identify DeAngelo without first securing a search warrant); Partial Matches: 
CODIS Searches and Partial Matches, Cont., NAT’L INST. JUST., https://pro-
jects.nfstc.org/fse/12/12-03.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (“A partial match 
occurs when the [individual DNA database profile] is excluded as the perpetrator 
because it does not match the crime scene profile, but the analyst identifies a suf-
ficient number of alleles in common between the [individual DNA profile] and 
crime scene profile to believe that a family member [of the individual] may be the 
true perpetrator.”); Jeremy W. Peters, New Rule Allows Use of Partial DNA 
Matches, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2010), https://www.ny-
times.com/2010/01/25/nyregion/25dna.html (reporting the adoption of a New 
York rule in December 2009 allowing partial DNA matches to identify perpetra-
tors and quoting forensic experts as explaining that “[s]ince family members share 
genetic traits, a partial DNA match allows investigators to narrow searches to rel-
atives of people whose DNA is already in the state database”); see also Ram, 
Genetic Privacy, supra note 288, at 1359–60 (explaining the forensic use of par-
tial match methodology); Ram, DNA by the Entirety, supra note 5, at 882 
(“[S]ource-excluding partial matches may . . . inculpate the offender’s close ge-
netic relatives as possible perpetrators of a crime.”). 
 308 See Corbyn, supra note 306. While the two distant cousins were each ge-
netically related to DeAngelo, they were not related to one another. See id. Trac-
ing them to the killer required a genetic genealogist to research the respective 
family histories of both distant cousins to identify an intermarriage between the 
two family lines. See id. Once that marriage was identified, other records led to a 
family with four offspring, including one male. See id. Ms. Corbyn explains more 
about the genetic genealogy process of “triangulation” in her Guardian article. 
See id.  
 309 Roberta Estes, The Golden State Killer and DNA, DNAEXPLAINED (Apr. 
30, 2018), https://dna-explained.com/2018/04/30/the-golden-state-killer-and-
dna/. 
 310 See generally, e.g., Hibbert, supra note 303, at 773–78.  
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of Investigation (“FBI”) and its state counterparts built DNA profile 
databases using samples taken from convicted criminals, crime 
scenes, and unidentified human remains.311 The “familial searching” 
methodology using partial DNA matches was first used in the mid-
2000s.312 In 2006, investigators in the United Kingdom used the 
technique to identify the “Dearne Valley Shoe Rapist,” who had 
committed a series of offenses two decades earlier using a unique 
modus operandi—tying up the victims with their stockings and then 
absconding with their stiletto heels.313  
In February 2005, a variation of familial searching was used to 
identify, prosecute, and eventually convict the “BTK Killer,” who 
had eluded police in Wichita, Kansas, for decades.314 He was iden-
tified after he sent local police a message on a floppy computer disk, 
which was digitally traced to a local church’s computer. Police nar-
rowed the investigation to Dennis Rader, who attended the 
church.315 To confirm his identify, investigators obtained a warrant 
to recover a biological tissue sample taken from Rader’s daughter, 
Kerri Rawson, during a routine diagnostic test at a university health 
clinic.316 The BTK Killer’s identity was confirmed by the partial 
match of his daughter’s DNA with the perpetrator’s crime scene 
 
 311 See id.; see also DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,       
§ 210304, 108 Stat. 2065, 2069 (1994) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 
12592). 
 312 See, e.g., Suter, supra note 68, at 310 (“[I]n  2006,  investigators  turned  
to  a  new  technology  called  familial  searching  to  identify  local  individuals  
in  the  DNA  database  whose  genetic  profile  closely  matched  the  crime  scene  
evidence,  suggesting  they might be related to the rapist.”). 
 313 See id.  
After visiting two of the forty-three individuals with partial 
matches, a police officer knocked on the door of June Lloyd and 
told her, “We’re running a cold case investigation and there are 
some similarities between your DNA and the offender’s DNA. 
Do you mind telling me, have you got any brothers?”  
Id. To her surprise, June Lloyd’s only brother, James Lloyd, turned out to be the 
rapist. Id. He was later convicted for four rapes and two attempted rapes. Id.  
 314 See Mark Hansen, How the Cops Caught BTK: Playing to a Serial Killer’s 
Ego Helped Crack the Case, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2006, at 44, 45, 47–48. “BTK Killer” 
was the moniker adopted by the unidentified serial murderer himself based on his 
modus operandi: to “bind, torture, and kill” his victims. Id. at 45. 
 315 Id. at 48. 
 316 Id.  
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DNA.317 At the age of twenty-six, Rawson learned from an FBI 
agent, who visited her home unannounced, that her beloved father 
was the serial killer known as BTK, whom police had been search-
ing for since the mid-1970s.318   
 
 317 Id. See generally KERRI RAWSON, A SERIAL KILLER’S DAUGHTER: MY 
STORY OF FAITH, LOVE, AND OVERCOMING (2019). 
 318 See RAWSON, supra note 317, at 6–7; see also A Serial Killer’s Daughter: 
Watch the Trailer, THOMAS NELSON, https://www.thomasnelson.com/p/a-serial-
killers-daughter/#trailer (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (promoting the book release).  
Familial searching like that used to confirm the identity of the BTK Killer 
raises other ethical and legal questions, such the rightful owner of a biological 
tissue sample taken from a medical patient. See Suter, supra note 68, at 251. The 
ethical and legal issues concerning excised human tissue were the subject of a 
best-selling book telling the story of Henrietta Lacks, a young mother who died 
of cervical cancer in 1951. See REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF 
HENRIETTA LACKS 3 (2010). While Lacks was still living, and apparently without 
her express consent, tissue samples were taken from her tumor by a Johns Hopkins 
University Hospital physician. See id. at 33. The tumor cells were later used to 
develop a cell line that has been the source of numerous innovative therapeutic 
medical interventions, all highly lucrative. See id. at 99–104. Her surviving spouse 
and children were never told by anyone in the medical community, and they never 
shared in the profits derived by medical researchers from the resulting “HeLa” 
cell line. See id. at 194–95. 
Courts have seldom addressed disputes about the ownership rights to biolog-
ical tissue samples. See, e.g., Ram, DNA by the Entirety, supra note 5, at 891. The 
few that have done so address the question from a variety of perspectives, but no 
court has held that the individual from whom the tissue is taken retains any own-
ership interests. See, e.g., Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673–74 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (applying Missouri law to hold that medical research participants made 
an “informed decision” and expressly intended to make a gift of their biological 
materials, and the University accepted them); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 
793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (applying California law to find that tissue donor 
failed to state a claim against University and its physician for conversion of tissue 
samples, but he could pursue his claims against his physician for breach of fidu-
ciary duty and failure to obtain his informed consent); see also E. RICHARD GOLD, 
BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL 
MATERIALS 23–40 (1996) (discussing Moore and the “property debate” over bio-
logical tissue). See generally Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and Benefit-
Sharing for DNA Donors?, 45 JURIMETRICS 153, 153 (2005) (challenging the “tra-
ditional assumption” that “the donors of genetic material used in research act al-
truistically and are entitled to no property rights or direct benefit-sharing in the 
fruits of the research”).  
But in the context of DNA testing, the issue is not who owns the tissue sample 
itself, but rather who controls the use and dissemination of the DNA profile—the 
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In 2013, the Supreme Court held that taking a DNA sample from 
an arrestee, even if only for identification purposes, qualifies as a 
Fourth Amendment “search.”319 However, the Court held that no 
warrant was necessary to conduct a relatively non-intrusive DNA 
cheek swab search in a hospital setting after the defendant had been 
arrested for a serious felony offense for which he was later con-
victed.320 Some courts have followed similar reasoning to uphold 
 
information derived from an individual’s biological tissue. See Suter, supra note 
68, at 332–34 (highlighting the importance that information can have on protect-
ing “personhood interests”). The ability or inability to control that information 
raises serious privacy implications for the DNA subject and arguably her biolog-
ical relatives, whether known or unknown. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehen-
sive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging in 
dicta professional baseball players’ “strong privacy interests” in urine specimens 
and associated drug test results); Norman–Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 
135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding invasion of privacy claim by gov-
ernment employees whose blood and urine samples were tested for sickle cell 
anemia and syphilis without their consent); Havasupai Tribe of Havasupai Reser-
vation v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1076 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (stating 
in dicta that “invasions of privacy relating to tissue samples such as the Tribe de-
scribed in its claim notices naturally give rise to subjective personal injury, even 
when, as here, the samples are given voluntarily”); Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 
972 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Colo. App. 1998) (upholding invasion of privacy claim by 
student whose blood sample was tested for HIV virus without his consent), as 
modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 6, 1998).  
Similarly, when law enforcement seizes tissue samples to create DNA pro-
files, inchoate and abstract informational privacy issues are implicated—of the 
sort that cannot be resolved by concepts of property law and economics. See, e.g., 
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177 (2016) (holding that police may 
administer a breath test, but not a blood test, during a warrantless search incident 
to an arrest for drunk driving; analogizing a blood sample to a DNA sample “from 
which a wealth of additional, highly personal information could potentially be 
obtained,” while a breath test leaves nothing for police to retain); United States v. 
Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 243–44 (4th Cir. 2012) (observing that “an analysis required 
to obtain a DNA profile . . . generally qualifies as a search, because an individual 
retains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information obtained from the 
testing”). 
 319 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013) (“It can be agreed that 
using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to ob-
tain DNA samples is a search.”). 
 320 Id. at 451 (analogizing the use of DNA for identifying an arrestee to “the 
accepted use of fingerprint databases,” while acknowledging that DNA provides 
“unparalleled accuracy” and that “DNA collected from arrestees is an irrefutable 
identification of the person from whom it was taken”).  
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body-tissue samples taken from a broad array of criminal offenders 
or suspects, including “nonviolent felons, misdemeanants, and even 
arrestees.”321 On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit has held that a 
DNA profile generated from a tissue sample taken from a crime vic-
tim’s clothing at the scene is an unconstitutional search.322 The court 
reasoned that a crime victim has a higher expectation of privacy than 
a criminal suspect.323 
The Justice Department has recently initiated a proposed rule 
amendment that would effectively require DNA testing of non-U.S. 
citizens. In October 2019, the Trump Administration announced its 
intent to take DNA samples from immigrants detained when cross-
ing the United States border.324 That new policy suggests that 
 
 321 Suter, supra note 68, at 311. 
 322 See Davis, 690 F.3d at 246 (“[A] victim retains a privacy interest in his or 
her DNA material, even if it is lawfully in police custody.”). 
 323 See id. at 245–46 (noting that “a court's constitutional analysis may differ 
depending on whether the person is an arrestee or a ‘free person,’” and that “ex-
traction of DNA and the creation of a DNA profile result in a sufficiently separate 
invasion of privacy that such acts must be considered a separate search . . .  even 
when there is no issue concerning the collection of the DNA sample”) (citations 
omitted). 
 324 See Bobby Allyn & Joel Rose, Justice Department Announces Plan to Col-
lect DNA From Migrants Crossing the Border, NPR (Oct. 21, 2019, 5:20 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/21/772035602/justice-department-announces-plan-
to-collect-dna-from-migrants-crossing-the-bord. A current Department of Justice 
regulation provides that “[a]ny agency of the United States that arrests or detains 
individuals or supervises individuals facing charges shall collect DNA samples 
from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted, and from non-
United States persons who are detained . . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(b) (2019) (em-
phasis added). “Non-United States persons” are defined as “persons who are not 
United States citizens and who are not lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence.” Id. However, the DNA sampling requirements “do not include, except to 
the extent provided by the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . aliens with respect 
to whom the Secretary . . . , in consultation with the Attorney General, determines 
that the collection of DNA samples is not feasible because of operational exigen-
cies or resource limitations.” Id. § 28.12(b)(4). The proposed new rule would re-
scind subsection (b)(4). See DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detain-
ees, 84 Fed. Reg. 56397, 56398 (proposed Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 28 
C.F.R. § 28.12). The proposed rule would effectively require DNA sampling from 
most non-citizen detainees except those lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence. See id. The justification for amending the rule was explained, in part, as 
follows: 
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federal courts will soon confront thornier questions about the pro-
priety, under the Fourth Amendment, of DNA sampling by immi-
gration law enforcement officers without individualized suspicion 
of criminal activity.325  The most troubling aspect of the Justice De-
partment’s rationale for amending the rule is its expressed assump-
tion that immigrants, other than those who enter lawfully for perma-
nent residence, categorically pose a risk of criminal activity as great 
as federal arrestees or convicted offenders.326 Moreover, categorical 
 
     [In 2010,] Secretary of Homeland Security Janet A. Napoli-
tano advised . . . that categorical DNA collection from aliens in 
this class was not feasible, on the grounds described in § 
28.12(b)(4). However, subsequent developments have resulted 
in fundamental changes in the cost and ease of DNA-sample 
collection. DNA-sample collection from persons taken into or 
held in custody is no longer a novelty. Rather, pursuant to the 
mandate of § 28.12(b), it is now carried out as a routine booking 
measure, parallel to fingerprinting, by Federal agencies on a 
government-wide basis. The established DNA-collection pro-
cedures applied to persons arrested or held on criminal charges 
can likewise be applied to persons apprehended for immigration 
violations.  
Id. at 56398–99.   
     [The] proposed rule’s removal of the authorized exception 
to DNA collection for certain detained aliens appearing in 28 
CFR 28.12(b)(4) will help to ensure that . . . DNA technology 
will be consistently utilized to further public safety and the in-
terests of justice in relation to immigration detainees, as has 
long been the case in relation to [federal] criminal arrestees, de-
fendants, and convicts . . . . 
Id. at 56400.  
 325 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (“The Court 
usually requires ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion’ before a search or 
seizure may take place.’”) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 560–61 (1976)); see also United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 244 (4th Cir. 
2012) (“[O]ur precedent and . . . decisions of our sister circuits . . . uniformly 
recognize that persons who have not been arrested [such as crime victims] have a 
greater privacy interest in their DNA than would persons who have been arrested 
. . . .”). 
 326 See DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
56399. 
[D]istinguishing the treatment of criminal arrestees and immi-
gration detainees with respect to DNA identification is largely 
artificial, in that most immigration detainees are held on the 
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DNA testing of non-U.S. citizens at the border will undoubtably ad-
vance the Trump Administration’s ability to identify, investigate, 
and prosecute a detainees’ relatives who may have already immi-
grated to the United States, whether lawfully or unlawfully.  
As this Article went to press, law enforcement access to private 
DNA databases took yet another turn. As noted above, GEDmatch 
took steps in May 2019 to protect the privacy of non-consenting 
subscribers by barring law enforcement access to their DNA profiles 
while allowing consenting subscribers to expressly opt in.327  Nev-
ertheless, in late October 2019, a Florida trial court judge issued a 
search warrant that authorized a detective to search the entire GED-
match database, including the DNA profiles of subscribers who had 
not consented to law enforcement access.328 Reporters sought a 
comment from New York University Law Professor Erin Murphy, 
who noted that “[t]he company made a decision to keep law enforce-
ment out, and that’s been overridden by a court. It’s a signal that no 
genetic information can be safe.” 329 
 
basis of conduct that is itself criminal. Aliens who are appre-
hended following illegal entry have likely committed crimes 
under the immigration laws, such as 8 U.S.C. [§§] 1325(a) and 
1326, for which they can be prosecuted. . . . The practical dif-
ference between criminal arrestees and immigration detainees, 
for purposes of DNA-sample collection, has been further 
eroded through policies favoring increased prosecution for im-
migration violations. 
Id. Of course, “policies favoring increased prosecution for immigration viola-
tions” are code words for the Trump Administration’s onerous policies deterring 
immigration. See, e.g., Priscilla Alvarez, ICE Ramps up DNA Testing for Migrant 
Families Along the Southern Border, CNN (July 22, 2019, 6:51 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/22/politics/ice-deploys-dna-testing-at-border/in-
dex.html (“The implementation of DNA testing along parts of the US-Mexico 
border is part of a concerted effort by the Trump administration to crack down on 
illegal immigration, as the number of apprehensions at the border continue to out-
pace recent years.”). 
 327 See Russell, supra note 306. 
 328 Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is Private? A Florida 
Judge Just Said Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-search-warrant.html?auth=login-
email&login=email. 
 329 Id.; see also Scott Simon, Privacy and DNA Tests, NPR (Nov. 9, 2019, 
8:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/09/777888000/privacy-and-dna-tests 
(interviewing Professor Erin Murphy regarding the privacy ramifications of the 
Florida search warrant).  
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As this discussion demonstrates, forensic familial searching us-
ing partial DNA matches has become a powerful law enforcement 
tool. If extended to private DNA databases, whether public domain 
or proprietary, the use of forensic genealogy significantly expands 
the universe of DNA profiles accessible to law enforcement. That 
universe potentially includes millions of individuals who are merely 
genetically related to a suspect, arrestee, or detainee, but who are 
not themselves suspected of any criminal activity.  
The possible public benefits of solving “cold cases” using these 
techniques should neither eclipse nor overshadow the serious pri-
vacy implications. Those who willingly share DNA with proprietary 
genealogy databases are most likely unaware that without clear re-
strictions, criminal investigators have the ability to access their 
DNA profiles, without customers’ knowledge, for use in identifying 
genetic relatives who are (or may be) suspected of criminal conduct. 
The latest move by the Trump Administration threatens to further 
expand the DNA universe accessible to law enforcement, raising the 
specter that the United States will one day have a “de facto” national 
DNA database from which none of us—including our genetic iden-
tities—can ever escape.330  
 
 330 See Ram, U.S. DNA Database, supra note 5.  
[Law enforcement use of consumer genetics platforms for the] 
identification of individuals who are not directly included in a 
genetic database runs afoul of any given reason [justifying] law 
enforcement use of such databases [as] legally and ethically ac-
ceptable. These individuals have not previously been arrested 
or convicted of a crime. Nor have they “volunteered” their DNA 
on a consumer genetics platform. Instead, like millions of ordi-
nary Americans, these individuals are identifiable to police 
through the genetic data of their kin. Few genetic relationships, 
however, are voluntary. Even if parents can be said to voluntar-
ily choose to have children, children plainly do not choose their 
parents. Nor do we choose our siblings, cousins, or more distant 
relatives—if we even know who they are. 
Id.; cf. Havasupai Tribe of Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 
P.3d 1063, 1076 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing Native American tribe’s pri-
vacy interests when members’ blood samples were used for population research 
beyond the scope of written consent); Donna M. Gitter, The Ethics of Big Data in 
Genomics: The Instructive Icelandic Saga of the Incidentalome, 18 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 351, 354 (2019) (providing a fascinating account of the 
ethical and legal issues arising from a DNA database, built by a private firm under 
a twelve-year government license, that included virtually all Icelandic citizens). 
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C. Assisted Reproductive Technology: Balancing a Child’s 
Right to Know, a Donor’s Right to Anonymity, and the Parents’ 
Right to Keep Family Secrets 
When author Dani Shapiro was in her mid-fifties, her husband 
decided to order a DNA profile from a popular genealogical testing 
service to learn more about his family’s medical history.331 He 
prompted her to do the same, and she agreed. Little did she know 
that the results would reveal a family secret that her deceased par-
ents had taken to their graves several years before. Shapiro’s only 
sibling was an older half-sister Susie, born to their father and his 
first wife years before he married Shapiro’s mother. While she never 
felt close to her mother, Shapiro had always been particularly fond 
of her late father, who had descended from a long line of European 
Ashkenazi Jews. Shapiro took pride in the religious and ethnic her-
itage she shared with her father, and she treasured the family me-
mentos and stories about her paternal ancestors.  
Several weeks after sending in her saliva sample, Shapiro’s 
DNA profile arrived. The results showing her statistically-probable 
ethnicity raised some nagging questions. She contacted her half-sis-
ter Susie to inquire whether she had ever had a genetic test and 
learned that she had. Susie located her own DNA profile and 
emailed it to Shapiro. To her shock, a side-by-side comparison of 
the two DNA profiles unequivocally reflected that the two women 
were not half-sisters after all. The only plausible conclusion that 
would reconcile the results was that Shapiro was not the biological 
child of her father.   
Shapiro then remembered a fleeting conversation with her 
mother decades before when Shapiro was twenty-five years old. Her 
father had recently died in a car accident, and her mother was still 
recovering from the serious injuries she had suffered in the same 
accident. In response to Shapiro’s question about something her 
mother had let slip in a casual conversation with an acquaintance, 
her mother mentioned that Shapiro had been conceived by means of 
artificial insemination at a “world-famous institute” after her parents 
had difficulty conceiving a child. Her mother, then in her late 30s, 
 
     331 See generally DANI SHAPIRO, INHERITANCE: A MEMOIR OF GENEALOGY, 
PATERNITY, AND LOVE (2019). The author’s story, briefly summarized in this sec-
tion, is well documented in the book.  
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had suffered a series of miscarriages, and her father was told he had 
“slow sperm.” Shapiro’s mother described how the doctor had care-
fully monitored her ovulation cycles to identify the optimum mo-
ment for conception, and then summoned her father away from work 
to provide a sperm sample for his wife’s insemination procedure. 
Eventually her mother became pregnant and gave birth to Shapiro 
in the late 1950s.  
Over the nearly three decades since that conversation with her 
mother, Shapiro had adjusted to the idea that she had been conceived 
with the assistance of a then-experimental clinical procedure. The 
family’s traditional religious beliefs would never have entertained 
the possibility that Shapiro’s conception was not the product of her 
father’s own sperm sample.  But now, she was stunned to learn from 
her DNA profile that she was not the half-sister of her father’s only 
other child.  
Shapiro would soon learn from comparing her own DNA results 
against the online database that she had a biological first cousin with 
an unfamiliar name. After a flurry of activity over the next twenty-
four hours, Shapiro and her husband were able to trace her DNA 
results against partial matches from family trees that others had up-
loaded to the genealogy website. She also found an obituary online. 
With the help of a genealogist friend, Shapiro was able to narrow 
down the possible candidates who might be her biological father to 
the two uncles of her biological first cousin. One turned out to be a 
retired surgeon who had graduated from medical school in the 1950s 
in the same city where the “world-famous” fertility institute had 
been located.  
After Shapiro and her husband tracked the surgeon down online, 
they found an internet video of a presentation he had given at an 
Oregon college. To their shock, the retired surgeon’s facial features, 
coloring, and mannerisms were nearly mirror-images of Shapiro’s 
own.  
The rest of Shapiro’s story details the personal identity upheaval 
and mixed emotions she experienced over many months as a result 
of learning that her long-deceased beloved father was not her bio-
logical father after all. Her experience raises questions about 
whether a child conceived by artificial insemination has a right to 
know her origins, and whether she has a right to know the identity 
of her biological parents and their medical history. It also raises 
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serious issues about her biological father’s right to remain anony-
mous, consistent with the assurances sperm donors typically receive 
by sperm banks in exchange for a waiver of parental rights and a 
disclaimer of parental responsibilities for the prospective child.  
Shapiro eventually worked up the courage to contact her biolog-
ical father by email, expressing her desire to meet him. Long mar-
ried with a family of his own, the retired surgeon at first politely 
declined. But many months later, after she reached out again, he re-
considered. Ultimately, Shapiro’s biological father and his wife 
agreed to meet Shapiro and her husband over lunch at a neutral lo-
cation, and they have enjoyed a cordial relationship since then.  
Dani Shapiro’s 2019 book, Inheritance: A Memoir of Geneal-
ogy, Paternity, and Love,332 chronicles her devastating emotional re-
action when she learned from her DNA results what she probably 
never expected to learn nor ever wanted to know: that she was not 
the biological daughter of her long-deceased father, but rather the 
offspring of her parents’ decision to conceive by artificial insemina-
tion. For a long time after she learned the truth, she felt betrayed by 
both her parents and the family secret they had kept from her about 
her true identity. But eventually, she came to realize that they had 
both wanted a child of their own so much that after her birth, they 
had simply refused to consciously acknowledge that she was not her 
father’s biological child.  
*      *      * 
The various methods of biological procreation that some schol-
ars have aptly called “collaborative reproduction” raise a number of 
provocative issues about the potentially conflicting rights of the par-
ticipants.333 Most scholarship to date has focused on the prospective 
 
 332 Id.; see also Grow Through It, Dani Shapiro on Growing Through a Family 
Secret, YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=g61SQM3ppwo (describing the “crisis of personhood” Shapiro experi-
enced after learning the truth—that secrets are “corrosive and toxic” and that “we 
can be formed by what we don’t know as well as what we do know”); Politics and 
Prose, Dani Shapiro, "Inheritance”, YOUTUBE (July 13, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNUsQvhj-xg (book promotional interview). 
 333 See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be A “Parent”? The 
Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 357 
(1991). 
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parents’ rights to procreational autonomy,334  and the possible ten-
sion between those rights and the interests of third-party contribu-
tors of biological material.335 Third-party contributors facilitate cou-
ples’ nontraditional procreational choices by contributing gametes 
or embryos,336 or, in the case of surrogacy parenting, by providing a 
 
We now live in an era where a child may have as many as five 
different “parents.” These include a sperm donor, an egg donor, 
a surrogate or gestational host, and two nonbiologically related 
individuals who intend to raise the child. Indeed, the process of 
procreation itself has become so fragmented by the variety and 
combinations of collaborative-reproductive methods that there 
are a total of sixteen different reproductive combinations, in ad-
dition to traditional conception and childbirth. 
Id. at 355 & tbl.10 (representing the various combinations of collaborative repro-
duction). 
 334 See, e.g., Allison Morse, Good Science, Bad Law: A “Multiple Balancing” 
Approach to Adjudication, 46 S.D. L. Rev. 410, 425–26, 425 n.83 (2001) (noting 
that, among many others, relational interests are aspects of the right of privacy 
and citing cases in support); Rao, Reconceiving Privacy, supra note 68, at 1102–
03 (“Privacy should be viewed as a relational right that ‘afford[s] the formation 
and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial 
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.’”) (quoting Rob-
erts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)); John A. Robertson, Assisted Re-
productive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 915 (1996) (posit-
ing that the fundamental constitutional right to procreational privacy should apply 
equally to ART); see also supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text (distin-
guishing the right to make autonomous decisions about exercising fundamental 
rights such as marriage and procreation and the more nebulous legal foundations 
for the right to informational privacy); cf. Sirpa Soini et al., The Interface Between 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetics: Technical, Social, Ethical and 
Legal Issues, 14 EUROPEAN J. HUM. GENETICS 588, 591, 601 (2006) (observing 
that genetic tests potentially have “far-reaching repercussions for the patients, and 
sometimes for immediate and extended family,” and that “[g]enerally agreed prin-
ciples on the extent and quality of the family history asked from a prospective 
donor do not exist”). 
 335 See, e.g., Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1148–67 (2008); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a 
Genetic Parent, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1145–61 (2008); Browne Lewis, Two 
Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between the Men Involved 
in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 972–79 
(2009). 
 336  Recent calls have been made for the Commission on Uniform State Laws 
to study the need for a uniform law or model legislation that would regulate the 
disposition of human embryos and gametes. See, e.g., Richard Vaughn, Uniform 
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natural environment for bringing an implanted embryo to a healthy 
birth.337   
But scholarship is relatively sparse with respect to the informa-
tional privacy rights of either the offspring338 of assisted 
 
Laws Needed to Regulate Abandoned Embryos, INT’L FERTILITY L. GROUP (Aug. 
26, 2019, 4:10 PM), https://www.iflg.net/laws-needed-abandoned-embryos/; 
Memorandum from JEB UFL Chair Barbara Atwood & Reporter Linda Elrod to 
Unif. L. Comm’n Comm. on Scope & Program (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.uni-
formlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document-
FileKey=324180e7-0408-9fdf-28a6-bdec13bb7fbb (citing In re Marriage of 
Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018); Gary A. Debele & Susan L. Crockin, Legal 
Issues Surrounding Embryos and Gametes: What Family Law Practitioners Need 
to Know, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 55 (2018)).  
     Some courts have treated preserved embryos differently than other kinds of 
human tissue.  
Courts have always struggled with characterizing embryos in 
disputes over their possession or use; the context of the dispute 
matters and often leads directly to the outcome. A number of 
courts have considered them a special kind of property or in 
some cases, sui generis, stating they are deserving of special 
treatment; in the divorce context most courts have considered 
them a unique form of joint or marital property that could not 
simply be valued and divided down the middle, with equal 
shares going to each party.  
Id. at 68 (citing and discussing cases). 
 337 See generally Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Collaborative Family-Making: From 
Acquisition to Interconnection, 64 VILL. L. REV. 223, 224 (2019). 
 338 For examples of scholarship about the offspring of ART, see generally 
Helen M. Alvaré, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Chil-
dren’s Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1 (2003); Pamela Laufer-
Ukeles, The Lost Children: When the Right to Children Conflicts with the Rights 
of Children, 8 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 219 (2014); J. Brad Reich & Dawn 
Swink, You Can’t Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights and Obliga-
tions of Egg Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 
(2010); Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technol-
ogy): Should the Law Protect Them from Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57; Cathe-
rine A. Clements, What About the Children? A Call for Regulation of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 84 IND. L.J. 331 (2009); cf. Kathryn Webb Brad-
ley, Surrogacy and Sovereignty: Safeguarding the Interest of Both the Child and 
the State, 43 N.C. J. INT’L L. 1 (2018). Scholars in other fields, however, have 
recognized the unique effects on children who are conceived by ART and on their 
interrelationships with parents and gamete donors. See generally, e.g., Susan 
Golombok et al., Children Conceived by Gamete Donation: Psychological Ad-
justment and Mother-Child Relationships at Age 7, 25 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 230 
(2011). 
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reproductive technology (“ART”),339 or third-party contributors 
such as gamete donors or surrogate mothers.340 As one author has 
observed, 
[t]here are multiple levels of secrecy and disclosure 
in the donor world. First, many donor-conceived off-
spring simply do not know that they are donor-con-
ceived. A second level concerns the layers of secrecy 
between offspring, donors, and parents who have 
used donor gametes. The secrecy that pervades this 
world is the product of cultural norms and contracts, 
not constitutional principles or legislative decision 
making. While donors and parents may have signed 
agreements pertaining to anonymity, very few court 
opinions have interpreted the validity, and applica-
bility, of these documents.341 
United States caselaw is even more sparse than legal scholarship 
pertaining to the respective informational privacy interests of the 
various participants in collaborative reproduction. The California 
Supreme Court tangentially addressed the issue in 2000 in the con-
text of a discovery dispute.342 Acknowledging that the case 
 
 339 The two principal types of ART are in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) and donor-
assisted artificial insemination (“AID”). See JUDITH DARR, THE NEW EUGENICS: 
SELECTIVE BREEDING IN AN ERA OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 9–13 (2017). 
Together, IVF and AID account for three percent of the births in the United States. 
Id. at 9. AID alone accounts for some 60,000 births annually. Id. at 8.  
 340 See Alvaré, supra note 338, at 1, 42–44 (noting that while interests of chil-
dren warrant consideration in analyzing parents’ rights to elect these alternatives, 
“the effects on children born through collaborative reproduction are, at best, un-
known because so few studies have addressed the topic”); Terra Ziporyn, ‘Artifi-
cial’ Human Reproduction Poses Medical, Social Concerns, 255 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 13, 14 (1986) (describing issues pertaining to donor privacy). 
 341 Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 391 (2012) [hereinafter 
Cahn, The New Kinship]; see Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regu-
lation Without Prohibition, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 261 (2009) (“From the 
inception of artificial insemination, anonymity and secrecy have been the 
norm.”). 
 342 See Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Ct. App. 2000), dis-
approved on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court, 398 P.3d 69 (Cal. 
2017). 
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presented an issue of first impression, the court defined the issue in 
terms of the parties’ respective privacy rights:  
whether parents and their child, conceived by the 
sperm of an anonymous sperm donor, may compel 
the donor's deposition and production of documents 
in order to discover information relevant to their ac-
tion against the sperm bank for selling sperm that [al-
legedly] transmitted [a specific genetic disorder] to 
the child.343 
The court concluded that the “alleged sperm donor” was re-
quired to “submit to a deposition and answer questions, as well as 
produce documents . . . but that his identity should remain undis-
closed to the fullest extent possible.”344 The court reasoned that the 
fertility clinic’s contract with the donor assuring his anonymity con-
flicted with public policy by going “too far in precluding disclosure 
of the donor's identity and related information under all circum-
stances.”345 While the court also recognized the sperm donor’s con-
stitutional “right of privacy in his medical history and his identity,” 
any such right did not preclude the court from compelling his depo-
sition and production of the records requested by the plaintiffs.346 
At least for now, protecting donor anonymity appears to remain 
the default practice in the United States.347 But recent scholarship 
demonstrates that the international trend clearly favors laws that not 
only permit children to access relevant information about their bio-
logical parentage, but also prohibit gamete donors from remaining 
anonymous.348 
 
 343 Id. at 867. 
 344 Id.  
 345 Id. at 873 (emphasis in original).  
 346 Id. at 875 (referring to the right of privacy granted by the California Con-
stitution, which is “broader than the implied federal right to privacy”). 
 347 See Ashley Fetters, Finding the Lost Generation of Sperm Donors, 
ATLANTIC (May 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/ 
2018/05/sperm-donation-anonymous/560588/.  
 348 See Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete 
Donor Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 
291, 292–93, 300 (2013) (explaining that “U.S. law does not prohibit anonymous 
gamete donation”).  
 
2020] FAMILY SECRETS AND RELATIONAL PRIVACY 885 
 
A few U.S. scholars have acknowledged that alternative repro-
ductive technologies implicate the right of relational or family pri-
vacy,349 the boundaries of which are said to be “delineated by the 
countervailing interests of others within the protected relation-
ship.”350 While adopted children face similar personal identity and 
 
Prohibiting gamete donor anonymity is a growing global trend. 
In jurisdictions prohibiting anonymity, egg and sperm donors 
are not anonymous. Instead, typically, when the child reaches 
the age of eighteen he can find out the identity of the egg or 
sperm donor – his genetic parent. The main goal driving the 
movement toward an open identity system are beliefs that chil-
dren need to develop their own identity, and that possession of 
information regarding their genetic origins is crucial for that 
purpose. 
Id. at 299. See generally Maya Sabatello, Disclosure of Gamete Donation in the 
United States, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 29, 29 (2014) (considering whether the 
United States should follow the international trend favoring reversal of the policy 
of anonymity for gamete donors). Countries that bar anonymous gamete donations 
include Austria, Australia (only the states of Victoria, Western Australia, and New 
South Wales), Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, and the United Kingdom. Bernstein, supra, at 300. In Canada, the issue 
has raised controversy about whether gamete donors’ option to remain anony-
mous discriminates against children conceived by artificial insemination by bar-
ring them from knowing their family history and allowing the destruction of rec-
ords that would help identify biological parents. See Vanessa Gruben & Angela 
Cameron, Donor Anonymity in Canada: Assessing the Obstacles to Openness and 
Considering a Way Forward, 54 ALBERTA L. REV. 665, 665 (2017) (“Donor an-
onymity has been hotly debated in Canada.”). See generally Matt Malone, Gamete 
Donor Anonymity in Canada: An Overview of Potential Policy Solutions, 38 
WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 71, 78 (2017). 
 349 See, e.g., Alvaré, supra note 338, at 1, 42–44 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s recognition that constitutional rights of some family members necessarily 
implicate other family members’ interests (citing, among others, Smith v. Org. of 
Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977); Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.4 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973); 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992)). 
 350 Rao, Reconceiving Privacy, supra note 68, at 1106; see Rao, Property, Pri-
vacy, supra note 68, at 399 (“Privacy not only guarantees individuals a certain 
degree of autonomy over their bodies, but it also safeguards the freedom to create 
and maintain intimate and consensual relationships apart from the state.”); Lainie 
M. C. Dillon, Conundrums with Penumbras: The Right to Privacy Encompasses 
Non-Gamete Providers Who Create Preembryos with the Intent to Become Par-
ents, 78 WASH. L. REV. 625, 628 (2003) (arguing that “the constitutional right 
to privacy broadly protects intimate decisions related to procreation, marriage and 
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family history issues, children conceived by ART are born into 
uniquely complex family relationships. They are typically the ge-
netic offspring of one legal parent but not the other, and the child 
also shares a genetic identity with a third-party donor whom the 
child may never know.351  
 
family life,” and therefore “a non-gamete provider's intimate decision to create 
preembryos falls squarely within the zone of privacy protected by the federal 
Constitution”); Lucy R. Dollens,  Artificial Insemination: Right of Privacy and 
the Difficulty in Maintaining Donor Anonymity, 35 IND. L. REV. 213, 223, 227 
(2001) (asserting that because ART conception “occurs within the confines of a 
close and personal association, it is afforded constitutional protection by the [as-
sociational] right of privacy,” and addressing the right of a sperm donor to remain 
anonymous) (citing Johnson, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875); cf. Pamela Laufer-
Ukeles, The Relational Rights of Children, 48 CONN. L. REV. 741, 769 (2016) 
(advocating that “any conception of individualized rights of children that does not 
also consider the interests of parents and society in providing care for children 
does not appropriately reflect the nature of childhood, parent-child relationships, 
and children as rights-holders”; and that “only through a relationship-focused per-
spective can children’s rights be accurately calibrated, and parent and state inter-
ests be appropriately limited”); Susan L. Crockin & Gary A. Debele, Ethical Is-
sues in Assisted Reproduction: A Primer for Family Law Attorneys, 27 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 289, 297 (2015) (noting that, unlike other means of con-
ception, “IVF separates the woman from the conceptus and thus introduces a 
novel element into any discussion of [constitutional] procreative rights”); John A. 
Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 
30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 20 (2004) (noting that reproductive rights are not absolute 
but rather subject to restriction for cause, and that “[r]estricting ARTs might be 
marginally more acceptable [than regulating] coital reproduction,” while ac-
knowledging many disputes about acceptable reasons for banning or restricting 
ART).  
Some legal scholars have addressed the issue from a comparative perspective. 
See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing, Uncer-
tainty, and Donor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1189, 1207 (2010) (analyzing data 
from Sweden, United Kingdom, and Victoria (Australia) as jurisdictions that pro-
hibit anonymity for sperm and egg donors). See generally Andreas S. Voss, The 
Right to Privacy & Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Comparative Study of 
the Law of Germany and the U.S., 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229, 232 
(2002) (comparing United States and Germany law on “the development of the 
right to privacy and its potential to solve new problems caused by modem assisted 
reproductive technologies”).  
 351 See Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the 
Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 959 (1996); see also Vasanti Jadva, 
Why Search for a Sperm Donor Online? The Experiences of Women Searching 
for and Contacting Sperm Donors on the Internet, 21 HUM. FERTILITY 112, 118 
(2018).   
2020] FAMILY SECRETS AND RELATIONAL PRIVACY 887 
 
The dearth of legal scholarship addressing the informational 
rights of ART children is surprising given its clinical use in the 
United States for several decades,352 as well as its increasingly fre-
quent use by prospective parents.353 Artificial insemination was first 
used in the 1950s to assist human procreation, although at first the 
practice was condemned by religious leaders and some judges.354 
ART came into general use for human reproduction in the United 
States in the 1970s, when a “thriving sperm-bank industry” led to 
the “commercialization” of artificial insemination.355 The first “test-
tube baby” conceived by IVF was born in 1978.356 At first, artificial 
insemination was used primarily to allow infertile couples to bear 
children, or to prevent conception of children who would be carriers 
 
 352  See generally JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE 
LAW 26–38 (2d ed. 2013) (summarizing the historical development of ART); 
Kara W. Swanson, Adultery by Doctor: Artificial Insemination, 1890–1945, 87 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 591, 595–62 (2012).  
 353 E.g., Jenna Casolo et al., Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 20 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 313, 354 (2019) (referring to “[t]he increasing popularity and suc-
cess rates of ART”).  
 354 DARR, supra note 339, at 28 (noting that in 1953 researchers reported preg-
nancies using frozen sperm samples) (citing R. Bunge & J. Sherman, Fertilizing 
Capacity of Frozen Human Spermatazoa, 172 NATURE 767 (1953)); CARL 
ZIMMER, SHE HAS HER MOTHER’S LAUGH: THE POWERS, PERVERSIONS, AND 
POTENTIAL OF HEREDITY 502 (2018) (explaining that the Pope declared artificial 
insemination adulterous, and an Illinois judge opined that a child conceived by a 
mother using donor sperm had been born out of wedlock); Hollace S.W. Swan-
son, Donor Anonymity in Artificial Insemination: Is It Still Necessary?, 27 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 151, 157 (1993) (explaining that courts considered 
donor-conceived children “illegitimate” as not born “in wedlock”) (citing Doorn-
bos v. Doornbos, 139 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956)). 
 355 W. Ombelet & J. Van Robays, Artificial Insemination History: Hurdles 
and Milestones, 7 FACTS, VIEWS & VISION OBGYN 137, 142 (2015); see DARR, 
supra note 339, at 5.  
Beginning with the birth of Louise Brown in 1978, the first 
child conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF), assisted re-
production has grown and evolved, becoming an indispensable 
player in contemporary family life. In three-plus decades, ART 
has blossomed from a nascent technology into a multi-billion-
dollar industry responsible for the births of over five million 
children worldwide. 
Id.  
 356 DARR, supra note 339, at 5. 
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of genetic diseases linked to the male sex chromosome.357 More re-
cently, however, it has become more common for single women or 
lesbian couples to conceive children by artificial insemination using 
donor sperm, known in the medical community as AID.358 The field 
of assisted reproduction technology in the United States, in contrast 
to other nations, remains largely unregulated.359 
A comprehensive discussion of the many fascinating privacy is-
sues surrounding ART is beyond the scope of this Article. But Dani 
Shapiro’s personal experience, detailed in Inheritance, illustrates 
how readily accessible DNA profiles stored in commercial data-
bases can reveal long-held family secrets. If and when revealed, 
those secrets have the capacity to dramatically up-end an individ-
ual’s sense of personal identity,360 to potentially raise conflicting 
emotions about predeceased loved ones that can never be re-
solved,361 and to dramatically alter a person’s intimate personal and 
familial relationships.362 On the other hand, her parents’ careful ef-
forts to keep the family secret that a third party might have been her 
biological father effectively prevented both Shapiro and the sperm 
donor from learning intimate information about each other’s iden-
tity, family history, and medical history, and from building a mean-
ingful relationship of their own.  
The story illustrates the inherent complexities of commercial-
ized DNA profiles at a time when family configurations have long 
since exceeded the boundaries of the traditional nuclear family. And 
it poses questions about whether closely held family secrets are 
 
 357 Ombelet & Van Robays, supra note 355, at 137. 
 358 Id. 
 359 See Naomi Cahn, The New “ART” of Family: Connecting Assisted Repro-
ductive Technologies & Identity Rights, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1443, 1447 [herein-
after Cahn, The New “ART”] (“There are few laws in the United States directly 
concerned with donor conception, apart from health and safety regulations relat-
ing to gamete testing and parentage determinations for a donor-conceived child 
or a child born through surrogacy.”); Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 341, at 
386 (“Gamete donation remains a largely private transaction that is handled 
through contract and intention with virtually no substantive regulation.”); Saba-
tello, supra note 348, at 31 (“[A]ssisted reproductive technologies . . . are hardly 
regulated in the United States.”).  
 360 See SHAPIRO, supra note 331, at 60–61. 
 361 See id. at 99–102. 
 362 See id. at 105–09. 
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permanently at risk of inadvertent disclosure, and if so, the potential 
ramifications for individuals and families. 
In the past few years, a growing number of scholars have ques-
tioned the practice of keeping children who have been conceived by 
collaborative reproduction techniques from learning truthful and 
complete information about their families and medical histories.363 
Those who promote full disclosure assert that children have a “right 
to know” the circumstances of their conception, as well as health-
related information about the gamete donors who enabled their con-
ception.364 On the other hand, the United States’ tradition of secrecy 
favors the rights of sperm donors to remain anonymous—also 
known as the right to be forgotten—with respect to search results in 
internet databases.365   
 
 363 See, e.g., Sabatello, supra note 348, at 31; Naomi Cahn, Do Tell! The 
Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2014) 
(“While the basic constitutional parameters support family privacy, respect for 
familial autonomy does not pre-empt the possibilities for reforms affecting donor-
conceived people's interests.”); Pino D’Orazio, Half of the Family Tree: A Call 
for Access to a Full Genetic History for Children Born by Artificial Insemination, 
11 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 249, 276 (2006) (advocating that children con-
ceived by AID should have the legal right to access non-identifying donor infor-
mation pertaining to genetic and medical history); Michele Goodwin, A View from 
the Cradle: Tort Law and the Private Regulation of Assisted Reproduction, 59 
EMORY L.J. 1039, 1099 (2010); Guido Pennings, The Right to Privacy and Access 
to Information About One's Genetic Origins, 20 MED. & L. 1, 13–14 (2001); Sara 
Cotton et al., Model Assisted Reproductive Technology Act, 9 J. GENDER, RACE 
& JUST. 55, 79–80 (2005) (proposing that “[p]arents of a child and the child born 
as a result of assisted reproductive technology shall have unlimited access to non-
identifying information held by the registry about the gamete or embryo donor”). 
 364 See, e.g., Sabatello, supra note 348, at 31; see also Barbara Prainsack, DIY 
Genetics: The Right to Know Your Own Genome, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND 
THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: GENETIC PRIVACY AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 
281, at 100, 104–13 (considering the right to know one’s genomic information 
balanced against the right not to know and the right to be forgotten); Samuel W. 
Royston, The Right to Be Forgotten: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 
48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 253, 254 (2016) (referring to the “‘right to be forgotten’ par-
adox”).  
 365 See Graeme Laurie, Privacy and the Right Not to Know: A Plea for Con-
ceptual Clarity, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: GENETIC 
PRIVACY AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 281, at 38, 38–39 (discussing compa-
rable rights under international law, for example, with respect to an individual’s 
right not to know one’s genetic status); R. Andorno, The Right Not to Know: An 
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The slow but steady trend in the United States appears to be fol-
lowing the lead of many other nations that have recognized the rights 
of donor-conceived children to information about their genetic her-
itage, at least once they reach adulthood.366 For example, the 2017 
Uniform Parentage Act requires clinics to record donor information 
as well to give donors the option of remaining anonymous or allow-
ing disclosure.367 Even if a donor elects anonymity, the clinic must 
make a good faith attempt to provide the child with nonidentifying 
information about the donor, and to notify the donor if the child re-
quests information in order to allow the donor to reconsider the non-
disclosure election.368  
The latest iteration of the Uniform Parentage Act provision was 
apparently modelled after a 2011 Washington state statute, the first 
of its kind in the United States, that expressly permitted a child con-
ceived by artificial insemination to access the donor’s medical in-
formation when the child reached age eighteen, even if the donor 
had opted to remain anonymous.369 The Washington Legislature 
 
Autonomy Based Approach, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 435, 435 (2004) (arguing that 
“‘autonomy’, understood in a wide sense, provides a theoretical basis for a right 
not to know one’s genetic status”); Gitter, supra note 330, at 368  (“In the field of 
biomedical research, the principle of autonomy, or self-determination, suggests 
that each individual has the right not to know selected information about her-
self.”); Bartha Maria Knoppers, Introduction: From the Right to Know to the 
Right Not to Know, 42 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 6, 6 (2014) (“Respect for the auton-
omy of research participants recognizes that all individuals have the right to make 
their own decisions.”). 
      The European Union Court of Justice introduced the “right to be forgotten” in 
interpreting the since-superseded E.U. Data Protection Regulation. Royston, su-
pra note 364, at 256. The right to be forgotten allows an E.U. citizen to petition 
an internet search engine to remove links to personal information that would harm 
one’s reputation. Id. In the European Union, “personal privacy trumps freedom of 
information.” Leslie E. Minora, Comment, U.S. Courts Should Not Let Europe’s 
“Right to Be Forgotten” Force the World to Forget, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 609, 609 
(2017). But in the United States, freedom of expression and the free exchange of 
information generally weigh more heavily in the balance than privacy interests. 
Id. As has been observed, “[E.U.] law highlights the stark value clash between 
freedom of expression in the United States and personal privacy in the EU.” Id. 
 366 See, e.g., Cahn, The New “ART”, supra note 359, at 1447–49 (highlighting 
examples of state legislation regarding donor-identifying information). 
 367 Id. at 1448 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 903). 
 368 Id. (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 903). 
 369 See id. at 1447–48 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.750(2)(b) (2017)). 
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repealed the statute effective January 1, 2018, at the same time it 
enacted the Uniform Parentage Act.370 California371 and Vermont372 
also enacted the Uniform Parentage Act in 2018, and other states 
have since introduced it in bill form.373 
It remains to be seen whether state laws in the United States will 
follow the lead of other nations by providing ART offspring the 
right to obtain health-related information concerning gamete donors. 
D. California Consumer Privacy Protection Act 
On January 1, 2020, a sweeping statute took effect in California 
that addresses the right to informational privacy.374 Specifically, the 
California Consumer Privacy Act375 creates new rights for consum-
ers to control access to and dissemination of the personal infor-
mation businesses collect and maintain about them.376 The Act, 
which reportedly “gives nearly 40 million people in [California] the 
strongest data privacy rights in the country,” was introduced on the 
initiative of Alastair MacTaggart, Founder and Chair of Californians 
for Consumer Privacy.377 MacTaggart did so after several internet 
 
 370 See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.903 (2018); see also Raegen Rasnic, 
State’s Parentage Act Gets Major Makeover, KING COUNTY B. ASS’N (Feb. 1, 
2019), https://www.kcba.org/For-Lawyers/Bar-Bulletin/PostId/690/states-par-
entage-act-gets-major-makeover.  
 371 Cal. A.B. § 2684, ch. 876 (2018). 
 372 Vt. H.B. § 562, Act 162 (2018). 
 373 2017 Parentage Act Enactment Map, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uni-
formlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-
4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 374 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–199 (West, Westlaw current with ur-
gency legislation through Ch. 3 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
 375 Id.  
 376 California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA): Background on the CCPA & 
the Rulemaking Process, CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2020) (soliciting public comments to rule modifications by March 
27, 2020). 
 377 Letter from Alastair Mactaggart, Bd. Chair & Founder of Californians for 
Consumer Privacy (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.caprivacy.org/post/a-letter-
from-alastair-mactaggart-board-chair-and-founder-of-californians-for-consumer-
privacy (reporting that a new and stronger initiative was filed on November 19, 
2019, that is slated to appear on the California general election ballot in November 
2020). As Mactaggart explained,  
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service providers had blocked proposed state legislation that would 
have reigned in the commercial exploitation of users’ personal in-
formation.378   
 
What this new law comes down to is giving consumers the right 
to take back control over their information from thousands of 
giant corporations. This is about power: the more a company 
knows about you, the more power it has to shape your daily life. 
That power is exercised on the spectrum ranging from the be-
nign, such as showing you a shoe ad, to the consequential, like 
selecting your job, your housing, or helping to shape what can-
didate you support in an election. 
Id.; see Letter from Alastair Mactaggart, Bd. Chair & Founder of Californians for 
Consumer Privacy, to Cal. Att’y Gen. Transmitting the Proposed Cal. Privacy 
Rights Act of 2020 (Nov. 4, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initia-
tives/pdfs/19-0021A1%20%28Consumer%20Privacy%20-%20Ver-
sion%203%29_1.pdf.  
 378 The California Consumer Privacy Act defines “personal information” 
broadly:  
“Personal information” means information that identifies, re-
lates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated 
with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with 
a particular consumer or household. Personal information in-
cludes, but is not limited to, the following if it identifies, relates 
to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could be 
reasonably linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular con-
sumer or household:  
(A) Identifiers such as a real name, alias, postal address, unique 
personal identifier, online identifier, Internet Protocol address, 
email address, account name, social security number, driver's 
license number, passport number, or other similar identifiers. 
(B) Any categories of personal information described in subdi-
vision (e) of Section 1798.80. 
(C) Characteristics of protected classifications under California 
or federal law. 
(D) Commercial information, including records of personal 
property, products or services purchased, obtained, or consid-
ered, or other purchasing or consuming histories or tendencies. 
(E) Biometric information. 
(F) Internet or other electronic network activity information, in-
cluding, but not limited to, browsing history, search history, and 
information regarding a consumer’s interaction with an internet 
web site, application, or advertisement. 
(G) Geolocation data. 
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The Act authorizes the California Attorney General to adopt reg-
ulations after seeking public comment.379 As this Article went to 
press, the proposed regulations have been published for notice and 
comment.380 Among other things, the regulations would bar a busi-
ness from using personal information for any purpose other than 
those the business disclosed to the consumer at the time of collecting 
the data.381 In addition, a consumer would have the right to “opt out” 
from the sale of the consumer’s personal information,382 to know 
what kind of personal information a business collects and main-
tains,383 and to request deletion of the consumer’s personal infor-
mation.384 
 
(H) Audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar in-
formation. 
(I) Professional or employment-related information. 
(J) Education information, defined as information that is not 
publicly available personally identifiable information as de-
fined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20 
U.S.C. Sec. 1232g; 34 C.F.R. Part 99). 
(K) Inferences drawn from any of the information identified in 
this subdivision to create a profile about a consumer reflecting 
the consumer's preferences, characteristics, psychological 
trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abili-
ties, and aptitudes. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (emphasis added). Certainly, this definition ap-
pears to be sufficiently broad to encompass genetic information, at least to the 
extent it implicates relational privacy interests of individuals who reside within 
the same “household” as the individual whose “personal” information has been 
collected and maintained by a business. See id. 
 379 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(a) (“On or before July 1, 2020, the Attorney 
General shall solicit broad public participation and adopt regulations to further the 
purposes of this title, including, but not limited to, the following areas . . . .”); see 
also California Attorney General Publishes Privacy Regulations, Seeks Public 
Comment, EPIC.ORG (Feb. 11, 2020), https://epic.org/2020/02/california-attorney-
general-pu.html. 
 380 See California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA): Background on the CCPA 
& the Rulemaking Process, supra note 376 (soliciting public comments to rule 
modifications by Mar. 27, 2020). 
 381 Chapter 20. California Consumer Privacy Act Regulations: Text of Initial 
Proposed Regulations, CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/ag-
web/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-proposed-regs.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (to be cod-
ified at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.305(a)(3)). 
 382 Id. (to be codified at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.306). 
 383 Id. (to be codified at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.308(b)(1)). 
 384 Id. (to be codified at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.308(b)(2)).  
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It remains to be seen whether other states will follow Califor-
nia’s lead by enacting state statutes that regulate the collection, 
maintenance, and retention of personal and relational information. 
Even more speculative is how future courts may interpret and apply 
state privacy statutes to address the increasingly complex relational 
privacy issues generated by digitized “personal” information.  
E. European Union General Data Privacy Regulation  
 The General Data Privacy Regulation (“GDPR”),385 which 
took effect on May 25, 2018,386 has global implications for informa-
tional privacy, even for businesses headquartered outside the Euro-
pean Union. It implements the European Union Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, which expressly provides that E.U. citizens have the 
right to “the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”387 
While the GDPR does not apply directly to U.S. citizens, its broad 
privacy protections govern any internet service provider that reaches 
E.U. citizens. Because so many technology-oriented businesses with 
a global reach operate outside the European Union, the GDPR indi-
rectly benefits citizens of the United States and other countries.388 
 
 385 GDPR, supra note 13. 
 386 See Gergana Sivrieva, The Equifax Breach Amid a Lawless Landscape: 
Changes Are Afoot for Privacy & Data Security Due to the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 553, 562–63 (2018) 
(summarizing the GDPR). “In every category, the GDPR exhibits provisions that 
are substantially more favorable to EU consumers than the protections offered to 
consumers by U.S. statutes.” Id.  
 387 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 
2000 O.J. (C 364) 10. 
1.  Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data con-
cerning him or her. 
2.  Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes 
and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some 
other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right 
of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3.  Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority. 
Id. art. 8.  
 388  “The GDPR gives EU data subjects legal control and individual redress 
rights related to access and use of their data anywhere in the world.” 3 ROBERT L. 
HAIG, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 27:37 (4th ed. 
2019).  
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But even the far-reaching GDPR raises serious issues about re-
lational privacy interests because of its restrictive definition of “per-
sonal data.” That definition is couched in terms that relate to a “data 
subject,” which is defined in turn to mean an “identifiable natural 
person.”389 
‘[P]ersonal data’ means any information relating to 
an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data sub-
ject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can 
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identifi-
cation number, location data, an online identifier or 
to one or more factors specific to the physical, phys-
iological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or so-
cial identity of that natural person . . . .390 
European scholars have already called for reform by redefining 
the meaning of “data subject” to recognize the broad implications of 
digital data-sharing—not  only for individuals, but also for family 
members, biological relatives, and even members of the same racial, 
ethnic, or population group as the “data subject.”391  
CONCLUSION       
The “relational” right of privacy needs a much sounder footing 
in U.S. constitutional, statutory, and common law. As articulated 
and defined by U.S. scholars and jurists since the early twentieth 
century, relational privacy interests have been unduly limited to a 
shared desire to protect grieving family members from suffering fur-
ther emotional distress as a result of disclosing information pertain-
ing to the death of their loved ones.392    
 
 389 GDPR, supra note 13, art. 4(1) (defining “personal data”). See generally 
P.T.J. Wolters, The Enforcement by the Data Subject Under the GDPR, 22 J. 
INTERNET L. 21 (2019); P.T.J. Wolters, The Control by and Rights of the Data 
Subject Under the GDPR, 22 J. INTERNET L. 6, 12–13 (2018). 
 390 GDPR, supra note 13, art. 4(1). 
 391 See generally, e.g., Ugo Pagallo, The Group, the Private, and the Individ-
ual: A New Level of Data Protection?, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF 
DATA TECHNOLOGIES 159 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds., 2017).  
 392 See supra Part II. 
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The American Law Institute will have the opportunity to clarify 
these issues in developing the next installment of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts. But Congress and state legislatures will need to re-
visit the disclosure exemptions in FOIA and related state statutes 
that allow agencies to withhold public records from disclosure to 
protect “unwarranted invasions of personal privacy.”393 The tradi-
tional meaning of “personal privacy,” the term Congress employed 
in FOIA exemptions to support a balancing test, relates to a right 
that belongs to a living individual.394 Surviving family members 
who desire protection from mental anguish as a result of disclosing 
records pertaining to the death of their loved ones seek to prevent a 
“relational wrong”395—but one that implicates interests in prevent-
ing infliction of emotional distress, not invasion of personal privacy.  
The dramatic ongoing developments in mapping the human ge-
nome and collecting and disseminating genetic data demand that le-
gal scholars and policymakers revisit relational privacy concepts 
with respect to burgeoning DNA biobanks. The increasing accessi-
bility of genetic data, unlike most medical and health care data, 
raises complex privacy issues. Those issues not only require balanc-
ing the interests of the individual against the needs of the public, but 
also the sometimes conflicting interests of other family members.396 
To date, social values have generally favored the collection and dis-
semination of genetic data to enable medical research for the “public 
good.” But little attention has focused on the serious risks to group 
and family privacy of unregulated collection, use, and dissemination 
of genomic data.397  
 
 393 See supra Part III. 
 394 See supra Part III. 
 395 Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 423 S.W.3d 548, 549, 553 
(Ark. 2012). 
 396 See, e.g., PATRICIA KUSZLER ET AL., GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES AND THE 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 78–79 (2007). “[U]nlike much of a patient’s medi-
cal history, the implications of genetic information are simultaneously uniquely 
personal and necessarily familial. This ‘dual ownership’ aspect of genetic infor-
mation poses unique challenges for physicians as they attempt to reconcile com-
peting duties to safeguard patient confidentiality and promote the welfare of oth-
ers.” Id.  
 397 See, e.g., Clayton et al., supra note 220, at 5.  
Each person’s genome, or full complement of DNA, is unique, 
but the specific variants within an individual’s genome may be 
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These complex legal and policy issues warrant further attention 
as legislatures and other policymakers confront competing legal in-
terests of those whose rights are implicated by the widespread col-
lection and sharing of genetic information. This Article seeks to 
open the long-overdue scholarly debate in the United States about 
how best to resolve these challenging public policy issues and their 
implications for family relationships. The genealogical genie has es-
caped from the bottle, and we have no time to waste.398  
Finally, the United States can no longer avoid these far-reaching 
global privacy issues, which are growing more complex by the mi-
nute with the rapid development of digitized information technol-
ogy. The U.S. Supreme Court should expressly recognize a consti-
tutionally-based right to relational information privacy—rather than 
ducking the issue by attempting to ground those rights in circular 
reasoning based on explicit privacy-based FOIA exemptions. And 
legal scholars around the world, together with international human 
rights tribunals, must work collaboratively on cross-border legisla-
tive solutions to what has become a global relational privacy chal-
lenge.  
 
 
 
widely shared with biological relatives or even across the entire 
human population. This mixed character of the genome—as a 
uniquely individual assemblage of widely shared common ele-
ments—imbues it with a dual private and public significance 
that confounds any discussion of policy addressing genetic pri-
vacy.  
Id. at 2. 
 398 See Rothman, supra note 299 (“We’re up against a pretty big foe and time 
is running out”) (quoting Cullen Hoback, director of the 2013 documentary film 
Terms and Conditions May Apply). 
